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ABSTRACT
CLINTON’S FOREIGN POLICY
AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION:
CASES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Daneta G. Billau
Old Dominion University, 2002
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty

This dissertation examines the sources of U.S. President Bill Clinton’s foreign
policy, with special attention to understudied political elements o f intervention. The
basis of this study is the Clinton Doctrine, in which Clinton opposed ethnic cleansing,
and supported democratic governance worldwide. The primary research question asks to
what extent and why was there a variation in Clinton’s application o f his own doctrine in
the specific cases of Rwanda in 1994, Haiti in 1994, and East Timor in 1999. To address
this question, the following five hypotheses are posited:
H i:

The more vital interests are at stake, and the closer the United States is to the
crisis, the more the president will push for intervention. Conversely, the more
peripheral interests are at stake, and the more distant the United States is from the
crisis, the less the president will push for intervention.

H2:

The more a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the less the president will intervene.
Conversely, the less a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the more the president will
intervene.

H3:

The more the United Nations is likely to call for intervention, the more the United
States is likely to support it.

H4 :

The more the U.S. Congress is likely to call for intervention, the more the
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president will intervene. Conversely, the more the U.S. Congress is likely to
oppose intervention, the less the president will intervene.
H5 :

The more the media opposes the president’s policy, the more public opinion will
engage during crisis, and the more cautious the president will be regarding
intervention. Conversely, the more the media endorses the president’s policy, the
less public opinion will engage during crisis, and the less cautious the president
will be regarding intervention.

These hypotheses pertain to the five variables examined, including support for
intervention from international allies, the United Nations, the U.S. Congress, U.S. public
opinion and the media, and U.S. interests under the Clinton administration.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the apparent contradiction between President Clinton’s
foreign policy discourse (stated as a “doctrine”) and his policies, by focusing on
international and domestic politics during times o f crisis, to examine pressure placed on
the president to implement particular foreign policy regarding intervention. Intervention
covers a broad array o f actions, including the use o f military force, humanitarian
assistance, economic or financial sanctions or incentives, diplomatic or political
negotiations, and inaction. In this dissertation, the focus is placed specifically on military
intervention. This examination considers events in Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor during
the 1990s.
This dissertation is important for four reasons. First, presidential doctrines lend
credence to foreign policy because they provide direction and momentum, and they
explain that direction. It is important for each president to assert distance from his
predecessors. Doctrines are a tool for doing this, because they tell the world the course
that will be set by the leaders who articulate them. Second, presidential doctrine clarifies
where the president places value. Doctrines are important strategically because they help
communicate intent. During the cold war, for example, doctrines repeated variations o f
the message that the United States would contain communist expansion, even if that
meant using military power. Third, presidential rhetoric gives clues to upcoming

The format for this dissertation follow s current style requirements o f The Chicago M anual o f Style: The
Essential G uide f o r Writers, Editors, and Publishers, 14th ed. (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press,
1993).
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decisions . 1 Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski explained, “if
doctrines capture the essence o f a challenge and formulate a response that is
geostrategically coherent, they have a lasting effect . ” 2 The containment doctrine endured
for fifty years during the cold war. Fourth, the Clinton Doctrine is an expression of
humanitarian ideals not expressed in previous doctrines. Therefore, the Clinton Doctrine
provides an example of unprecedented intent to end ethnic violence against innocent
civilians around the world, even though such a doctrine could violate laws o f sovereignty.
Thus, presidential doctrine is an important indicator o f long-term foreign policy direction
that merits study. The following historical examples demonstrate the lasting nature of
presidential doctrines.
After Word War II, the United States provided aid to Greece and Turkey to
bolster their efforts to contain the aspirations o f the Soviet empire. When then-president
Harry Truman went to Congress to ask for that aid, he established the Truman Doctrine,
arguing that it “must be the policy o f the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures . ” 3 The
Truman Doctrine initiated and shaped foreign policy toward the containment of
Communism that lasted throughout the cold war.
Richard Nixon became president after the strain o f the Vietnam W ar ended the
political career of his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson. Nixon recognized that the United
States could not sustain extended engagement in too many overseas commitments. As a

1. See Clark D. Edwards, “Predicting Presidential D ecision Making from Presidential Language and
Mass Media Reportage,” P residen tial Studies Q uarterly 25, no. 1 (1995): 4 3 -6 6 .
2. Quoted in Bob Davis, “Pledging a ‘Clinton Doctrine’ for Foreign Policy Creates Concerns for
Adversaries and A llies A like,” The Wall S treet Journal, 6 August 1999, A 12 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/
asp/publib/story/asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).
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result, the Nixon Doctrine established that the United States would help those countries
that helped themselves. The Nixon Doctrine branched out from strict containment policy
to embrace a more flexible stance on resolving conflict abroad. It did this through the
application of third-party politics, such as “Vietnamization,” in which the United States
supplemented and replaced U.S. soldiers in the field with those o f a host country, thereby
limiting costs of foreign conflict.
The Carter Doctrine came in the wake o f the Iranian revolution and the 1979
Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan. The Carter Doctrine pronounced that the United States
would intervene unilaterally and militarily to protect its vital interests in the oil-rich
Persian Gulf. The Carter Doctrine maintained the momentum o f cold war Communist
containment, and foreshadowed the eventual Persian G ulf war.
The Reagan Doctrine pronounced a return to Manichean foreign policy for
containment o f the “evil empire” in the developing world. The Reagan Doctrine stated
that the United States “must not break faith— on every continent from Afghanistan to
Nicaragua—to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours from
birth . ” 4 The Reagan Doctrine was more sweeping than earlier containment doctrines,
because it was not confined to Europe.
As these examples show, presidential doctrines should set the tone o f foreign
policy decisions during a given administration. The Truman, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan
doctrines demonstrate that for fifty years, cold war doctrines remained deeply rooted in
anti-communist rhetoric and sentiment that served to divide the East from the West. The

3. Quoted in Mary Beth Norton, David M. Katzman, Paul D. Escott, Howard P. Chudacoff, Thomas
G. Patterson, and William M. Tuttle, Jr., A P eople an d a Nation: A H istory o f the U nited States, 3rd ed.
(Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company, 1990), 826.
4. Ronald Reagan, Weekly Com pilation o f P residential D ocum ents 21, no. 6, 11 February 1985, 146.
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Clinton Doctrine evolved, as do most presidential doctrines, from those seeking to
understand the direction of the president’s foreign policy, rather than from an explicit
announcement by the president himself. Charting a new course was not simple in the
early years after the end of the cold war, and Clinton had to make many hard choices . 5 In
the post-cold war era, Clinton had the rare opportunity to define the course o f foreign
policy at a time when the slate had been washed clean. As the first post-cold war
president, Clinton had within his grasp the power to form foreign policy at a critical
juncture in American history, when world politics was adjusting to tremendous and
unsettling shifts in the international geopolitical balance. Therefore, the Clinton
administration was selected for this study for one overarching but very profound reason:
Clinton was the first post-cold war president with an opportunity to set the pace, tone,
and agenda for U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future.
The end o f the cold war ushered in a new era and along with it, new post-cold war
rhetoric. Jim Kuypers explains that the post-cold war approach needed fresh new rhetoric
to replace that of the outdated cold war containment-based rhetoric . 6 Rhetoric could no
longer be founded in communist containment, and under Clinton, there was a return to
moralistic rhetoric, justifying intervention on humanitarian laws, norms, and principles.
This new rhetoric eventually led to what would be termed the Clinton Doctrine.
Glimmers o f a future Clinton Doctrine began to take shape as early as his presidential
campaign. In a campaign speech on 1 October 1992, Clinton noted that since

5. Difficult ethical choices regarding humanitarian actions are discussed in the collection o f essays,
see Jonathan Moore, ed., H ard Choices: M oral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
6. Jim A. Kuypers, P residential Crisis Rhetoric and the P ress in the P o st-C o ld War W orld (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1997).
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democracies do not go to war against one another, democracy abroad helps protect
Americans at home . 7 Clinton termed this speech “one o f the two most important
speeches o f his presidential campaign.” The other was about the economy . 8
Clinton stood at the threshold o f a changed international order. The post-cold war
world had filled with “teacup wars , ” 9 and theory held that increasing the number of
democratic states would reduce war, and increase stability. As the leader o f the only
world superpower, Clinton could grasp the opportunity to define the nature o f the
international environment, and could thereby shape a world in which the United States
would prosper . 1 0 In this regard, Clinton went on record on 23 March 1999, saying “I
want us to live in a world where we get along with each other, with all o f our differences,
and where we don’t have to worry about seeing scenes every night for the next 40 years
of ethnic cleansing in some part o f the world . ”

11

Clearly, he envisioned a world

environment where peaceful relations as well as basic human rights could prosper, and at
least rhetorically, he was willing to use force to make that happen.
Clinton turned to democratic enlargement and the strengthening o f international
institutions as methods for stabilizing security in the international system. Democratic
enlargement speaks to the very essence o f why we study international relations: how to
overcome anarchy. Democratic enlargement is rooted in the democratic peace thesis,
which posits that democracies do not go to war against one another. Clinton’s early

7. See A. M. Rosenthal, “On M y Mind: The Clinton Doctrine,” New York Times, 6 October 1992,
23A.
8. Paul Gigot, “Clinton Doctrine? China and Bosnia W ill Offer Clues,” The W all Street Journal, 20
November 1992, A 14 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).
9. Leslie Gelb, “Quelling the Teacup Wars: The N ew World’s Constant Challenge,” F oreign Affairs
73, no. 6 (1994): 2 -6 .
10. Hegemonic theory suggests that the nature o f the system hegemon determines the nature o f the
system. Thus, if the United States wants a benevolent system, it must use benevolent measures to shape it.
11. Charles Krauthammer, “The Clinton Doctrine,” Time 153, no. 13, 5 April 1999, 88.
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foreign policy emphasized strengthened international systemic constraints to provide
stability in a U.S.-dominated post-cold war world. Therefore, the Clinton administration
started out supporting democracy under the umbrella o f a strengthened United Nations,
because such institutions provide legitimate authority for intervention in the internal
affairs of sovereign countries. To bolster international stability, the Clinton
administration supported democratic enlargement, as exemplified in the case study o f
Haiti, where Clinton demonstrated a willingness to use force to restore democracy and
promote regional stability. W ithout the legitimacy provided by international institutions
such as the United Nations, these interventions would be tantamount to invasion and
declaration o f war.
Clinton’s early support o f international organizations was called “assertive
multilateralism” in his campaign speeches. Clinton’s efforts to strengthen the UN were
demonstrated as early as April 1992, when the United States advocated a UN Rapid
Deployment Force . 12 The United States indicated that it was prepared to incorporate the
UN into its foreign policy in a serious manner, despite the fact that Congress increasingly
criticized the UN, especially concerning contributions. For example, when Madeleine
Albright became UN Ambassador, she spoke o f the UN being “poised to take a central
and positive role for peace . ”

13

Shortly thereafter, she embarked upon the policy of

12. See Ivo H. Daalder, “Knowing When to Say NO: The Developm ent o f U .S. Policy for
Peacekeeping,” in U N P eacekeeping, Am erican Politics, and U ncivil Wars o f the 1990s, ed. William J.
Durch (N ew York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 41.
13. Quote from M adeleine K. Albright, “Statement at Confirmation Hearing o f U.S. Ambassador to
the United N ations,” 23 January 1993, U.S. D epartm ent o f State D ispatch 4, no. 15 (1993): 229.
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assertive multilateralism, indicating that a renewed American interest in the United
Nations would be “more than a short-term fad . ” 14
In response to the pivotal events of 3 October 1993 in Somalia that culminated
with the humiliation o f U.S. troops, Clinton altered his foreign policy strategy from
multilateralism to “limited engagement. ” 15 The U.S. Marines arrived on the beaches of
Mogadishu, Somalia in December 1992, in what started out under the Bush
administration as a U.S.-led humanitarian operation, but became a nation-building
mission in May 1993 under Clinton. The U.S. commitment in Somalia ended with the
tragic deaths o f eighteen U.S. Army Rangers on 3 and 4 October 1993.16 The highly
publicized images o f U.S. troops fighting and dying in Somalia shocked America. For
fear o f a public backlash, Clinton reduced the mission mandate to humanitarian
assistance only, and ordered U.S. forces to withdraw from Somalia within six months.
Thus, warlord General Mohamed Farah Aideed defeated the United States and
demonstrated that it could be frightened away by a public display o f killing U.S. soldiers.
Until Somalia, the United States had lacked explicit policy guidelines on
participation in peacekeeping missions, but this changed quickly. Three pivotal speeches
took place after the Somalia debacle. First, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright raised
several tough questions at the National Defense University to qualify the types of
conditions that should be present before the United States should consider intervention.
Second, Clinton criticized the UN’s over-commitment, saying that “if the American

14. M adeleine K. Albright, “Myths o f Peacekeeping,” Statement before the Subcommittee on
International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights o f the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 24 June 1993, U.S. D epartm ent o f State D ispatch 4, no. 26 (1993): 4 6 4 -7 .
15. Heinz A.J. Kern, “The Clinton Doctrine: A N ew Foreign Policy,” The Christian Science M onitor,
18 June 1 9 9 3 ,1 9 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).
16. For a policy discussion o f the lessons from Somalia, see Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst,
“Somalia and the Future o f Humanitarian Intervention,” F oreign Ajfairs 75, no. 2 (1996): 7 0 -8 5 .
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people are to say ‘yes’ to UN peacekeeping, then the United Nations must know when to
say ‘no . ’ ”

17

Third, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake addressed Johns Hopkins

University and reminded the world that “multilateralism is a means, not an end,” and that
it is “one of the many foreign policy tools at our disposal . ” 1 8 These speeches were
widely understood as a foreign policy reassessment.
As a direct response to events in Somalia, Clinton not only withdrew troops, but
also completely reformulated peacekeeping guidelines initiated in April 1993. These
guidelines would soon become known as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25).
PDD 25 was an attempt to deal quickly with the loss o f American troops in Somalia,
before political rivals could use the opportunity to make it more damaging and politically
costly for Clinton. The debacle in Mogadishu immediately created a backlash in
Congress against participation in UN peacekeeping operations altogether. The Somalia
debacle forced the Clinton administration to take a more restrictive line on UN peace
operations in general, and an even tougher position on U.S. involvement in these
missions. Thus, the PDD 25 was the administration’s major policy response to the
Somalia humiliation, in an effort to prevent a public backlash against the use o f American
forces in UN missions.
The shift in policy was profound. During May 1994, Clinton’s budget requests
found little support in Congress. Moreover, Congress had become staunchly opposed to
paying UN peacekeeping dues, and made such payments conditional on UN reform.
From the American perspective, the UN could no longer be considered a tool for serious

17. Quoted in Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Clarifying the Clinton Doctrine,” The Los Angeles Times, 4
October 1993, A 19 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story/asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).
18. Quoted in Kirkpatrick, “Clarifying the Clinton Doctrine.”
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foreign policy issues because of leadership and managerial inefficiency, not to mention
an unruly membership. This stance would come back to haunt the Clinton
administration, however, because Madeleine Albright, then Ambassador to the UN,
delayed and blocked UN peacekeeping measures in Rwanda. Meanwhile, the UN
Secretariat and member states, to varying degrees, considered the United States
irresponsible, because it made payment on already outstanding dues conditional on
reform.
Officially issued in May 1994, PDD 25 announced new limits on U.S.
commitment to peacekeeping, as well as the administration’s intention to seek reform o f
UN peace operations . 19 From this point on, if ground troops would be inserted into
ongoing civil conflict, then the United States would not deploy them for UN
peacekeeping missions. Most broadly, PDD 25 “signaled a complete reversal o f
Clinton’s earlier declarations and returned foreign policy to the Republican, WeinbergerPowell doctrine o f extreme caution and non-support for international peacekeeping
operations . ” 2 0 Robert Worth writes that the establishment o f a “Clinton Doctrine” of
limited intervention forced the military to adjust to “a steady diet o f small-scale
interventions . ” 21 While Clinton’s foreign policy did not require significant reforms at the
Pentagon, Clinton was content, according to Professor Eliot Cohen, as long as the
military “did not make headlines or get him into trouble . ” 2 2

19. For the unclassified Executive Summary o f the directive, see White House, “The Clinton
Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PD D 25),” Annex One, U SU N P ress
Release, 5 May 1994, 74.
20. M ichael G. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f US P eacekeeping P o licy under Clinton: A Fairweather
F riend (London: Frank Cass, 2000), vii.
21. Robert Worth, “Clinton’s Warriors: The Interventionists,” W orld P olicy Journal 15, no. 1 (1998)*
43.
22. Eliot Cohen quoted in ibid., 48.
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Upon deeper examination, policy variation under Clinton shows that he was in
fact cautious in forging policy. Clinton said, in a 14 September 1994 speech, that he
wanted to promote democracy abroad and that this was in the U.S. interest. His objective
over three years was to “make sure that the military dictators leave power and that the
democratically elected government is returned.”

93

Despite clear signs that the Clinton administration was pulling back from its
initial statements supporting assertive multilateralism, confusion remained on what
exactly the Clinton Doctrine was. For example, in December 1997, the doctrine was said
to involve “avoiding war but using American troops in modest numbers in many places to
create space for democracy (as in Haiti) or to keep warring factions from fighting again
(in Bosnia ) . ” 2 4 A few days later, another article pointed to “geoeconomics” and domestic
special-interest groups as the roots o f the Clinton Doctrine

25

In June 1999, President Clinton helped clarify the Clinton Doctrine when he said,
“If somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because o f
their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it,
•

96

we will stop it.”

For some, this overarching goal looked like a recipe for inaction.

99

Moreover, the goal itself was established with such clauses as “if it is in our power,”
thereby making the policy a rhetorical device, rather than a tool for action. As a result,
Clinton has been accused o f operating in an “ad hoc” fashion that led to the “reality o f

23. W illiam J. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Haiti,” Weekly Com pilation o f Presidential
D ocuments 30, no. 38, 18 September 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgibin...D =56249622997+
1 l+0+0& W AISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
24. E.J. Dionne, Jr., “The Clinton Doctrine,” The Washington P ost, 26 December 1997, A29
(http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2001).
25. Robert A. Manning and Patrick Clawson, “The Clinton Doctrine,” The Wall Street Journal, 29
December 1997, A 10 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2001).
26. D avis, “Pledging a ‘Clinton Doctrine.’”
27. For a critique o f the breadth o f the Clinton Doctrine, see Krauthammer, “The Clinton Doctrine.”
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inconsistency . ” 2 8 By relying on a number o f case studies, this dissertation seeks to clarify
this seeming inconsistency.
Placing each case study in the context o f the Clinton Doctrine is meaningful
because it highlights differences between policy launched and policy implemented during
the Clinton administration. As shown at the outset o f this chapter, rhetoric emanating
from the White House during times o f international crisis should echo the doctrine
announced by the president. Any policy departure away from doctrinal logic should be
an indicator that there were other, more compelling factors. In this study, the Clinton
Doctrine is the yardstick against which foreign policy decisions and implementation are
measured. This study seeks to establish why extreme variations in the Clinton foreign
policy occurred.
The three case studies introduced in this dissertation examine the uneven
application of the Clinton Doctrine in Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor. This examination
clarifies the doctrine by exploring the administration’s actions as well as the explanations
it offered for its policy. Although the end o f ethnic cleansing was the fundamental goal
o f the Clinton Doctrine, that goal was not consistently pursued. This is seen particularly
in the case of genocide in Rwanda, where the United States was unwilling to risk
deploying ground troops to protect peripheral interests such as ending ethnic violence.
Chapter II lays out the literature regarding foreign policy and intervention.
Chapter III puts forward the dissertation research design, and provides the methodology
for examining the hypotheses against three specific case studies, which are instrumental

28.
Arnold Kanter, “Memorandum to the President,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a
Workable D octrine, ed. Alton Frye (N ew York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), 1.
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in discovering how, and more importantly, why Clinton’s foreign policy appeared
inconsistent with his rhetoric.
Chapters IV, V, and VI consist o f case studies o f crises in Rwanda, Haiti, and
East Timor. The three case studies represent international crises, in which the U.S. policy
on intervention addressed issues such as humanitarian aid, ethnic cleansing, or
democratic governance. Chapter IV examines the case o f ethnic cleansing in Rwanda in
1994, when the United States selected a humanitarian aid-only policy. Chapter V
analyzes the U.S. diplomatic and military intervention in Haiti in 1994, focusing on
democratic governance. Chapter VI considers U.S. non-intervention in 1999 in East
Timor, where the United States remained on the sidelines despite the failure o f
democratic reforms. These three case studies demonstrate conflicting policy choices, and
bring to bear the research question: to what extent and why was there a variation in
Clinton’s foreign policy relative to the Clinton Doctrine. All case studies are similarly
arranged around five specific variables: the United Nations, U.S. allies, the U.S.
Congress, U.S. public opinion and the media, and U.S. interests.
The final chapter in this dissertation brings together findings from the three case
studies. It draws on similarities and differences in the findings to formulate a framework
for understanding why and how Clinton apparently failed to consistently implement the
Clinton Doctrine.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE ON FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERVENTION

The literature on foreign policy and intervention contains several fields o f study
that portray different approaches to the debate over when, whether, how, where, and why
to intervene. These include philosophy, law, theory, military operations, and foreign
policy. The following section frames this debate from each perspective, and concludes
by explaining how this dissertation fits into such a diverse body o f literature.

PHILOSOPHY AND INTERVENTION
The philosophical discourse on intervention examines the fundamental moral and
ethical essence o f what it means for an actor to take steps to alter a situation in another
country, in which that actor was not originally involved. There are proponents and
opponents of intervention who base their arguments along the lines o f just war or
pacifism . 1 Richard Haass presents these schools o f thought along Christian and legal
norms . 2 In general, both the just war and pacifism are defensive measures.
Just war assumes that individuals are left to negotiate the struggle to survive
under conditions where there is no grand arbitrator and where attempts to mitigate
anarchy have failed. Anarchy is conducive to a general state o f war, because there is no
government, law, police, or sense o f community. A just war is waged as a last resort by a

1. See Robert L. Phillips and Duane L. Cady, Humanitarian Intervention: Just War vs. Pacifism
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
2. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use o f A m erican M ilitary F orce in the P o st-C o ld War World,
rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).
3. Michael Walzer gives extensive theory o f just intervention in Just a n d Unjust Wars: A M oral
Argument with H istorical Illustrations (N ew York: Basic Books, 1997).
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legitimate authority for a worthy cause, is expected to achieve success with the use of
appropriate force, and respects the welfare o f non-combatants.
This approach to intervention assumes that in the fight for survival, groups
develop that share a common bond o f similar values, norms, and principles. One value,
for example, is that everyone has the basic and undeniable right to self-defense. By
banding together in large groups with similar belief structures, people can live together
without constant existential threat. An outgrowth o f the concept that man has the
undeniable right to self-defense extends to and justifies the idea o f national sovereignty,
because even larger groups band together within a specified territory that is defensible
and demarcated. Therefore, common morality within groups is a precursor for cultural
differences between groups, which justify the establishment and defense o f sovereign
nations that are founded in the principle o f non-interference. This calls to mind Samuel
Huntington’s classic work regarding the eventual conflict between seven major
civilizations that disagree on what is just and unjust. 4 Conflict operates similar to
tectonic plates that move against one another, generating friction in the process.
When combined, morality and sovereignty lead to the idea o f just intervention as
a means to protect given groups or nations. Intervention, in this view, is necessary when
a system is corrupted to the point that survival is so threatened as to make it morally
retrograde not to intervene to safeguard life and rights. James Mayall builds on this
point, arguing that international institutions reflect progress in cultural and human
understanding. This is because it is now possible for the UN Security Council, which
derives legitimacy and authority from the international community, to intervene in civil

4.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f the W orld O rder (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
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conflicts “to protect the victims o f sustained human rights abuse, even when the
perpetrators were their own governments . ” 5 At this point, military intervention to stop
ethnic cleansing is not only appropriate, but also justified, necessary, and responsible
based on international values. In this line o f thinking, it was the responsibility o f the
international community to intervene in Rwanda to stop genocide.
The opposing view to the just war is the pacifist perspective on intervention.
Pacifism stems from the concept that countries wish to influence the development or
internal fabric o f other countries and can do so without the use o f military force. Along
the lines of pacifism, there are those who support non-violent intervention—which is to
say that they oppose the use o f force in general. 6 There are various approaches to the
concept o f non-violent intervention, including various forms o f aid and assistance
programs, as well as diplomatic intervention to protect human rights. In a nutshell, non
violent intervention consists of methods o f persuasion other than the use of military force
(such as visiting mediators, transnational broadcasting), and economic activity (such as
investment or sanctions). David Baldwin’s work on economic statecraft explains many
forms o f economic political and diplomatic persuasion . 7 An example is positive and
negative sanctions that are low-risk and low-cost to implement. While the jury is still out
regarding levels o f success enjoyed by sanctions, they are nonetheless important forms of
peaceful intervention and should not be ignored.
Economic expansion based on trade is another example o f non-violent

5. James Mayall, W orld P olitics: Progress and its Limits (Cambridge: Polity, 2000). Mayall builds
on Josef Joffe’s four criteria for intervention, including moral imperative, national interest, chances o f
success, and domestic support. See Josef Joffe, “The N ew Europe, Yesterday’s Ghosts,” Foreign Affairs
72, no. 1 (1992/93): 33.
6. Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Thomas Weber, eds., N onviolent Intervention across Borders: A
Recurrent Vision (Honolulu: University o f Hawaii, 2000).
7. See David Baldwin, Econom ic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
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intervention. It is intervention because it crosses national boundaries and brings change
to the receiving country. For example, expanding a domestic economy into a porous
target economy gains access and influence for the country o f origin, making slow, less
noticed change in the target country . 8 Economic expansion by liberal democracies brings
cultural and social changes in the target country, and generates a process o f liberal
democratic socialization o f sorts . 9 Here, economic expansion would bring stability by
improving the standard o f living in less wealthy places, thereby allowing the growth of
liberal capitalism and an acceptable system for political unity. Stability is derived from
the fact that once a standard of living has been improved, no one wants it to drop.
This raises a problem with pacifism though, because as economic expansion
proceeds, receiving countries often become increasingly dependent on continued
economic interaction for a sustained and improved standard o f living. The more recipient
countries become dependent on economic aid, foreign investment, or trade, the more
vulnerable they are to shocks in the system. For example, when the Thai Baht fell in
1997-98, the banks in Indonesia collapsed and virtually wiped out the assets o f the
middle class. People took to the streets, creating turmoil that forced the government to
step down. To restore order, Indonesia resorted to force. Thus, pacifists ignore that a
potential consequence o f economic expansion could be the use o f force, if the expected
levels o f wealth are disrupted. As a result o f increased economic dependence, therefore,
military intervention can be called upon to defend threatened economic enterprise, the
loss of which could jeopardize an improved standard o f living.

8.
This phenomenon can be examined as transnational relations. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed.,
Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, D om estic Structures and International
Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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The philosophical debate regarding intervention is informative regarding how
morality leads to sovereignty, and why it could legitimize intervention. As such, it helps
in this study to explain the basis for Clinton’s call to end ethnic cleansing if and
whenever possible. Moreover, the philosophical discussion clarifies the importance of
U.S. public opinion and the media as variables, because the American public is the
essential group with values such as the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit o f happiness,
and the media are a transmission belt without which the public might not be aware o f
activities abroad. In addition, American values have expanded into the international
community to produce a larger group with international values, norms, principles, and
laws against crimes against humanity. For example, Charles Shotwell and Kimberley
Thachuk discuss the UN Charter, revealing intervention as an increasingly accepted
international norm .10 Therefore, the philosophical debate informs general discussion in
this dissertation regarding two o f the five causal variables; however, it is insufficient to
fully explain U.S. foreign policy regarding military intervention.

THE LAW AND INTERVENTION
There is a considerable amount o f literature on the law and intervention. Laws
function to limit the ways and reasons for going to war. In general, the right to selfdefense is paramount. This debate focuses on the international and legal implications of
intervention.

9.
See Joshua Muravchik, Exporting D em ocracy: Fulfilling A m erica's D estiny (W ashington, D.C.:
AEI Press, 1991).
10.
Charles B . Shotwell and Kimberley Thachuk, “Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for
Legitimacy,” S trategic Forum, National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, no. 166
(1999).
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In the twentieth century, global interconnectedness reached unprecedented levels,
enabling the establishment o f international organizations such as the United Nations to
improve international order and stability.11 In particular, the UN, as it grew to embody
the legitimizing authority regarding international matters, introduced international
regulation into world politics. Sean Murphy examines the U N ’s role in intervention and
argues that technology has made the world so small that the violation o f humanitarian law
is almost immediately known internationally.12 Increased international awareness—
especially in Western developed countries— o f when and where human rights violations
occur, often generates pressure on the UN and its members to remedy horrors o f
violations against human rights. In addition, unilateral or multilateral intervention
without UN approval and mandate are growing less acceptable.
The enhanced importance o f the UN is especially reflected in the growing body of
international law.13 We are witnessing the institutionalization o f the international
environment. Institutionalization occurs when democratic values are embedded into
formal practices within an organization or institution. This is seen in the United States in
the form o f the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. W ithout sufficient
institutionalization, society and culture would be unable to withstand challenges to
stability from constituent groups. Lester Brune, for example, argues that economic and
political interdependence is a method to prompt stability, because unstable conditions

11.
For a critique o f the U N , see the collection o f essays edited by Ted Carpenter, D elusions o f
Grandeur: The UN and G lobal Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1997).
12.
Sean Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The U nited Nations in an E volving W orld O rder, vol.
21, Procedural Aspects o f International Law Series (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1996).
13.
John Norton Moore and A lex Morrison, eds., Strengthening the U nited N ations an d Enhancing
War Prevention (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2000).
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stem from insufficient system at the state and local levels.14 The international Tribunal at
The Hague has existed for many years, and has been instrumental in developing
international consensus regarding war crimes. The deepening o f the international
institution for law recently reached new heights with the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) on 11 April 2002.15 Despite its drawbacks, the ICC
created a new and important avenue for international justice and stability.16
The trouble with international law, however, is that it is difficult to enforce, and
therefore introduces delicate questions regarding the function o f intervention. Debate on
law enforcement and intervention often focuses on crimes against humanity, issues
surrounding violations of sovereignty, and sanctioned/unsanctioned or multilateral/
unilateral intervention. Fernando Teson justifies humanitarian intervention based on
international law that is founded in the fundamental human right to defend life as argued
under the just war assertion above.17 Even though international law is difficult to
enforce, it is useful for resolving conflict by strengthening norms of behavior and
mechanisms for settling disputes. The effectiveness o f international law is based in the
willingness of states to observe it.

14. Lester H. Brune, The United States and P ost-C old War Interventions: Bush a n d Clinton in
Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, 1 992-1998 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1999).
15. For debate in the United States regarding the ICC, see “An Unjust International Court,” The
Washington Times, 11 April 2 0 0 2 ,2 0 ; “Red Meat for Unilateralists,” The Washington P ost, 11 April 2002,
28; and “N o Court Dates for America,” The Washington Times, 11 April 2 0 0 2 ,2 1 .
16. Two o f the dominant arguments against U.S. membership in the ICC are that it is unaccountable
to any governing body, and that rogue or unfriendly states could become members and utilize the ICC
bureaucracy to bring harm to the United States or its citizens. The argument favoring the U.S. membership
in the ICC is that U.S. participation in the development o f an international court is crucial, even if it is not
perfect.
17. Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and M orality (Irvington-onHudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1997).
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THEORY AND INTERVENTION
The theoretical literature on intervention deals primarily with causes o f civil
conflict and conflict prevention. Theory about the causes o f civil conflict includes
various security dilemmas that are brought on by transition or change.

1ft

A security

dilemma occurs when efforts to increase security in one state bring an increase in
insecurity to another. A classical security dilemma was the East-West competition
during the cold war that ended in a tremendous arms race.
To find alternatives for resolving security dilemmas at the core o f conflict,
Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder explore why civil conflict breaks out.19 Much o f the
security dilemma is caused by fear o f change and unstable conditions. For example,
changes in the political environment may be found in governmental breakdown, as was
seen in Somalia. Stephen Van Evera examines how increased nationalism contributed to
war, for example, in the former Yugoslavia.20 Another example is when changes in the
political balance of power between groups within a country bring on social turmoil,
especially if the system is not institutionalized to withstand such changes, as in Iran.
Furthermore, shifts leaving one ethnic group geographically isolated or vulnerable can
spell doom to peace, as happened in Rwanda. Shifting distribution o f economic wealth
can also bring about civil conflict, as the standard o f living could drop precipitously and
spark public outrage, as was seen in Indonesia. When civil order breaks down, lawless

18. Stephen Van Evera, Causes o f War: P ow er and the R oots o f Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1999); Chiam Kaufman, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,”
International Security, 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 136-76; and Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, ed., C ivil
Wars, Insecurity, an d Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
19. Ibid.
20. Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International Security 18, no. 4
(1994): 5 -3 9 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21
warlords take over, as in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.21 Military disarmament after a peace
agreement can bring on a “reverse security dilemma” between antagonists, increasing
insecurities and leading to a breakdown in the peace agreement.

O ')

Kenneth Schultz

examines a type o f security dilemma that is brought about by conditions o f open social
structures under democracy, as opposed to non-democracy.23 He determines that open
information in democratic states can increase or diminish the credibility o f a state’s
threat, and can therefore bring about or ameliorate an information-driven security
dilemma that alters perceptions due to public response to policy during crisis.
Theory on conflict prevention is largely an answer to the causes o f conflict and
how to stop conflict from breaking out. The most influential theory on conflict
prevention is the democratic peace thesis, as coined by Michael Doyle in 1983, in which
democracy is thought to contribute to peaceful relations between states.24 The
democratic peace thesis, based on Immanuel Kant’s idea o f “perpetual peace,” posits that
democracies do not make war against one another.25 Tony Smith endorses intervention in
support of democratic governance for three reasons.26 First, it functions as a bulwark
against nationalistic extremism that could lead to instability. Second, it provides a stable

21. John Mueller, “The Banality o f ‘Ethnic War,’” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 4 2 -6 7 .
22. A reverse security dilemma can occur when distrust between parties leads to cheating on
disarmament, or when one party reduces real capabilities and the other reduces surplus or outdated
capabilities.
23. Kenneth A. Schultz, D em ocracy a n d Coercive D iplom acy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001).
24. Michael W. D oyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” P hilosoph y an d Public Affairs
12, nos. 3 and 4 (1983).
25. For more on influential works regarding the democratic peace thesis, see the follow ing two
volumes, which consist o f previously published articles: Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and
Steven E. Miller, eds., D ebatin g the D em ocratic Peace: A n International Security R ea d er (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1997); and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed. P aths to P eace: Is D em ocracy the Answer? (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1997).
26. Tony Smith, “In D efense o f Intervention,” in F oreign Affairs E ditors ’ C hoice S eries (N ew York:
Council on Foreign Relations, 2001), 2 6 -2 7 .
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modem institutionalized government founded on a constitution that reduces the chances
of civil war, which could spill into the larger region. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts give
an example o f how the system worked to stop the United States from escalating the war
in Vietnam.27 Even though there were hawks, there were also doves, and the resultant
policy was a compromised solution. Thus, institutionalized government adds to stability
because varying constituencies and actors make it difficult to implement extreme policies
such as war. Third, democratic enlargement increases peaceable relations between like
states with similar values that foster economic prosperity. Once attained, no one wants to
have war disrupt wealth or liberty.
William Dixon advances that democracies are better equipped to diffuse conflict
among themselves at an early stage prior to military engagement.

There is a delicate

period when a newly democratized country, especially one that has a non-democratic
tradition, would be more likely to revert to previous types o f governance. Christopher
Layne criticizes the democratic peace thesis because it relies on “persuasiveness” found
in institutional constraints, such as cultural norms and principles to promote peace, that
are insufficient to provide long lasting results.29 Mansfield and Snyder conclude that
states in the process of democratizing are more likely to engage in war than are mature
democracies or stable autocracies, but they leave hope that international stability can
prosper in the presence of mature, established democracies.30 Therefore, democratic

27. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony o f Vietnam: The System W orked (W ashington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1979).
28. William Dixon, “Dem ocracy and the Peaceful Settlement o f Disputes,” Am erican P olitical
Science R eview 88, 1 (1994): 14-32.
29. Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth o f the Democratic Peace,” International Security
19, no. 2 (1994): 6.
30. Edward D. M ansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger o f War,” International
Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 5 -3 8 .
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enlargement must be accompanied by a commitment to see young democracies through a
less stable transition period in which they develop and institutionalize deeper democratic
norms, values, and principles.
U.S. support o f democratic enlargement reflects a highly valued component o f
American society. Some argue that democratic enlargement takes on imperialistic
tones.31 For example, Mark Peceny examines important turning points in America’s
identity as a great liberal power, and demonstrates that the American presidents’ efforts
to legitimize intervention, both in the international and domestic spheres, are essential for
the cause o f democracy and liberal peace.32 Whether acknowledged or not, the Clinton
administration’s effort at democratic enlargement involved the promotion o f democracy
to legitimate continued American leadership in the post-cold war international system.33
As a result, promoting democratic enlargement is a method for fostering international
stability and is in the interest of the United States.34 This is especially so in bordering
regions and nations, but also as a whole, and invokes the U.S. “grand strategy” of
democratic enlargement for engendering international stability favorable to overarching
U.S. goals.35
Gideon Rose explains that debate in the United States has a classic division about

31. See Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Am erican D em ocracy
Promotion Impulses, Strategies, and Im pacts (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000). This is a
collection o f essays written by well-known authors such as Michael D oyle, Randall Schweller, and Ole R.
Holsti, among others, regarding intervention and democratic governance.
32. Mark Peceny, D em ocracy at the Point o f Bayonets (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1999).
33. See Naom Chomsky, A N ew Generation D raws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor a n d the Standards
o f the West (N ew York: Verso, 2000).
34. For the Clinton administration’s thoughts on democratic enlargement, see Strobe Talbott,
“Democracy and the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 6 (1996): 4 7 -6 3 ; and G. John Ikenberry,
“America’s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-war Era,” in Cox,
Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, Am erican D em ocracy Promotion, 103-26.
35. See Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold
War,” International Security 21, no. 4 (1997): 49 -8 9 .
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the promotion o f democracy as a foreign policy goal.

This division exists between

those who argue that the United States should be content to provide an example of
democracy for others and those who feel that the United States should proactively shape
political developments in other countries according to American ideals. Rose points out
that “rhetorically the Clinton administration fell into the ‘crusader’ camp,”37 declaring
■JO

that “promoting democracy” was an important element in its national security strategy.
Huntington explains that there have been three waves o f democracy— the first in the
1950s, the second in the 1960s, and the third in the late 1980s to early 1990s— in which
dozens o f countries became democratic converts.

Larry Diamond argues that after the

third wave o f democratization—which is drawing to a close— those remaining
democracies without institutionalization or legitimization will likely consolidate.40
Thomas Carothers cautions that democratization abroad suffers from limited
accomplishments because an American model for democratization that does not consider
local circumstances often generates a negative image o f democracy in the minds of
locals41 As a result, such practice is doomed because o f local barriers to progress.
Chalmers Johnson provides a bitingly critical examination o f U.S. intervention in terms

36. Gideon Rose, “Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy: A R eview Essay,”
International Security 25, no. 3 (2000-2001): 186-203.
37. Ibid., 188-9.
38. See W hite House, “Documentation: A National Security Strategy o f Engagement and
Enlargement,” February 1996, reprinted in A m erica ’s Strategic Choices: An International Security R eader,
Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1997), 286.
39. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1991).
40. Larry Diamond, D eveloping D em ocracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999), 23.
41. Thomas Carothers, A iding D em ocracy Abroad: the Learning C urve (W ashington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1999). For a similar argument that includes lessons on exporting
democracy, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., Exporting D em ocracy: The U nited S tates a n d Latin A m erica
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
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o f commitment to maintaining a global empire after the cold war.42 His book is an
account o f foreign resentment o f U.S. policies that have built up over time, and of the
kinds o f economic and political international retribution that may return to the United
States in the twenty-first century. Johnson views imperial expansion as the root of
terrorism and other international trouble. To avoid harsh resentment, the United States
could benefit by enabling democratic and institutional consolidation under stable
conditions. To do so, the United States could continue implementing democratization
based on the American model, albeit with more sensitivity to local needs, while
remaining flexible, so that a mid-stream change o f course is possible, rather than
abandoning the project altogether. Understanding how democratic enlargement is a long
term goal for U.S. foreign policy, supports discussion in this dissertation o f powerful
belief structures that slumber in the American psyche. Values founded in democracy are
important especially in considering U.S. actions in Haiti; however, they do not explain
the full breadth of U.S. foreign policy.

THE MILITARY AND INTERVENTION
The literature on military intervention is considerable and generally addresses the
question o f how to use military force. The answer to the question o f how to intervene,
involves military capabilities, as well as the types o f warfare to be used. It is not
specifically addressed here because that literature does not apply directly to analysis in
this dissertation. Rather, this section examines literature regarding policy aspects o f

42.
Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs a n d Consequences o f Am erican E m pire (N ew York:
Metropolitan Books, 2000). The term “blowback” was invented by the CIA for internal use. It refers to the
unintended consequences o f policies that were kept secret from the American people. Johnson concludes
with the question as to whether the United States has becom e a “rogue” superpower.
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military intervention that have to do with broader policy, such as military doctrine.
Clausewitz wrote that war is politics “by other means,” and this is clearly the case with
military intervention.43 Just as international law functions to limit the ways and reasons
for use o f military force, so do military doctrines. Military doctrines provide guideposts
for decisions on military intervention, including peace making, peace enforcing, and
peacekeeping. This is demonstrated clearly in the following three examples o f military
doctrine.
The attack on the U.S. military barracks in Beirut brought about high-level
considerations in the Department of Defense in 1984. The resulting Weinberger Doctrine
presented six guidelines for informing decisions on military intervention: 1) a vital
interest or ally must be at stake; 2) there must be support from popular opinion and
Congress; 3) force must be used only as a last resort; 4) only commit with the intent to
win wholeheartedly; 5) clearly define objectives; and 6) reassess and update the size,
composition, and disposition o f the forces as conditions change. A few years later, in
1992, the Powell Doctrine changed the military approach to intervention by formulating
policy around four specific points: 1) force should only be used as a last resort; 2) define
clear objectives; 3) clarify the basis for withdrawal; and 4) commit with overwhelming
force.
In April 2002, after the dramatic events o f September 11, a new, broader approach
to military intervention emerged. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld updated military
policy to clarify new considerations in light of military success in the war on terrorism in

43.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 87. See also Clausewitz, The Principles o f War (Harrisburg, PA: Telegraph Press
1942), 6.
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Afghanistan.44 Rumsfeld included eight points: 1) use all elements o f national power
(economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and overt and covert
military operations); 2) forces must be able to communicate and operate jointly; 3) accept
help from other countries; 4) coalition warfare should not be fought by committee; 5) use
prevention and preemption to take the war to the enemy; 6) rule out nothing, including
ground troops; 7) place special forces on the ground early; and 8) be honest with the
American people.
These doctrines show the development o f policy for U.S. military intervention
over the last twenty years. Each doctrine shows a distinct appreciation that military
intervention must enjoy at least minimal popular support, especially for prolonged
intervention. Over time, the necessity o f public support became an understanding,
demonstrated by the fact that Powell did not mention it. Instead, his inclusion o f an end
game directly speaks to the Vietnam hangover, as public support had become an
underlying factor for policy. Barry Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes explained this
important limitation to military action, in that the U.S. threat to use force is insufficient to
bring compliance to its demands abroad, because everyone knows that killing Americans
will drive them away.45 It could drive them away, because the American public only
tolerated a zero casualty level. A clear example o f this is the media frenzy and public
outcry over images o f American soldiers dragged through the streets o f Mogadishu in
October 1993. Clinton immediately reduced the mission and withdrew as early as
possible. Such hard truths present the president with a dilemma, because to achieve

44. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (2002): 3 1 -2 .
45. Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, “Defining Moment: The Threat and U se o f
Force in American Foreign Policy,” P olitical Science Q uarterly 114, no. 1 (1999).
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success when using force, the United States must select engagements carefully and then
display staying power. The recent war on terrorism promises to change the post-Vietnam
catering to public opinion, because this war is expected to be long and to generate
unknown numbers of American casualties. Instead o f catering to the public, Rumsfeld
proposes to inform the public, but public support remains an important element in
military policy.
Rumsfeld’s recent reevaluation and broadening o f military doctrine shows that
prevailing classic definitions for intervention are too narrow for m odem warfare. For
example, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse assert that peacekeeping is no longer
a matter of self-help by states; rather it is mainly about collective response organized
through the United Nations.46 Moreover, they argue that the main role o f military forces
in intervention is to establish a secure environment for non-military operations such as
electoral monitoring, refugee repatriation, and the distribution o f humanitarian relief by
civilian agencies. Issues on intervention go beyond this, however. In the wake o f
Somalia, humanitarian relief in situations o f civil conflict has been called into question.
Richard Haass provides a recent analysis o f military intervention in which he concludes
that relying solely on air power to wage intervention is insufficient, because ground
troops are necessary to protect vulnerable populations47 He argues that there are four
considerations in the decision to intervene, including action to prevent genocide, costs
and consequences o f action, availability o f military partnership with others, and the likely
results o f alternative action or inaction. The above development o f military doctrines

46. Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom W oodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in C ontem porary Conflict:
A Reconceptualization (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1996).
47. Richard N. Haass, “The U se and Abuse o f Military Force,” Brookings P o licy Brief, no. 54 (1999):
1- 8 .
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shows a broadening o f elements and considerations that cannot be ignored, because it
informs decisions regarding intervention. In this dissertation, military considerations are
informative to the evaluation o f U.S. interests, but are insufficient to explain broader
foreign policy.

FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERVENTION
The debate on foreign policy and intervention focuses on what it means to make
decisions on intervention. Thus, it is concerned with a larger context than any o f the
above categories, and actually encompasses them and more. The policy debate on
intervention examines overarching questions such as the who, whether, when, why, and
how o f intervention. The broader context o f policy therefore must take into consideration
the philosophical, legal, military, and political issues involved in any given intervention,
and leads to policy on a case by case basis. For example, it would be unrealistic for the
president to call for intervention without first considering ethical implications, legal
limitations, international or domestic support, military capacity to perform necessary
operations, or the political and historical background o f each specific situation.
In the United States, the decision to intervene ultimately falls to the president.
This does not mean, however, that he can intervene at will. The debate on who makes the
ultimate decision regarding intervention generally revolves around the question of war
powers o f the president. This points out the recurring vigorous debate regarding
congressional oversight and accountability o f the president. If the president holds
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An

supreme control over the nation’s military, as is commonly believed,

then the question

arises as to how that power is kept in check. James Meemik examines 458 crises
between 1948 and 1988, and surprisingly concludes that there is political value in taking
advantage o f opportunities to use force.49 After examining the role o f international and
domestic factors in American foreign policy, he consoles us that decisions to intervene
are more often motivated by national interest than personal political gain. This is
certainly a relief, but it raises the murky debate over what exactly is a national interest.
For the purposes o f this dissertation, the concept o f national interest is not used, even
though considerable emphasis is given to U.S. vital and peripheral interests as defined
under the variable “United States interests” in Chapter III.
In making decisions about how to intervene, the president must take into
consideration many different perspectives. The president is pressured from numerous
directions, including those stemming from the international as well as the domestic
environments. We have already explained the importance o f the United Nations and
international law as an example o f international factors that the president must take into
consideration when determining how to intervene. Within his own cabinet, though, the
president is confronted with varying alternative perspectives. The Council on Foreign
Relations provides an excellent illustration of these perspectives in the form o f fictional
memos to President Clinton from the National Security Advisor, the Secretary o f State,
the Secretary o f Defense, and the Joint Chiefs o f Staff. As each o f these actors justifies

48. See C.V. Crabb and P.M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the P residen t a n d Foreign
P olicy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980); C.F. Hermann, Crisis in Foreign P olicy
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); John T. Rourke, Congress and the P residency in U.S. Foreign P olicy
M aking (Boulder, CO: W estview Press, 1983); and H.K. Tillema, A p p ea l to F orce (N ew York: Thomas
Crowell, 1973).
49. James Meemik, “Presidential Decision Making and the Political U se o f Military Force,”
International Studies Q uarterly 38, no. 1 (1994): 121-38.
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their position, and recommends a different policy approach, we gain a fuller
understanding o f the overall issues involved in the decision-making process, because
each advisor suggests a different policy.50
Since the end o f the cold war, increased struggle within and across borders
threatened to lead to far greater conflicts. Richard Haass eloquently reviews recent cases
of U.S. military intervention abroad, and argues that the post-cold war era is
characterized by “international deregulation,” when new actors have new capabilities and
alignments but lack new rules.51 This situation increases the number o f violent conflicts
within and across borders. Haass concludes that in the modem world, policy on
intervention reflects ongoing political and technological characteristics. The relatively
recent technological development o f “compellent force”52 by “smart munitions” such as
precision-guided bombs increases the political uses o f force as called for by Clausewitz.53

THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
In looking through the literature on foreign policy and intervention, the author has
not found any work that specifically addresses intervention in terms o f the five variables
found in this study, which include the UN, allies, Congress, public opinion and the
media, and U.S. interests. The approach adopted in this dissertation examines the
influence of these five variables on the foreign policy decisions under Clinton. This

50. Alton Frye, Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable D octrine (N ew York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 2000).
51. Haass, Intervention.
52. Compellent force is the ability to strike specific military/political targets in one location to
influence behavior elsewhere. Ibid., 16.
53. This corresponds with Les Aspin’s view. See “The Use and U sefulness o f Military Forces in the
Post-Cold War, Post-Soviet World,” Address to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs,
Washington, D.C., reprinted in Haass, Intervention, 2 0 7 -1 4 .
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section examines Michael MacKinnon’s analysis regarding foreign policy and
intervention, as his work comes closest to the approach used in this dissertation.54
There are three main differences between our analysis and the MacKinnon
examination. First, he examines the international environment by looking at the United
States and the UN, but not U.S. allies. He is particularly interested in extreme policy
shifts in the United States toward the UN. For example, many expected that the end o f
the cold war would loosen the deadlock in the UN Security Council, providing conditions
for unprecedented cooperation amongst the more influential member states, but that did
not exactly happen. Although President Clinton initially promised to strengthen the UN,
after Somalia, he reconsidered participation in peacekeeping efforts and stepped away
from assertive multilateralism. In May 1994, PDD 25 raised an obstacle to effective and
timely international action, as well as to any chance o f improving and strengthening the
UN’s operational capacity. MacKinnon’s work is centrally focused on U.S.-UN
relations, while this dissertation is a more broadly focused deductive study to isolate the
elements o f influence on decisions regarding intervention.
Second, M acKinnon’s analysis is based on Roger Hilsman’s “political process
model,” which is the basis of the bureaucratic politics model.55 Hilsman’s model offers
three rings o f power. The inner ring is the president and his staff, political appointees,
Congress, the bureaucrats. The second ring includes interest groups and the press/
television. The outer ring includes public opinion and the electorate. These three rings

54. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f US Peacekeeping.
55. Roger Hilsman, with Laura Gaughran and Patricia A. Weitsman, The P olitics o f P o licy M aking in
Defense an d F oreign Affairs: C onceptual M odels and Bureaucratic P olitics, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993).
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have two outputs o f power: foreign affairs and defense policy. Hilsm an’s model is
similar to, yet different from, the analysis in this dissertation.
MacKinnon alters Hilsman’s model to suit his cases more closely. MacKinnon
examines four actors in the domestic environment: the executive, the bureaucracies
(Department of State and Department of Defense), Congress, and public opinion.
MacKinnon argues that Congress dominated the flexible Clinton administration in setting
policy towards international organizations, and uses PDD 25 on U.S participation in UN
peacekeeping to show the “true nature and the twisted roots o f the U.S. attitude to the
UN.”56 He concludes that PDD 25 was “largely the result o f a self-perpetuating cycle o f
confrontation and conciliation played out between the White House and Congress.”57
This dissertation differs from MacKinnon, because our analysis does not consider
the bureaucracies per se, but rather considers decisions taken by the Clinton
administration to encompass the president’s advisors, including various ranking
department heads, but not singling each out individually. Moreover, it is similar because
it considers Congress and public opinion; however, it differs because in this dissertation
Congress is separate from public opinion, while the media is part o f it. MacKinnon does
not make any specific treatment o f the media. Finally, this dissertation considers U.S.
interests as a launching pad for examination o f foreign policy in the cases provided.
Third, while MacKinnon is specifically interested in the erratic U.S.-UN
relationship regarding peacekeeping in the early post-cold war years leading up to the
PDD 25, this dissertation covers a wider span of time: until the turn o f the century. In
short, whereas MacKinnon’s work most closely resembles the analysis in this

56. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f US Peacekeeping, vii.
57. Ib id , 105.
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dissertation, it differs significantly because it is based closely on the political process
model and does not include all five variables. Thus, this dissertation contributes to the
literature on foreign policy by using a holistic approach that differs from any other
approach.
Overall, the current project builds upon all o f the above categories in the literature
on intervention, but strictly falls into none o f them. The gap in the literature, filled by
this dissertation, is that this approach to intervention is holistic in nature. That is, policy
decisions are seen as outcomes of the interplay o f various international and domestic
constraints placed on presidents. In this regard, this study differs from previous work on
intervention, as it is more concerned with policy making within a broader international
and domestic context. At the international level, the importance o f international
organizations and regional allies is investigated. At the domestic level, presidential
decision making is constrained by Congress in an institutional manner. This assumes that
there will be bipartisan consensus against the president; however, as we have seen in
recent decades, partisan divisions within Congress can weaken its ability to constrain the
president. In addition, public opinion and the media can influence presidential policy
decisions. Thus, this dissertation approaches U.S. foreign policy by focusing on
constraints on presidential decisions to intervene, which are found in international and
domestic politics.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN

There is no clear or convincing theory for foreign policy decisions regarding
military intervention. On the whole, such decisions often seem ad hoc and are commonly
made on a case-by-case basis. This study seeks to clarify patterns o f interaction between
five variables across three specific case studies to help us understand how decisions
regarding intervention are formed and the extent to which these five variables influenced
President Clinton’s foreign policy decisions to resolve small-scale international crises, in
the context o f his stated Doctrine.
This study o f the politics o f intervention unfolds at the international and domestic
levels, and looks at the field o f foreign policy by breaking it into its component parts.
This dissertation builds on the existing foreign policy literature by inquiring to what
extent five specific variables impacted Clinton’s foreign policy. In addition, it builds on
existing foreign policy literature on intervention to define to what extent these five
variables influenced the type o f intervention policy that is ultimately implemented, such
as inaction, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and military intervention. Each option
is the result o f a process o f interaction between the five variables identified for this study.
This dissertation is specifically concerned with U.S. intervention in small-scale crises, to
clarify what it takes for the United States to intervene in areas o f peripheral as opposed to
vital interests, what type of intervention might be expected, and why.
The primary research question asks why there were such variations in the
implementation o f the Clinton Doctrine in Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor. For example,
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why did the United States intervene militarily in Haiti, but not in either Rwanda or East
Timor? Furthermore, why did the United States provide substantial humanitarian aid to
Rwanda’s refugees, but not to Haiti’s or East Timor’s? M ost o f all, why did Clinton not
call for military intervention to stop the genocide in Rwanda, or the civil violence against
the East Timorese, when his doctrine specifically promises that he would do so whenever
possible? In response to these questions, this study clarifies what is required for the
United States to intervene in areas o f peripheral interest. To answer the primary research
question, five foreign policy variables are explored. After a review o f these variables,
this chapter will describe the methodology to be utilized in the dissertation.

THE VARIABLES
Nothing exists in a vacuum, and that is particularly so with American foreign
policy. Scholars have worked for many years to explain the intricacies o f international
relations. For example, this dissertation draws on Kenneth W altz’s three main levels of
analysis— the individual, the state, and the system.1 In examining the individual level,
this dissertation considers U.S. interests as defined by the Clinton administration. This
analysis does not examine the individual level in terms o f Clinton’s personality or
ideological inclination. Therefore, this study examines the way the Clinton
administration explained U.S. interests, which tend, especially in the case o f vital U.S.
interests, to have enduring characteristics that transcend presidential administrations. For
example, any U.S. president would define the Persian G ulf as a vital security interest
because o f its impact on regional U.S. strategic and economic interests.

1.
Kenneth N . Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical A n alysis (N ew York: Columbia
University Press, 1959).
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This dissertation examines the relationship between the U.S. intervention and five
specific sources o f foreign policy, or variables. The variables in this study include U.S.
interests during the Clinton administration, U.S. allies, the United Nations, the U.S.
Congress, and U.S. public opinion and the media. As explained in the literature review in
Chapter II, some authors approach either foreign policy or intervention by examining one
or more o f these variables, but this author has found no literature that examines foreign
policy and intervention by analyzing the political implications o f all five.
This dissertation explores the relationship between foreign policymaking under
President Clinton and the extent to which foreign and domestic forces shape policy
regarding U.S. intervention. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the variables.
The process o f foreign policymaking is very complex and, depending on the context and
situation, the variables have different levels o f importance.2 For example, given a
situation in which the variable domestic public opinion is strong enough to engage,
organize lobbies, and divide elites at the decision-making level, then this variable’s
importance to and impact on decision making rises to the forefront o f all five variables.
The independent variable is U.S. interests; the intervening variables at the domestic level
are the U.S. Congress, and public opinion and the media, and the intervening variables at
the international level include U.S. allies and the United Nations. The dependent variable
is the type of intervention policy selected.
Intervention decisions are generally made on a case-by-case basis, because the
importance o f each variable relative to the others may differ in each circumstance.

2. This highlights the complexity o f foreign policy.
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Moreover, each variable does not necessarily apply consistent pressure on decision
makers either throughout each case or across the case studies, nor do they always interact
in a consistent manner. Thus, the interaction o f these variables adds complexity to
decision making for intervention. The following explanation o f the variables clarifies
specific application o f each one in this study. This section establishes the relevance, and
method of examination, measurement for each variable.

U.S. Interests under Clinton
“U.S. interests” are the independent variable in the following analysis.3 For this
dissertation, a distinction is made between vital and peripheral U.S. interests. Vital
interests are the most important interests to a state’s survival, and they cover security and
economic issues. As explained in the literature review, under conditions o f anarchy, the
state’s survival depends on measures of self-help. Therefore, one method to improve
security is for the state to maximize stability in the international environment. There are
two main methods for a state to promote international stability. One method is to enforce
stability in the system through military or strategic means. A second method is for the
state to maximize its financial well being as it also improves the financial well being of
other states, as discussed. Thus, vital interests pertain to military, strategic, and economic
policies.
Peripheral interests also affect international order, but they do not respond to
existential threats to the state in the same manner as do vital interests. Peripheral

3.
U .S. interests differ from U .S. national interests, which are delineated into three categories: vital
(survival, safety, and vitality), important (national well-being or regional development), and humanitarian
(disaster relief, violations o f human rights, rule o f law, joint recovery operations, development,
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interests include international values, norms, principles, and laws. Values, norms, and
principles have an important role in the process o f stabilizing international order, because
they function to bring differing countries into closer understanding with one another. If it
is possible to overcome extreme differences through internalization o f overarching
values, norms, and principles, then it is possible to reduce the effects o f international
anarchy. Thus, it is in the U.S. interest to promote acceptable international values,
norms, and principles in the world community, because as these spread, a greater
consensus can grow. Consensus regarding values, norms, and principles makes
international law possible. International law codifies values, norms, and principles in an
enforceable way that improves international stability and reduces the impact of anarchy.
It follows then, that it is in the U.S. interest (albeit peripherally) to establish accepted
standards o f international law, because they provide a basis for regulating the effects of
anarchy and thus promote coherence rather than chaos in the international system.
Therefore, even though international values, norms, principles, and laws do not protect
the United States in the same concrete and immediate ways as military, strategic, and
economic interests, they are nonetheless very important to far-reaching efforts for
promoting long-term international stability. Peripheral interests are akin to the icing on
the cake, while vital interests are the cake itself.
Table 1 lists reasons for some post-cold war intervention according to vital and
peripheral interests. This list is instrumental in the case study selection (described below)
because it provides a broad overview o f real-world interventions for the independent
interests with pertinent examples. Table 1 also lists the justification and examples of

environment, and demining). See The W hite House, A N ational Security S trategy f o r a G lo b a l A g e
(Washington, D.C.: U .S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 4.
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Table 1
Reasons for Post-Cold War Intervention
Vital Interests
Military Interests
Territorial Defense (Panama 1989, War on Terrorism 2001)
Classical Deterrence (Taiwan Straits 1996)
Strategic Interests
Terrorism (Sudan 1998, Afghanistan 1998, Afghanistan 2001)
Regional Stability
Collapsed Government (Somalia 1993, Haiti 1994, Rwanda 1994,
Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo 1991-1999, Indonesia/East Timor 1999)
Refugees {Rwanda 1994, Haiti 1994, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999,
Indonesia/East Timor 1999)
Balance of Power (Middle East-Persian G ulf War 1991, N/S Iraq 1993)
Democratic Enlargement (Panama 1989, Somalia 1993, Haiti 1994)
Economic Interests
Regional Stability
(Europe-Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo 1991-1999, Middle East-N/S Iraq
1993)
Drug Trade (Panama 1989, Colombia ongoing, Haiti 1994)
Economic Turmoil (Somalia 1993, Rwanda 1994, Haiti 1994, East Timor 1998)

Peripheral Interests
Norms, Values, and Principles
Humanitarian Assistance
(Sudan 1990-1992, Somalia 1992-1993, Bosnia 1993-1995, Rwanda 1994,
Kosovo 1999, East Timor 1999, Afghanistan 2002)
Nation-Building (Somalia 1993, Haiti 1994, East Timor 1999)
International Law
Violation o f Sovereignty (Persian Gulf War 1991, Kosovo 1999)
Drug Trade (Panama 1989, Colombia ongoing, Haiti 1994)
UN WMD Inspections (Iraq 1998)
War Crimes {Rwanda 1994, Kosovo 1999)
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intervention according to vital and peripheral interests. The cases in this study are
italicized in Table 1, and fall into a variety o f different categories o f interests. For
example, the case of Haiti is listed under vital interests in both the Strategic Interests
category and the Economic Interests category, but it is also listed under Peripheral
Interests both for Humanitarian Assistance and International Law.
To examine vital and peripheral interests, this section considers the implications
o f the post-cold war environment including collapsing states, civil conflict, and refugee
flows. Many o f the crises noted in Table 1 included some aspect o f collapsed
government. At the end o f the cold war, there were a growing number o f disintegrating,
or collapsing, states.4 They cease to be states because they degenerate into ungovemed
territory. Collapsing states commonly experience a variety o f side effects that impact the
interests o f other states, including democratic breakdown and human rights violations.
During the process o f collapse, state leadership often turns the governing apparatus
against the citizenry or a portion of it. Under such circumstances, it is not at all
uncommon for collapsing states to experience ethnic or religious violence that results in
the flight o f threatened civilians. Collapsing states often generate considerable
movement o f refugees and displaced persons, because the governmental control
mechanisms have broken down, giving lawless marauders the opportunity to rob,
brutalize, and murder other citizens.5
Refugee flows are demographic shifts o f persons who are not allowed to return

4. See I. William Zartman, ed., C ollapsed States: The D isintegration a n d R estoration o f Legitim ate
Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997).
5. John D. Steinbrunner explains this phenomenon in Principles o f G lobal Security (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 141-2.
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home. Nana Poku and David Graham confirm that since the end o f the cold war, there
has been a broadening o f the term “security” in developed countries to include threats
from refugees, asylum seekers, forced migrations, and undocumented migrants, with
special emphasis on those from less developed countries.6 Receiving countries often
view refugees as problems for multiple reasons: they can challenge existing patterns of
political representation, drain the economy, damage the environment, threaten law and
order, introduce health risks, become terrorists, alter the existing cultural composition,
and dilute national identity.7 As a result, refugees may not be welcome. Alejandro
Portes and Ruben Rumbaut explain that immigration without assimilation can lead to
ethnic solidarity.8 This situation can increase domestic political concerns, especially for
politicians who have large sub-populations as constituencies. Political concerns of this
type were seen in Florida, for example, with the arrival o f Haitian refugees. More
importantly, large numbers of refugees sometimes use refugee camps as a base to
organize and militarize. Such conditions generated a great deal o f regional instability for
Rwanda’s neighbors, especially Zaire and Burundi. Moreover, once organized and
militarized, refugees may invade their country o f origin to gain power, as was also seen
in Rwanda.
Rainer Muenz and Myron Weiner argue that the end o f the cold war gave many
citizens of less developed countries the opportunity for “reducing unemployment, earning
remittances, and reducing demographic pressure” by migrating to more developed

6. Nana Poku and David T. Graham, Redefining Security: Population M ovem ents an d N ational
Security (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).
7. For more about types o f threats presented by refugees, see Mark J. M iller, “International Migration
and Global Security,” chap. 2 in Redefining Security, Poku and Graham.
8. Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, Imm igrant Am erica: A P ortrait, 2nd ed. (Berkeley:
University o f California Press, 1996), 138.
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countries, especially to Western Europe or the United States.9 Myron W einer lists three
reasons why migration has been on the rise since the end o f the cold war: there is more
conflict within states themselves; modem conflicts produce more refugees than
previously; and clusters o f countries that drive away refugees form “bad
neighborhoods.” 10
There are three typical responses to mass migration observed in the receiving
countries. First, countries can introduce restrictive border regimes and immigration laws
to limit undesired mass migration. Second, they might develop preventive or
interventionist strategies against the countries of origin. This may be either by non
violent means, such as sanctions, or by the use o f force. Third, as a humanitarian gesture,
they may accept a number of the migrants, but reject others. There is occasionally a
positive impact o f refugees on the receiving country, in that they sometimes provide
cheap, skilled labor. In the recent past, however, refugee migration has significantly
contributed to regional instability, and was the case in Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor.
Barry Posen cites other methods to stem migration once it is already under way.11
Long-term private sector solutions, such as trade and foreign investment, require a great
deal of patience and have few short-term affects. Such remedies have many problems,
due to the lack o f financial security found in politically unstable regions. Governments,
however, can bring about short-term results through aid. The trouble with foreign aid,

9. Rainer M uenz and Myron Weiner, eds., Migrants, Refugees, and F oreign P olicy: U.S. and German
P olicies tow ard Countries o f Origin (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), vii.
10. Myron Weiner, “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods,” in M igrants, Refugees, a n d Foreign
P olicy: U.S. and G erm an P olicies tow ard Countries o f Origin, ed. Rainer M uenz and Myron Weiner,
(Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), 208.
11. Barry Posen, “Can Military Intervention Limit Refugee Flows?” in Migrants, Refugees, and
F oreign P olicy: U.S. an d German P olicies to w a rd Countries o f Origin, ed. Rainer M uenz and Myron
Weiner, (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), 2 7 3 -3 2 2 .
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however, is that it may be rerouted to corrupted bank accounts with few desired results,
as occurred in Indonesia under Suharto.
In sum, collapsing states commonly threaten vital interests o f other states,
including military, strategic, and economic interests, because internal instability caused
by a collapsing government threatens to spill civil turmoil into the larger region, and
threatens regional stability. Refugee movement is an indicator of severe dysfunction in a
state. Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher argue that it is the responsibility o f other states to
intervene to restore order, lest hordes o f refugees requiring care invade other countries.
As a result, “grievous human rights abuses are not an internal matter when neighboring
states must bear the cost o f repression by having refugees forced on them.” 12 Thus, the
importance of international stability can override the right o f sovereignty, as other states
have not only an interest but also a responsibility to intervene to stop civil turmoil and
violence, since they trigger refugee movements that can result in areas where they gather
to organize and militarize. The importance o f this variable on Clinton’s foreign policy is
estimated by examination o f speeches, interviews, and other statements.

U.S. Allies
Theoretical patterns o f international interaction rooted in balance o f power
politics explain that alliances are an outgrowth o f self-help interaction between states that
are seeking to survive in an anarchic international environment in which less powerful
states join to balance more powerful threatening states.13 As explained earlier, conditions

12.
Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher, “R efugee Flows as Grounds for International Action,”
International Security 21, no. 1 (1996): 59.
13. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins o f Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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o f anarchy exist in the absence o f government, laws, police, and sense o f community.
Without these, there is no regulation either at the individual, state, or international level.
This variable considers patterns o f interaction formed between the United States and
other friendly countries, or allies.
Alliances are formal or informal arrangements between states that share common
aims to overcome anarchy, and are aimed principally at security and military concerns.
Alliances demonstrate the willingness o f states to cooperate and make mutual
commitments to act to protect each other under threatening situations. During the first
post-cold war decade, there was an increase and then a marked decrease in the U.S.
willingness to perform unilateral operations abroad, as the absence o f the bipolar
international environment no longer regulated the actions o f states o f all sizes. This
unwillingness partly stems from the importance placed on multilateral coalitions.
The G ulf War launched the post-cold war era with a dramatic example of
American commitment to working in a coalition o f allies. In this respect, the Gulf War
set the tone o f U.S. operations by providing a stellar example o f successful coalition
operations, which proved that coalitions increase legitimacy and authority. When
Iraq violated Kuwait’s sovereignty, the United States led the coalition to send the
message that international law is indeed enforceable. A country’s intervention
in the internal affairs of another country can be especially controversial because it
challenges this most important international principle upholding the post-Westphalian
international order. It is wise for leaders to seek the support o f allies, because
there is greater legitimacy in numbers. Riding this wave o f multilateral success, the
Clinton administration for a time brought into the White House an unprecedented air o f
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assertive multilateralism that reflected a new American vision o f international
cooperation.
For this study, U.S. allies are U.S.-friendly countries or regional international
organizations that played an important role in a crisis and thereby exercised some
influence on the U.S. decision regarding whether, how, or when to intervene. In the case
of Rwanda, for example, France unilaterally intervened to create a safe haven, thereby
relieving the United States o f responsibility to act. In Haiti, regional OAS members
spearheaded economic and political pressure on the insurgents, and worked with the UN
and the United States to reinstate democracy. Haiti’s neighbors cooperated in shutting
down trade and crippling the Haitian economy. In East Timor, regional actors such as
Australia took on a critical function by intervening, again relieving the United States of
the responsibility. Thus, in all three crises, U.S. allies were instrumental in the
developments and resolution of the crisis. This dissertation examines how the allies’
position and actions during such crises contributed to Clinton’s decisions regarding
intervention. The influence o f U.S. allies on Clinton’s foreign policy is estimated by
examining the actions and declarations from U.S. allies or regional international
organizations that had an integral association with the crisis at hand. Patterns in the
relationship between U.S. and allied actions are included in this examination, to assess
the influence o f U.S. allies over Clinton’s decisions.

The United Nations
The examination of the United Nations is based on the same grounds as the above
examination o f alliances, and is treated in a similar fashion. Even though the UN is not a
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world government, it does function to ameliorate anarchy, because it provides a forum for
dialog aimed at resolving disputes and designing the type o f world that is most acceptable
to its members. Thus, the UN, through consensus, legitimates international laws and
authorizes policing o f those laws, even though the United States does not intervene every
time the United Nations mandates it. In addition, the UN provides a collecting place for
world leaders to get to know one another and thereby increases a sense o f international
understanding and community. This dissertation examines UN actions to ascertain the
influence these activities exerted over U.S. foreign policy decisions regarding
intervention in our three specified cases.
The end o f the cold war released the UN Security Council from deadlock between
the Soviet Union and the United States, making it difficult to form a UN consensus
regarding the relationship between sovereignty and community.14 The post-cold war era
was a time o f heightened international nervousness, in which disturbances in the
international system, even in small countries, generated a wave o f instability throughout
the world. Richard Haass aptly calls this post-cold war environment “international
deregulation.”15 The mission o f the United Nations continued to facilitate the peaceful
resolution o f differences between members and to provide a forum for interaction
between nations and peoples.
The UN role thus took on added significance in the post-cold war environment,
and made possible new international norms. Such norms included a deeper
understanding of the relationship between internal political crisis and international

14. See M ichael J. Glennon, “Sovereignty and Community after Haiti: Rethinking the Collective Use
o f Force,” Am erican Journal o f International Law 89, no. 1 (1995): 70.
15. Haass, Intervention, 5.
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security. Norms promoted a wider acceptance o f UN authority to impose mandatory
sanctions on countries that threaten international security. Moreover, the UN was the
only international body equipped with the legitimacy and credibility to mandate
international military action in crises. The precedent was set during the Persian G ulf War
for the UN to authorize military intervention in a country that threatens peace. For
example, despite reservations voiced by important members such as China and India, the
OAS convinced the UN to impose sanctions on Haiti, even before the United States
decided on a course of action.
The Clinton administration’s response to each crisis was not independent o f other
countries around the world; in part, it varied because of the UN influence. This study
considers the development of UN support for intervention o f each crisis. The United
Nations pressured the United States to increase support for peacekeeping operations and
succeeded, until October 1993. As already explained, after Somalia, Clinton’s PDD 25
“all but ruled out U.S. participation in, and perhaps even support for, UN-led peaceenforcement operations.” 16
The influence o f this variable on Clinton’s foreign policy is estimated by
reviewing Security Council resolutions during each crisis, as well as events and activities
surrounding or involving the UN Security Council. Consensus within the UN regarding
intervention in another country is an important variable for determining U.S. foreign
policy, because UN backing legitimizes intervention. This is because the UN is
comprised o f members from throughout the world and places onerous pressure to
conform on members. Thus, the UN legitimizes intervention policies because they are

16. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f U.S. Peacekeeping, 115.
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brought before the General Assembly and the Security Council, debated, and documented
in a legal and transparent fashion. This is important because the more an issue is debated,
the more it is legitimated. Kepplinger, Brosius, and Staab argue that the more frequently
recipients are confronted with one side of an adversarial argument, the more likely they
will adopt that point of view and thus strengthen that position.17 Countries with
grievances can defend themselves and possibly gain international support. This occurred,
for example, in the establishment of Israel in 1948, and more recently in the case o f East
Timor. However, the very essence o f intervention violates sovereignty: it is an act o f war
that can cause many complications, as demonstrated in the case o f Indonesia’s occupation
and annexation o f East Timor. Therefore, any state that wishes to intervene in the
internal affairs o f another state for any reason should first seek a UN blessing. Such UN
mandates commonly specify conditions o f the intervention, as occurred with France in
Rwanda, the United States in Haiti, and Australia in East Timor, and they lay the ground
rules for the operation.
In this dissertation, UN policies, mandates, and actions influence the U.S. policy
making process regarding intervention, because without its legitimization through
collective mandates, any intervention would be problematic. This speaks to the concept
that the United States needed UN support for intervention, and therefore had to generate
support in the UN. One problem with this variable however, is that the United States sits
on the UN Security Council, which means that this decision making may be circular
rather than causal. This having been said, this dissertation examines how the UN
contributed to Clinton’s decisions regarding intervention during each crisis. Analysis of

17.
H.M. Kepplinger, H.B. Brosius, and J.F. Staab, “Opinion Formation in Mediated Conflicts and
Crises: A M odel o f C ognitive-Affective Media Effects,” International Journal o f Public O pinion Research,
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the UN examines Security Council resolutions about each crisis. These resolutions are
credible indications o f the intent and actions o f the most influential UN body. As
applicable, the relations between the United States and the UN are included in this
examination to establish the influence o f the UN on Clinton’s decisions regarding
intervention.

The U.S. Congress
The U.S. Congress is one o f the three institutions o f democratic power in the
United States. It shares power with the executive and judiciary. Congress is a powerful
institutional force that every president must work with to forge successful policies. The
literature regarding the president and the Congress is divided between two schools of
thought.18 First, the “two presidencies” theory suggests that “while often frustrated in the
sp h ere,. . . presidents do not fail on any major foreign policy initiatives.”19 Whereas this
argument has been shown faulty in recent history, it did pave the way for a better
understanding o f the fact that the president tends to experience more congressional
support in foreign affairs than in domestic initiatives. Second, there are those who

no. 3 (1991): 132-56.
18. There is considerable literature regarding this topic. See, for exam ple, Lance T. LeLoup and
Steven A. Shull, The P residen t a n d Congress: C ollaboration an d Com bat in N ational Policym aking
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999); Thomas E. Cronin, “A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial
Presidency,” P o litica l Science Q uarterly 95, no. 2 (1980): 2 0 9 -3 7 ; Douglas Foyle, “Public Opinion and
Foreign Policy: Elite B eliefs as a M ediating Variable,” International Studies Q uarterly 41, no. 1 (1997):
141-69; Eugene R. Wittkopf, C ongress an d the P olitics o f U.S. Foreign P o licy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994); James McCormick, “D ecision Making in the Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Relations Committees,” in C ongress Resurgent: Foreign an d D efense P olicy on C apitol H ill, ed. Randall
B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1993); James L. Sundquist,
B eyond G ridlock? P rospects f o r G overnance in the Clinton Years— an d A fter (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings, 1993); and Gerald Feliz Warburg, Conflict an d Consensus: The Struggle between Congress and
the President over F oreign Policym aking (N ew York: Harper & Row, 1989).
19. See, for exam ple, Aaron W ildavsky, “The Two Presidencies,” Trans-Action, no. 4 (December
1966): 7 -1 4 ; and Jeffrey E. Cohen, “A Historical Reassessment o f W ildavsky’s ‘Two Presidencies’
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believe that partisan voting in Congress impacts foreign as well as domestic policy.

20

Brandon Prins and Bryan Marshall, for example, state that “it is evident that post-cold
war congressional decision making on issues relating to the president’s foreign policy
agenda have become increasingly characterized by less congressional consensus and
greater partisanship.”21 In this dissertation, legislative voting is the measure for this
variable.
Clinton’s early months in office were marred by several political battles. For
example, his nomination of Zoe Baird to Attorney General failed because she had
illegally hired a nanny and failed to pay social security. In addition, his early fight over
gay rights in the military hit Clinton especially hard with opposition from Congress.
Topping it all off, his defeat on the health bill came on the eve o f the 1994 midterm
election. Not long after Clinton came to office there was a congressional Republican
resurgence, in the midterm election o f 1994. For a period o f time, the administration
“remained in a state o f shock, having lost its footing and confidence as a result o f the
midterm election.”22 Thus, opposition in the 104th Congress played a large role in
moderating Clinton’s policies.
The Clinton White House was domestically oriented and was careful about raising
political costs at home by appearing to refuse to work with Congress on foreign policy
initiatives abroad. For example, Michael MacKinnon argues that PDD 25 resulted from a

Thesis,” in The Two Presidencies: A Q uarter Century Assessm ent, ed. Steven A. Shull (Chicago: NelsonHall, 1991), 3.
20. See, for example, Richard Fleisher, Jon R. Bond, Blen S. Krutz, and Stephen Hanna, “The
Demise o f the Two Presidencies,” Am erican Politics Q uarterly 28, no. 1 (2000): 3 -2 5 .
21. Brandon C. Prins and Bryan W. Marshall, “Congressional Support o f the President: A
Comparison o f Foreign, D efense, and Domestic Policy Decision Making During and After the Cold War,”
P residential Studies Q uarterly 31, no. 4 (2001): 672.
22. William C. Berman, From the Center to the Edge: The P olitics a n d P olicies o f the Clinton
P residency (Oxford, England: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 46.
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perpetual cycle o f confrontation between the Congress and the White House, in which it
seemed that “the harder Congress pushed, the more pliable the Executive appeared to
be.”23 PDD 25 is an example of how Clinton’s flexibility in bargaining was a great asset.
PDD 25 “was designed to avoid any future confrontations with Congress over U.S.
support of a UN mission, or participation in such a mission,” not to strengthen
peacekeeping.24 Along these lines, PDD 25 “was directed and formulated based on the
self-interested, political calculations o f what the Clinton administration believed was
necessary to appease hostile congressional positions.”25
Congress retains a considerable measure o f de facto control over the approval or
denial o f any proposed mission because it controls funding for the annual Department o f
Defense budget. This forces the executive to make funding requests for each individual
case as it arises. In this way, Congress is able to maintain checks and balances on foreign
policy, regardless o f whether the UN gives its go-ahead to intervene. MacKinnon
concludes, “domestic politics have led the United States to become a ‘self-restrained’
power.”26
Apparent inaction in Congress results in part from differentiated roles o f the
executive and legislative branches. Michael Smith argues that the executive and
legislature reached a stalemate during the twentieth century, contributing to “a situation
in which each side depends on the other when committing the United States to a major

23. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f US Peacekeeping, 105.
24. Ibid., 106.
25. Ibid., xviii.
26. For more on this argument see Stanley R. Sloan, The U nited States a n d the Use o f Force in the
P ost-C old War World: T ow ard Self-Restraint? CRS 94-581 S, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research
Service, 20 July 1 9 9 4 ,1 6 -1 7 . For similar view s see Thomas L. Friedman, “Theory vs. Practice: Clinton’s
Stated Foreign Policy Turns into More M odest ‘Self-Containment,’” N ew York Times, 1 October 1993, A3.
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military operation.”27 Smith explains that this stalemate between the president and the
Congress has led to a bifurcation in the roles o f each institution. The president “provides
energy and expediency in ordering forces overseas, acts as the highest level in the chain
o f command when forces are actually engaged, and serves as the focal point for U.S.
interests on the world stage.”28 Philip Trimble argues that the president has greater
legitimacy, based on a greater constituency than is found in Congress.

Indeed, says

Trimble, due to the president’s accountability to this greater constituency base, the
president has more authority to exercise his right to use force than the Congress has the
authority to require him to petition it for permission. The Congress serves as a forum for
intense debate and provides support for U.S. forces sent abroad. As a result o f their
shared power, these two bodies are forced into a bargaining situation that often influences
presidential decisions during foreign crises.
In this study, Congress has the capacity to impact foreign policy because it has the
authority to question long-term military intervention. Thus, if the president anticipates
that a particular intervention may last longer than the sixty days allowed by the war
powers resolution, then he must be cognizant of, and consider the views in, Congress.
Thus, there is less congressional oversight in the short term, but intervention in crisis is
often a longer-term affair than sixty days. Without congressional approval o f foreign
policy decisions, the president would still run into roadblocks in implementing policy,
including crisis situations when the president’s popularity tends to rise.

27. M ichael Smith, “Congress, The President, and the U se o f Military Force: Cooperation or Conflict
in the Post-Cold War Era?” P residen tial Studies Q uarterly 28, no. 1 (1998): 51.
28. Ibid.
29. Phillip R. Trimble, “The President’s Constitutional Authority to use Limited Military Force,”
Am erican International Journal o f Law 89, no. 1 (1995): 8 4 -8 7 .
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The president must remain attuned to views in Congress to determine whether or
not he has support for his policy agenda. If he does not, then he may wish to act to
persuade Congress to support him. Congress, for example, could deny funding for
military operations that it finds unnecessary or unappealing, as occurred in the East
Timor crisis, when it cut off military aid to Indonesia. The president’s awareness at the
outset of a crisis that Congress does not support intervention will impact his decision.
Under such circumstances, the president may be required to bargain for support and take
on

a different approach, such as appealing for public support.

Thus, the case study

analyses here consider the orientation o f the Congress to be a vital element in shaping
foreign policy.
The evaluation o f congressional debate on intervention is important because the
more an issue is discussed, the more important it becomes in the minds o f the discussants.
If a crisis is o f high importance, then the consensus regarding intervention policies should
be clearly delineated. In this study, the level o f support in Congress for U.S. policy on
intervention is established by determining the extent to which Congress pressured the
president on foreign policy. A review o f congressional debates regarding intervention
should reveal what type of approach Congress is willing to support. There are two
measures of support in Congress for intervention. First, this study examines resolutions
on each crisis to uncover the formal decision on each case. Whenever possible,
evaluation o f votes should clarify partisan politics impacting each resolution. Second,
consideration o f the debate surrounding intervention for each case should outline the

30.
Since N eustadt’s seminal study, others have written on the bargaining president including: Aaron
Wildavsky, The P olitics o f the B udgetary P rocess (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964); Graham Allison, The
E ssence o f D ecision: Explaining the Cuban M issile Crisis (N ew York: Harper Collins, 1987); Hugh Heclo,
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specific issues involved in the congressional decision. Thus, an exploration o f committee
and subcommittee hearings should include the number o f committee and subcommittee
hearings, and highlight efforts made by members of Congress to influence the president’s
decisions regarding each crisis. This research should reveal the extent o f support in
Congress for intervention in each case as well as overview the issues.

Public Opinion and the Media
This section examines the role o f public opinion and the media in foreign policy
decision making. There are three specific factors to consider regarding public opinion:
the relationship between the president and public opinion, the role o f public opinion polls
in the decision-making process, and the impact o f the media in crisis situations. For its
part, the media plays three vital roles in the relationship between the president and public
opinion: to relay the president’s message, to educate or inform both the president and the
public, and as a lobby to elites for the public. Since the media is so flexible, it is
important for the president to “manage” the media carefully.
First, we shall examine the relationship between the president and public opinion.
The president of the United States receives power from popular support. Yet, as Robert
Dallek points out, the president holds an elected position and public opinion also has
71

power to pressure him.

In this respect, President Clinton was well known for his

domestic orientation. Since the president is theoretically accountable to the public for

The Governm ent o f Strangers (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977); and N elson W. Polsby,
Consequences o f P arty Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
31.
Robert Dallek, The Am erican Style o f Foreign Policy: Cultural P olitics and Foreign Affairs (New
York: Knopf, 1983).
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making policy that will not harm them, there has been extensive analysis o f the
relationship between the president and public opinion.32
Shapiro and Jacobs, for example, examined the pattern o f elite33 responsiveness to
public opinion, and concluded that interest groups and partisan politics substantially drive
policy decisions.34 They show that developments in the relationship peaked during the
Vietnam War and have declined since then.35 Prior to World War I, it was thought that
elites in Congress or the executive drove policy. After World War II, it was thought that
public opinion increasingly drove policy. These findings correspond to the debate on the
Almond-Lippmann consensus.36 Holsti explains that World War I led to the belief that
public opinion impacts foreign policy, but that World War II led to the AlmondLippmann consensus, wherein the elites drive foreign policy. However, the Vietnam War
led to refutation of the Almond-Lippmann consensus. Thus, democratic responsiveness
rose after 1934, peaked in the 1970s, and has declined since.
There is, however, a natural balance in this relationship between the president and

32. For an overview o f the debate on whether public opinion impacts policy making, see Bruce
Russett, C ontrolling the Sword: The D em ocratic Governance o f N ational Security (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1990); Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years o f Trends in
Am ericans' P o licy Preferences (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1991); John Aldrich, John Sullivan,
and Eugene Borgida, “Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates Waltz before a Blind
Audience?” Am erican P olitical Science Review, no. 83 (1989); and Robert Shapiro and Lawrence Jacobs,
“The Relationship between Public Opinion and Public Policy: A R eview ,” in P o litica l B ehavior Annual,
vol. 2, ed.. Samuel Long (Boulder, CO: W estview Press, 1989).
33. For an excellent examination o f the elite in America, see Thomas R. Dye, W ho‘s Running
America: The Bush Restoration, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002).
34. Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R. Jacobs, “Source Material: Presidents and Polling: Politicians,
Pandering, and the Study o f Democratic Responsiveness,” Presidential Studies Q uarterly 31, no. 1 (2001):
150-67.
35. Ole R. Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann
Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates,” International Studies Q uarterly 36, no. 4
(1996): 4 3 9 -6 6 .
36. For an excellent analysis o f the Almond -Lippmann consensus, see Maxine Isaacs, “Two
Different Worlds: The Relationship between Elite and Mass Opinion on American Foreign Policy,”
P olitical Communication 15, no. 3 (1998): 3 2 3 -4 5 ; and Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, “Lyndon
Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking Realist Theory o f Leadership,” P olitical Science
Q uarterly 29, no. 3 (1999): 592 -6 1 6 .
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public opinion. If this balance goes too far in either direction, the other operates to pull it
back into balance. For example, lobby and interest groups form in response to
unresolved issues and thereby function to balance the responsiveness o f elites to public
opinion. Accordingly, if public opinion is excessively ignored by decision-making elites,
then the public will begin to be engaged, and apply pressure on Congress. Once
Congress responds to public pressure, it will in turn place pressure o f its own on the
president. Therefore, once public opinion is engaged it is transformed into a lobby of
sorts, threatening the elite decision-making apparatus with internal division that alters the
balance of power between decision makers and bureaucracies. It is at this critical
juncture that public opinion begins to impact the decision-making process, because it
gains access to representatives, infiltrating the ranks o f the elite decision makers to
generate a shift in policy.
If the president wishes to maintain a cohesive administration while having a
relatively free hand in foreign policy, he must hold a finger on the pulse o f American
public opinion to know if it remains moderate and steady. There is a distinction to be
made between public opinion and public mood. Public opinion is dynamic, but public
mood tends to remain static for a period o f time. James Stimson describes the public
mood as a cyclical process whereby the public strives for moderate policies.37 Based on a
normal distribution, public mood might enjoy rhetorical extremes, but the electorate

37.
James A. Stimson, P ublic Opinion in Am erica: Moods, Cycles, and Swings, 2nd ed. (Boulder,
CO: W estview Press, 1999).
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patterns indicate that the public prefers moderate policies.38 This cycle bears out in the
ever present shifting between conservatism and liberalism, because the public constantly
seeks the middle but is only presented with a two-party system and therefore must either
lean left or right.
Clinton keenly evaluated public mood. He knew that the public wanted to hear
that America supported humanitarian good deeds (mood), but would only pay for such
policy to a point (opinion). The public will not support a long drawn out and involved
war because costs are too high and quickly become extreme. This understanding aided
Clinton in forming moderate policies that found rhetorical favor with the public. Looking
at this from another angle, as long as public opinion remains steady and moderate, there
is little reason for it to organize a lobby to impact the president’s decisions and the
president will maintain relatively greater freedom— moderately speaking, o f course.
Thus, if the president has steady public support, or even disinterest for his policies, he has
a better position vis-a-vis representatives in Congress.39 This is especially true when the
president must sell a moderate policy in the face o f extreme voices in Congress.
Second, the president uses polls for two important but very different purposes.
On one hand, the president uses polls to ascertain what types o f rhetoric would find favor
with the public. Polls are thus important for informing how the president should best
formulate explanations of policy. Knowing how to talk to the public is critical at times o f
crisis, when the president must call for some action that may not find favor among the

38.
Philip Converse was the first to argue that the normal distribution for public opinion is
problematic, because aggregate public opinion does not reflect coherent attitudes, since foreign policy is far
too complex and remote. See Philip Converse, “The Nature o f B e lie f Systems in Mass Publics,” in Ideology
and Discontent, ed. David Apter (N ew York: Free Press, 1964); and John Zaller, The N ature a n d Origins o f
M ass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. chap. 5.
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public at large. The president must generate sufficient public support, if not prior to
intervention, then soon afterward, before there is time for a lobby or interest group to
form. Otherwise, Congress could invoke the War Powers Resolution; this was one o f the
most powerful lessons o f the Vietnam War. After Vietnam, to avoid domestic or
international resistance or hindrance to U.S. policy, foreign policy decision favoring
intervention may need to be “sold” to the public.
Selling foreign policy means that there should be a solid rationale for decisions,
and this requires careful use of rhetoric to explain goals and expectations.40 If the
president is to generate public support, it is imperative that his message makes its way
intact to the public, Congress, and international audiences if at all possible. Press
Secretary McCurry and his colleagues were “engaged in a daily struggle to control the
agenda, to seize the public’s attention, however fleetingly, for Clinton’s wide-ranging
initiatives. They had to package the presidency in a way that people would buy the
product.”41 Presidential rhetoric during crisis is “about the creation o f stable contextual
frames through which to view the event and justify any action taken in response to the
event.”42
The president’s ability to sell his policy makes the public more likely to accept or
support a policy that could affect and displease large numbers o f citizens. This was seen

39. See Samuel Kem ell, G oing Public: N ew Strategies o f P residential Leadership (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1997), 3; and Richard Neustadt, P residen tial P ow er (N ew York: John
W iley and Sons, 1980).
40. John M altese examines the White House Office o f Communications from N ixon to Bush and
concludes that a m odem president must communicate goals, achievements and agendas directly to the
public or indirectly through the press. See John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control: The White H ouse Office o f
Communications and the M anagem ent o f Presidential N ew (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina
Press, 1992).
41. Howard Kurtz, Spin Cycle: H ow the White H ouse and the M edia M anipulate the N ews (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), xv.
42. Kuypers, P residen tial Crisis Rhetoric, 195.
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in the U.S. involvement in Somalia. Many in the United States saw little reason for an
intervention in that country. The president’s explanation emphasized the need to reduce
human suffering and increase democracy abroad. On 26 February 1993, he said, “we
must challenge the changes now engulfing our world toward America’s enduring
objectives o f peace and prosperity, o f democracy and human dignity.”43 Such an
explanation said little about U.S. strategic interests in the region, but it did resonate well
with American beliefs and values based in liberal democracy. Thus, in Somalia, the
president was able to promote public support for intervention by using a rhetoric that
spoke to the American identity.
Public opinion that fails to engage has a lower probability o f generating a lobby in
Congress. As a result, when public opinion shifts, attentive decision makers in Congress
tend to shift as well. As this occurs, attentive representatives are more likely to lobby the
president on behalf of the public. As a result, there would be increased debate and
opposition to policy that counters public opinion. As a result, it is important for the
president to understand what the public wants to hear, so that he can use rhetoric to
enunciate policy in ways that will appeal to the public, even when the content o f the
message is not what the public wants to hear. By doing so, the president can reduce the
chances that public opinion will initiate a shift in Congress to oppose the president’s
policy. Thus, the president has more latitude to operate. It is beyond the scope of this
dissertation to examine the polls in terms o f informative rhetoric.
The president also uses polls to examine public levels of policy receptivity. As
explained above, it is important for the president to know the extent to which his policy

43.
Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Albina Shayevich, and Boris Zlotnikov, eds., The Clinton Foreign P olicy
Reader: P residen tial Speeches with Com mentary (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 9.
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direction differs from the sway o f public opinion. This is so that he can take steps to
moderate public opinion before it begins to engage and assert influence or opposition to
preferred policy. All modem presidents take polls, but in the Clinton administration
“they were virtually a religion.”44 Whenever “Clinton went before the press to argue this
or that position, he was, in most cases, leading where he knew the public would
follow.”45 This approach is part of managing the media in the m odem age.46 By polling
the public, the president remains alert to the public opinion, and can take action as
necessary to explain policies to the public. In this way, the president is motivated not
only to maintain acceptable policies, but also to stay one step ahead o f the public in
forming policy. In this study, poll data are examined to establish levels o f public
acceptance and support for intervention.
Third, the media plays a vital role in the U.S. democratic system. While the term
“media” is often used in the literature, it is not a monolithic entity and in fact
encompasses a variety o f media outlets, including television broadcasting, newsprint,
magazines, and increasingly today, the internet.47 This study primarily examines the role
o f the elite print media (i.e., the New York Times and the Washington Post) in shaping
public opinion and covering the crises we examine. To assess the impact o f the media,
several methods can be explored.

First, we can count the number and length o f articles

or broadcasts on a particular issue or event to establish the extent o f coverage. Second,

44. Kurtz, Spin Cycle, 203.
45. Ibid., 204.
46. For an examination o f varying ways that presidents from Franklin R oosevelt to George Herbert
Walker Bush used to interact with the media, see Mary E. Stuckey, The P resid en t as Interpreter-in-C hief
(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers Inc., 1991).
47. For more about the mass media in the political process, see Doris A. Graber, M ass M edia and
Am erican P olitics, 6th edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 2002).
48. See John T. W oolley, “U sing M edia-Based Data in Studies o f Politics,” A m erican Journal o f
P olitical Science 44, no. 1 (2000): 156 -7 3 .
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we can calculate the number o f times a particular word or phrase is used in articles or
broadcasts, such as “ethnic cleansing” or “genocide.” Third, we can examine the
ideological slant of particular news firms, to establish the extent a newspaper favors a
more liberal or conservative position. The extent to which a newspaper might favor a
more liberal or conservative position inherently shapes what is considered newsworthy
and how a given event is depicted. This study did not intend to and does not provide a
highly quantified measure o f this variable, but it does examine the elite newspapers along
these lines.
In an ideal democracy, the media is the gatekeeper for the public good;
unfortunately, however, this is not always true in practice. The media can remain neutral,
work for the president, inform the president and the public, or even represent the public
as an informal sort o f lobby. This dissertation considers the media as an intervening
variable that is an essential part o f the political process. Here, the media is an intervening
variable because the government recognizes that information is power and therefore
routinely works to manipulate the press as an instrument o f national power.
If the media endorses the message o f the president, it can diminish the ability o f
the public to engage elite attention. The media can, however, encourage or enflame
public opinion to produce a lobby, by pointing out flaws in the administration’s policies
or actions. If the president manages the media well, he may enjoy their endorsement,
making it less likely to either enflame public opinion or allow it to publicize anti
administration items.
The media plays a critical role because the president relies on it to relay his
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message to the American public and to the world at large.49 Since John F. Kennedy, the
importance o f the media has grown in the White House. President Richard Nixon, for
example, was the first president to have a White House Office o f Communications that
was dedicated to developing good media relations. President Ronald Reagan was the first
modem president to fully utilize the power o f the media available to the executive. White
House insider David Gergen reveals a “chaotic” White House under the Clinton
administration; however it was one that paid close attention to relations with the media.50
Today, it is expected that the White House generates news o f the day stories,
which keep the executive in a positive light and set the tone for media relations. An
example is the rally-around-the-president phenomenon that frequently occurs during
crisis situations.51 This characteristic of the media stems from the idea that in a liberal
democracy, the U.S. government provides the media with reliable and credible news.
This leaves the government to set the course o f media relations, as explained by Timothy
Cook, via a “fourth institutional branch” of political government.52
The media is important to the president as a conduit o f information both to and
from the White House. It can tell the president about powerful undercurrents in America
that could threaten the president’s agenda. Thus, despite official efforts to manipulate the
news, the media retains the potential to turn against policy makers in Washington in
situations where public opinion becomes extreme and begins to use the media to lobby

49. For discussion o f various strategies on how a president might gain and maintain popular support,
see Samuel Kemell, G oing Public, Chapter 7.
50. David Gergen, Eyewitness to Power: The E ssence o f Leadership, Nixon to Clinton (N ew York:
Simon and Schuster, 2000), 292.
51. For an explanation o f how the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon works, see Matthew A. Baum,
“The Constituent Foundations o f the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon,” International Studies Quarterly
46, no. 2 (2002): 2 6 3 -9 8 .
52. Timothy E. Cook, G overning with the News: The N ew s M edia as a P o litica l Institution (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1998).
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elites. News reporting is an essential element for democracy, because the press “plays a
major role in rendering opposition effective.”53 The media is a tool for educating the
public on important matters that it would otherwise be unlikely to learn about. It is also a
mouthpiece for public opposition, and thereby becomes a lobby and can impact elite
decision makers by generating division among them.
The media works as a constraint on the president because it speeds up time. For
example, Clinton knew that intervention must have an end strategy that is not too far in
the future, because the public expects to see results quickly and is reluctant to see
American boys put into harm ’s way for an extended period. For example, when the
public saw images of American soldiers as victims o f brutality, it reduced support and
increased opposition for the intervention to the point that elites challenged policy. For
fear of a public backlash, Clinton withdrew U.S. participation from Somalia operations
within six months. As a result, the media played a large role in the U.S. entry into and
exit from Somalia. Clinton’s retreat from the press was prompted by the “CNN effect,”
which “suggests that policy makers only respond when there are scenes o f mass
starvation on the evening news. It also suggests that policy makers obtain most o f their
information about ongoing disaster from media reports.”54 While the direct influence of
the CNN effect on the president is overstated, it can have a mobilizing effect on the
public.
Therefore, the media can become an actor in and of itself, as images and stories
are used to make a profit in a competitive environment. Recent examples include media

53.
Leon V. Sigal, R eporters and Officials: The O rganization a n d P olitics ofN ew sm aking
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1973), 193.
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photos o f atrocities that generated revulsion in the American public. Images o f suffering
or atrocities are highly influential on shaping public opinion in favor o f finding a remedy,
even in cases where they are misleading.55 The public just does not want to see horrible
images on TV, and policy makers are therefore pressured to do something about the
problem. In such cases, by showing the atrocities— for whatever reason—the media
becomes an influencing factor in the policy-making process.
The media often puts its own spin on the news. There has been considerable
research on what is called “indexing” in media reporting.56 Indexing refers to the extent
to which the news staff adheres to a particular point o f view in news reports, be that
official, public, or their own. Indexing could prove important in cases where the
administration’s activities are explained with an underlying or overt spin. It is unclear
whether indexing actually impacts public opinion regarding the president and policy;
however it holds the potential to do so because it represents news with some preexisting
bias. For example, if the media and the president sit in adversarial positions, then the
media might present the president’s message with a critique that could damage the
tendency of the public to offer the president support for policy. Clinton, for example,
increasingly operated at arms length with the media after sensational stories were
published about him. Thus, it remains likely that the media, by interjecting bias, can
intervene between the president and the public by reshaping the rhetoric used by the

54. Andrew N atsios, “Illusions o f Influence: The CNN Effect in Complex Emergencies,” in From
M assacres to G enocide: The M edia, P ublic Policy, a n d Humanitarian Crises, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and
Thomas G. W eiss (W ashington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996), 150.
55. See Tim A llen and Jean Seaton, The M edia o f Conflict: War R eporting a n d Representations o f
Ethnic Violence (London: Zed Books, 1999), 2.
56. See, for example, Lance Bennett, “Toward a Theory o f Press-State Relations in the United
States,” Journal o f Com m unication 40, no. 2 (1990): 103-25.
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president to explain policy, and this gives the media the power to influence public
opinion.
As media shapes news about the president, it also shapes public opinion. In doing
so, the media acts as an intervening variable, sifting the president’s message as it is
relayed to the public. The media, for example, could reawaken powerful images of
domestic opposition that occurred during the Vietnam War as a warning o f foreign policy
gone afoul. In informing the public, the media becomes an integral part o f the
information chain. To be sure, Clinton’s performance “had helped create the sense that
the country was doing just fine on his watch. But it was a carefully honed media
strategy—alternately seducing, misleading, and sometimes intimidating the press—that
maintained this aura o f success.”57
In this study, public opinion is measured by analyzing public opinion polls. Polls
give an indication of how the American public viewed U.S. action during each crisis
under study.58 It is, however, beyond the scope o f this study to examine how the Clinton
administration analyzed the polls to design rhetoric that would be amenable to public
receptiveness. The examination o f the polls reveals the level o f support or opposition to
policy set by the administration under a given crisis situation and reveals the extent of
public influence over policy makers.
In this dissertation, the examination o f public opinion includes the role o f the
media, and considers the extent to which the news supports the position o f the

57. See Joe Conason and Gene Lyons, The Hunting o f the President: The Ten Year Cam paign to
D estroy Bill an d H illary Clinton (N ew York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), xiii.
58. For a clarification o f how polls may portray m isleading results, see Kurt Taylor Gaubatz,
“Intervention and Intransitivity: Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the U se o f Military Force Abroad,”
W orld P olitics 47, no. 4 (1995): 5 3 4 -5 4 .
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administration, or provides its own index of the crisis, or reflects the position o f public
opinion. Since the media is considered to hold the potential to impact public opinion, it is
approached as an intervening variable between the president and his public. Moreover,
the media is an intervening variable because it can become a catalyst for action, either by
influencing public opinion, or by turning itself into a lobby to divide elite policy makers.

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
Each variable has a corresponding hypothesis. The hypotheses are listed at the
beginning and in the conclusion o f this dissertation. The case study findings and analyses
are given in the concluding chapter. The following section explains why the cases of
Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor were selected for analysis in this study.

Case Study Selection
This dissertation uses the Method of Structured, Focused Comparison to examine
three case studies.59 The case studies are occurrences o f small-scale intervention in
which the United States faced risks to vital and peripheral interests. The case studies for
this analysis were selected for six reasons. First, each crisis is similar to the others, in
that it engaged world attention and had its roots in history that went back decades— if not
centuries—prior to the crisis. Consequently, they are all crises that resurfaced in the
deregulated post-cold war environment. These crises could no longer be sublimated
without U.S.-Soviet cold war competition. In addition, cold war rhetoric favoring

59.
See Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theoiy Development: The Method o f Structured,
Focused Comparison,” in D iplom acy: N ew A pproaches in H istory, Theory, a n d P olicy, ed. Paul Gordon
Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979): 4 3 -6 8 .
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containment and U.S.-Soviet animosity cannot be properly compared with the rhetoric o f
the post-cold war era, due to the demise o f the foundation for and acceptance o f
containment rhetoric. Therefore, for comparative purposes, the case studies o f Haiti,
Rwanda, and East Timor fall into the same post-cold war rhetorical category and time
frame.
Second, all three cases occurred during the same administration— under Clinton.
For example, Haiti drew direct economic, political, and military intervention, whereas the
United States balked against involvement in international intervention in Rwanda, and in
East Timor, the United States had mixed responses. The explanation o f existing
dissimilarities should therefore be discemable for reasons other than differences between
administration styles or time periods.
Third, the case studies selected for analysis in this dissertation represent a crosssection o f instances in which vital and peripheral interests were at stake. For example, in
Haiti, refugee issues posed a threat to regional stability and therefore engaged vital U.S.
interests regarding security and economy. Moreover, it was an example o f how
democratic disruption engaged further vital U.S. strategic interests. Peripheral U.S.
interests in Haiti included humanitarian issues. In Rwanda, vital interests referred to
strategic interests and regional stability. Ethnic cleansing and genocide threatened
peripheral U.S. interests regarding international law and human rights. In East Timor,
U.S. interests focused more narrowly on military/security and economic stability o f the
larger region, placing high priority on Indonesia-U.S. relations. In this case, only
peripheral U.S. interests were threatened in East Timor— specifically, the American
values represented in ideals of self-determination and the right to life, liberty, and the
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pursuit of happiness. Thus, the three cases selected represent situations that engaged vital
and peripheral U.S. interests. This combination o f cases gives examples o f each type of
interest plus a combination o f the main categories o f U.S. interests. As a result, a
comparison between these specific case studies should reveal variances in U.S. policy on
military intervention based on the level of interest involved.
Fourth, each crisis represents a different area o f the world. Selection o f these
three case studies places importance on varying geographic proximities to limit
influences on foreign policy due to potential bias based on region, culture, or other
affinity. Therefore, varying geographic regions are considered, including Rwanda in
Africa, Haiti in the Caribbean, and East Timor in Southeast Asia.
Fifth, each crisis represents one o f three different causes o f crisis, including ethnic
genocide, civil violence, or democratic crisis. Accordingly, the case studies for this
dissertation include ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, civil violence in East Timor, and
democratic governance in Haiti. The case on ethnic genocide was selected because
directly invokes the Clinton Doctrine. The cases on civil violence and democratic
governance both fall into strategic goals o f the Clinton administration for democratic
enlargement, as covered in Chapter II. All three cases involve elements o f human rights,
self-determination, and regional stability.
Sixth, each case study represents a small-scale crisis with different degrees of
intervention. High-intensity crises, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, are not considered
because this study focuses on small-scale, low-intensity crises where the United States
has only marginal interests and where the risks are limited. This is an important
distinction, because when U.S. vital interests are at stake, and the costs o f non-
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intervention are substantial, the United States is more likely to intervene. This study,
therefore, focuses on instances o f low-intensity crises where the likelihood o f U.S.
intervention is not a foregone conclusion. In this study, Rwanda represents a crisis in
which the United States experienced very low intensity in terms o f urgency. The United
States chose not to intervene with force to stop the killing in Rwanda. Furthermore, the
United States experienced low intensity in terms o f urgency to provide humanitarian aid
once the killing eased. Similarly, East Timor is low-intensity non-intervention in military
terms and low intensity in humanitarian relief. Haiti, however, ranks as mediumintensity military intervention, because the United States did use military force, but with
low risks. The case studies cover only the lower spectrum o f intensity of intervention.
The selection o f case studies reflects a range o f foreign policy initiatives from sanctions
to incentives, and from apathy to military force.
Table 2 illustrates important elements o f each case. In the table, “Interest” points
to the type o f U.S. interest at stake. As discussed, interests are divided into two
categories: peripheral and vital. Peripheral interests have little or no impact on the
United States. Peripheral interests rank lower in priority than vital interests. Vital
interests include those o f high importance to the United States. In this study, peripheral
and vital interests were at stake for all cases selected.
“Intensity” refers to the level o f engagement to which the United States was
willing to commit. In other words, it entails those items that matter enough to call for
intervention. Low-level intensity, for example, refers to a lack o f U.S. resolve to address
the crisis in a significant way, including a lack o f long-term commitment. Any
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Table 2
Case Study Typology Overview
Case

Interest

Intensity

Reason

Time

Location

Rwanda

vital and
peripheral

very low

humanitarian 1990-94
representation

Africa

Haiti

vital and
peripheral

medium

democracy/
1991-94
humanitarian

Caribbean

East Timor

vital and
peripheral

low

humanitarian 1991-99
self-determination

SE Asia

engagement in this category would only be done at very low risk, very low cost, and very
short-term. A low-intensity crisis would most likely encounter U.S. policy, which
without reference to duration resists committing troops, equipment, or economic
assistance. For this study, East Timor is considered a low-level intensity crisis. Rwanda
was a very low-intensity crisis for the United States. Medium-level intensity indicates
willingness to engage, however only with moderate risk, moderate cost, and for a limited
time. A crisis in this category would likely encounter U.S. policy placing limitations on
troop levels and movement, equipment, and economic resources, and will generally
demand a specific objective. For this study, Haiti is a case in which the United States
displayed moderate intensity. High-level intensity refers to high U.S. willingness to
provide troops, equipment, and resources, and often demonstrates a willingness to
commit to a longer-term resolution. Such crises may have an open-ended time frame,
such as was seen in Kosovo, but are not examined in this study.
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“Reason” in the above table refers to the accepted understanding by policy makers
about what type o f crisis is involved. For this dissertation, the case study crises are all
humanitarian in some form, including peacekeeping, human rights, and ethnic cleansing,
and Haiti experienced democratic breakdown. This column in the table refers to the
decision taken in Washington on each particular crisis, according to the U.S. perspective.
It does not refer to the position taken by other international entities or actors.
The “Time” column in the table refers to the years that the crisis occurred. The
crisis in Rwanda began in October 1990 and ended in late 1994. The crisis in Haiti
began in September 1991 and ended in late 1994. The crisis in East Timor started in
November 1991 and ended in late 1999. These crises all began within two years o f the
beginning o f the post-cold war period, which bespeaks the deregulated international
environment discussed earlier.
The “Location” o f the crisis refers to the area o f the world in which the crisis took
place. As explained earlier, the geographic proximity o f the crisis to the United States
influences the U.S. sense o f urgency. Rwanda is in Africa. Haiti is in the Caribbean.
East Timor is in the Southeast Asia. As a result o f varying geographic distance from the
United States, each case has a different sense o f urgency, with the closest having the
highest level and the farthest having the lowest. The study o f geographic proximity is
made by other authors and is therefore accepted in this dissertation as a natural
phenomenon.

Case Study Structure
Each case study begins with an historical background summary, after which each
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variable is examined at length. All case studies are similarly arranged around the same
five specific variables. The initial variables under examination in each case are found in
the international environment. The first variable includes important U.S. allies or
international organizations other than the UN. The second variable, the United Nations,
represents the international organization as an approximation o f a legitimizing world
body, as already explained. The remaining variables are found in the domestic
environment. The third variable is the U.S. Congress, as the body for domestic political
representation and debate. The fourth variable reveals what U.S. public sentiment means
in terms o f foreign policy, and includes an examination o f the media. The last variable
encompasses U.S. interests under the Clinton administration, including how Clinton or
his advisors portrayed interests in public statements. Each case study concludes with a
brief overview o f critical turning points for each variable as it influenced Clinton’s
foreign policy. Case study findings and analysis are in Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDY ON ETHNIC CLEANSING IN RWANDA

The 1994 crisis in Rwanda resulted in at least a million lives lost in war between
the Hutu and the Tutsi tribes, and culminated in the largest known case o f ethnic
cleansing since World War II. This chapter explores U.S. policies during the crisis to
examine why and how the Clinton administration chose not to intervene militarily to stop
the violence. We begin with a brief historical section, then examine the five international
political variables outlined previously, and conclude with a brief summary o f our
findings.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The Hutu and Tutsi people o f Rwanda had longstanding differences. Historians
are divided on the Hutu-Tutsi relationship prior to colonization.1 Some argue that it was
symbiotic and friendly between Hutu cultivators and Tutsi cattle owners. While the Tutsi
kings ruled most o f Rwanda, the country’s administrative leadership was frequently given
to Hutu. Rwanda was initially a German colony that was placed under the League of
Nations after World War I. It was then turned over under trusteeship to Belgium, as were
Burundi and Zaire. The colonizers disrupted the existing relationship, placing Tutsi in

1.
For an overview o f Rwandan history, see United Nations, The U nited Nations an d Rwanda: 1 9 9 3 1996, United Nations Blue B ook Series, vol. 10 (New York: The United Nations Department o f Public
Information, 1996); Tor Sellstrom, Lennart Wohlgemuth, The Nordic Africa Institute, with contributions
by Patrick Dupont and Karin Andersson Scheibe, The International Response to Conflict a n d Genocide:
Lessons from the Rw anda Experience, 5 vols. (Copenhagen: Steering Committee o f the Joint Evaluation o f
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996); and Larry Minear and Randolph C. Kent, “Rwanda’s
Internally Displaced: A Conundrum within a Conundrum,” in The Forsaken P eople: Case Studies o f the
Internally D isplaced, ed. Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution Press, 1998).
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power positions over the Hutu majority, and instituting a polarized social structure that
caused hatred o f Belgians, who issued the controversial identity cards bearing ethnic
origin that was later key in the genocide. Other historians contend that prior to
colonization, Tutsi rule had led to a two-tiered societal structure, which was deepened
and institutionalized by colonization. Both schools o f thought agree, however, that
during the colonial period the Tutsi minority gained significant power, exploited the Hutu
majority, and spread myths of Tutsi intellectual and political superiority that inflamed
social tension.2 Rwanda-Urundi, as it was known, was split into Rwanda and Burundi in
the 1950s, when decolonization swept across Africa.
Decolonization meant more than throwing o ff the yoke o f foreign colonizers. It
was Hutu emancipation from Tutsi rule and resulted in the flight o f around 120,000 Tutsi
refugees to neighboring states.3 Formal independence was granted on 1 July 1962 to
Hutu president Gregoire Kayibanda, but did not ensure domestic stability. For many
years, periodic violence between the groups caused large numbers o f refugees to collect
in neighboring states. Relentless attacks from Tutsi refugee rebels were launched from
refugee bases in Uganda and Burundi, and caused difficulties for Tutsi in Rwanda as well
as increasing the number o f refugees. Violent exchanges occurred with the Hutu/Peasant
Revolution in 1959-61, and crises in 1963-64 and 1973 in which an estimated 600,000
Tutsi became refugees in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zaire by the early 1990s.4 After
the Hutu regime up-scaled retaliatory Tutsi killings in 1967, the Tutsi rebel attacks eased.
In a military coup d ’etat in mid-1973, Hutu Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana

2. See Catherine Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics o f History in Rwanda,” A frica Today 45, no. 1
(1998): 7.
3. The United Nations, The United Nations and Rwanda, 9.
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seized power and set up single-party rule. Even though Rwanda remained one o f the
poorest countries in the world, the economy thrived for fifteen years, but a slump in
world prices for coffee hit Rwanda’s main export and disrupted the agricultural economy.
In an effort to help, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the African
Development Bank, and the European Union contributed $216 m illion in 1990 and
increased aid to $375 million in 1991 for structural reforms.5 After seventeen years
without ethnic violence, this severe economic downturn set o ff a disastrous spiral of
events, as Habyarimana renewed discriminatory policies that worsened competition for
scarce resources in one o f the most densely populated countries in the world.

The Crisis
For nearly thirty years Tutsi refugees were a source o f regional instability,
involving Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. For example, by 1990, there
were over 470,000 Tutsi refugees in other countries, with 280,000 in Burundi, 80,000 in
Uganda, 80,000 in Zaire, and 30,000 in Tanzania.6 The economic drain on these host
countries prompted the OAU and UN to resolve refugee issues, pressuring Habyarimana
beginning in the late 1980s to implement power sharing reforms. Habyarimana stood to
lose power by these reforms, and he was slow to implement them, but he did allow the
organization o f other political parties.7
Tutsi refugee rebels invaded from Uganda on 1 October 1990, marking the

4. See Sellstrom et al., “Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors,” vol. 1, The International
Response to Conflict and G enocide, 30.
5. United Nations, The U nited N ations a n d Rwanda, 11.
6. Ibid., 11
7. These included the Mouvement democratique republicain (M DR), Habyarimara’s main opposition
party, but also the Parti social democrate (PSD), the Parti liberal (PL), and the Parti democrate chretein
(PDC).
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beginning o f the crisis in Rwanda.8 They killed hundreds o f Hutu and set off intensified
anti-Tutsi activity in Rwanda, such as political arrests and intermittent massacres o f Tutsi
in the countryside. The October Tutsi invasion prompted France, Belgium, and Zaire to
aid the Hutu regime to quell the invasion.
The economic downturn, along with renewed civil war in 1990, left Rwanda’s
economy in ruins. International development assistance did little to end the violence, and
may have exacerbated tensions due to exclusionary politics in elite Hutu circles.9 Two
weeks after the invasion, the leaders o f Rwanda and Uganda agreed to attend a
conference supervised by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)
and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to discuss the refugee issue. They agreed
to negotiate with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and reached a cease-fire on 26
October. The cease-fire lasted until the RPF violated the agreement on 8 February 1993
and accused Habyarimana o f human rights violations,10 including a massacre in January
1993 in northwest Rwanda.11 A day later, the Dar Salaam Declaration committed the
Rwandan government to offering Tutsi refugees a threefold choice. They could return
home to Rwanda, remain in the host country and retain Rwandan citizenship, or become
nationals o f the host country. A cycle o f cease-fire violations and extensions eventually
led to the creation o f an OAU-monitored buffer zone.

8. Such Tutsi activity was repeated on five other occasions prior to the 1994 genocide.
9. For further discussion o f this issue, see Peter Uvin, D evelopm ent, Aid, a n d Conflict: Reflections
from the C ase o f Rw anda (Helsinki: U N University/WIDER, 1996).
10. Claims that the government o f Rwanda violated human rights were subsequently substantiated by
the International Commission o f Inquiry, “alleging serious and widespread human rights abuses and
concluding that the majority o f offenses had been committed by the Rwandese Government soldiers or
officials,” United Nations, U nited N ations and Rwanda, 20.
11. United Nations, “Report o f the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on his
Mission to Rwanda o f 11-12 May 1994,” E /C N .4S-3/3, 19 May 1994, reprinted in United Nations, The
United N ations and Rwanda, 2 8 5 -8 9 .
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Progress in international negotiations was slow. In August 1992, the OAU and
the government of Tanzania sponsored peace negotiations in Arusha.12 Under domestic
and international pressure, Habyarimana finally signed the Arusha Peace Accord on 4
August 1993,13 ending the civil war that had raged since October 1990.
The Accord arranged power sharing between the Hutu government and the Tutsiled RPF, and arranged for the repatriation o f refugees and resettlement o f displaced
persons. It favored the RPF and the opposition, which received the majority interim
cabinet and legislature seats before elections, as well as half o f the officer and 40 percent
of the enlisted positions. This arrangement amounted to an implicit negotiated surrender
of the Hutu army to the Tutsi rebels.14 In the accords, the RPF and domestic opposition
would receive 50 percent o f the officer and 40 percent o f the enlisted positions. Thus,
Habyarimana grasped at the remaining chances to retain leadership and reintroduced ageold anti-Tutsi rhetoric as a method for splitting opposition.
Relations between the Hutu government and the Tutsi RPF were further
complicated by unexpected political trouble in neighboring Burundi. In June 1993,
democratic reforms in Burundi ushered in the first Hutu president. Shortly thereafter, on
21 October, Tutsi rebels assassinated Burundi’s new president and killed thousands of
Hutu. As a result, approximately 375,000 Hutu refugees fled into Rwanda, heightening
Hutu fears there and prompting further anti-Tutsi propaganda.

12. Belgium, Burundi, Germany, France, Senegal, and Zaire also participated.
13. For a general overview o f the fourteen months o f negotiations leading to the Arusha Accord with
analysis based on interviews by a former UN diplomat, see Bruce D. Jones, P eacem aking in Rwanda: The
Dynamics o f Failure (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), esp. chaps. 3 and 4; and Amare Tekle, “The
OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,” in The P ath o f A G enocide: The Rwanda Crisis
from Uganda to Zaire, ed. Howard Adelman, and Astri Suhrke (N ew Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1999), chap. 6.
14. See Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits o f Humanitarian Intervention: G enocide in Rwanda
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 11.
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Rwanda was in a state of near collapse, and Habyarimana began the groundwork
for genocide to eliminate his political opposition and maintain power.15 Habyarimana
and his supporters, threatened by their loss o f power, quickly sought to undermine the
accord by splitting domestic Tutsi-Hutu party alliances. For example, he offered political
moderate leaders, such as Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana from the Mouvement
democratique republicain (MDR) opposition party, positions within his administration.
Such appointments made it possible to monitor and control their activities more closely,
while at the same time breaking them away from previous political cooperation with
opposition RPF elements.16
These events unfortunately fed Habyarimana’s plan to undermine the Arusha
Accord and hold on to power by planning genocide.17 The genocide was highly
organized and planned, with initial perpetrators recruited and trained to kill. Hutu
governmental extremist preparations for the coming genocide included amassing
weapons and machetes, recruiting and training extremist anti-Tutsi militants, expanding
anti-Tutsi networks, and starting up a private radio station, used to incite ethnic violence
against Tutsi. Catherine Newbury proposes that the Hutu placed generalized blame for
social problems on the Tutsi, thereby making all Tutsi in the country “enemies o f the

15. See Timothy Longman, “Rwanda: Chaos from A bove,” in The African State at A Critical
Juncture: Between D isintegration and Reconfiguration, ed. Leonardo A. Villalon and Philip A. Huxtable
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 75 -8 9 .
16. She surprised Habyarimana with her unwillingness to conform to his ideals and may have
contributed to her assassination. See Linda M elvem, A P eople Betrayed: The Role o f the West in R w a n d a ’s
G enocide (London: Zed Books, 2000), 104-5.
17. Proof o f a plot for committing genocide includes the 11 January fax from the UN Force
Commander General Dallaire, reporting that the Hutu militia called the interhamwe was preparing to kill
large numbers o f Tutsi in the Kigali area. See United Nations, The U nited N ations a n d Rwanda, 31.
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state.” 18 The genocide was set into motion as a program to eliminate enemies o f the
state, and when Tutsi rebels learned about these activities, they earnestly trained for war.
On 6 April 1994, the president’s plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile
during its landing approach to Kigali, killing both President Habyarimana and President
Ntaryamira o f Burundi. The double assassination is attributed to extremist forces within
Habyarimana’s Rwandan Army, and Hutu extremists immediately took hold o f the
government. The killing was goal-oriented but departed from common bureaucratic
channels o f authority that would later complicate calls for justice.19 Rwanda, one o f the
most densely populated countries in Africa with approximately one-half o f its population
under age 15, was also very poor. Dire economic conditions made recruitment less
difficult. John Mueller examines Rwanda and shows that ethnic violence used “common,
opportunistic, sadistic, and often distinctly non-ideological marauders,” who were
“recruited and permitted free reign by political authorities.”20 This explains why the RPF
relatively quickly took control of the country: because the killers were cowardly
opportunists, who fled in the face o f military opposition.
Ethnic violence began with the downing o f Habyarmana’s plane. According to
some observers, “within 30 minutes of the plane crash, barricades were thrown up around
Kigali and the killing began.”21 Elimination o f political opposition and moderates was
the first step in launching the genocide. The initial killings targeted not only Tutsi, but
also moderate Hutu politicians, including the much-publicized case o f the first woman

18. Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics o f History in Rwanda,” 7.
19. For more, see A lison Des Forges, Leave N one to Tell the Story: G enocide in Rwanda (N ew York:
Human Rights Watch, 1999), 9.
20. John Mueller, “The Banality o f ‘Ethnic War,’” 43.
21. H olly Burkhalter, “The Question o f Genocide: The Clinton Administration and Rwanda,” World
P olicy Journal 11, no. 4 (1994): 47.
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Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. She had taken office as Prime Minister in July
1993 in accordance with the Arusha Accord. A moderate, who worked toward
diminishing discrimination, she had visited a Tutsi refugee camp in November 1991,
where Tutsi army training was underway. After the visit, she insisted that such training
end, but was ignored by camp directors and local authorities.22 She was assassinated in
her home on 7 April 1994, because she “called for reforms, which would avert further
internal conflicts,” and because she openly opposed existing class structure in Rwandan
society.23
A central element in the extremist strategy was to sow confusion with
disinformation and communications blackouts, so that neither foreigners nor nationals
knew what was happening. In addition, the Hutu government contributed to international
misunderstanding o f the genocide by explaining the massacres as a “spontaneous civilian
outbreak as a result o f incitement from the RPF.”24 It also charged the RPF with
responsibility for the massacres, despite U.S. reports to the contrary. Further
complication stemmed from the difficulty for outsiders to recognize that this new
outbreak o f violence was not a continuation of previous conflict, because it appeared to
be chaotic and anarchic, rather than highly organized.
By 21 April, an estimated 250,000 Tutsi were already dead. This occurred
surprisingly fast, as many seeking refuge were killed by grenade or machete in churches,
schools, stadiums, athletic fields, and hospitals. Sometimes massacres occurred within

22. For more see D es Forges, L eave None, 136.
23. Peter Anyang’ N yong’o, “Governance, Security and Conflict Resolution in Africa,” D iogenes
46/4, no. 184(1998): 136.
24. United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, H earing before the Subcommittee on Africa
o f the Com m ittee on F oreign Affairs House o f Representatives, 103 Cong., 2nd sess., 4 May 1994, 6.
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sight o f clergy or UN observers, who lacked the mandate to intervene. Communication
from Kigali to the countryside by phone was interrupted, so news spread slowly.
Different regions had different rates o f violence throughout the country. By the end of
< \c

April, the largest massacres were already completed.
Unlike most researchers, Robert Kuperman finds that the genocide in Rwanda
happened faster than the West learned o f it. He argues that even if action had been taken
immediately, the genocide would have been achieved anyway, because it was swifter
than a reasonable required response time necessary. The killings were largely over by
April 21, and President Clinton later said that the killers “did their work five times as fast
as the mechanized gas chambers used by the Nazis.”26 Extremists strategically
announced on 11 May that the genocide was already finished, possibly to avoid UN
military intervention. Kuperman argues that “three-quarters o f the Tutsi victims would
have died even if the West had launched a maximum intervention immediately upon
learning that a nationwide genocide was being attempted.”27
Reports have since come to light detailing the UN communications breakdown,28
and declassified U.S. documents point to the likelihood that some U.S. officials “knew
the potential for mass slaughter” at the outset, and held an even higher level
understanding of the situation three weeks in.29 The international community

25. For a chilling account o f personal stories o f genocide, see Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform
You that Tomorrow We w ill be K ille d with Our Families: Stories fro m Rwanda (N ew York: Farrar Straus
and Giroux, 1998).
26. President Clinton’s speech, “Clinton’s Painful Words o f Sorrow and Chagrin,” N ew York Times,
26 March 1998, A 12.
27. Kuperman, Limits o f Humanitarian Intervention, viii.
28 See Barbara Crossette, “Inquiry Says U.N. Inertia in ’94 Worsened Genocide in Rwanda,” N ew
York Times, 17 December 1999: A l, A14.
29.
N eil A. Lewis, “Papers Show United States Knew o f Genocide in Rwanda,” N ew York Times, 22
August 2001, A5.
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misunderstood the conflict, however, seeing it as renewed civil war. Former UN
diplomat Bruce Jones explains that the posture taken by any given state was most likely
dominated by the state o f their previous relationship with Rwanda. For the United States,
the crisis was “driven by bureaucratic, not political actors, never reaching the level even
of secretary of state, let alone the White House.”30 Consequently, the international
community, and especially the United States, sought to bring the two sides to a cease-fire.
The difficulty with negotiating a cease-fire was that condemning the Hutu regime for
committing genocide would make it impossible to support their continued rule. Such
condemnation would ultimately bring the RPF to the political fore, and France and
Belgium in particular did not want this to happen. Thus, the international effort had to
remain neutral.
From late April until the end o f June, the war moved across Rwanda from east to
west.31 Seeing that the Hutu were unable to stop RPF progress, France intervened on 23
June to provide a safe haven in the southwest for their former Hutu allies. The RPF
continued to gain the upper hand until a cease-fire was declared on 18 July 1994.
Rwanda returned to Tutsi rule, but there were massive numbers o f displaced persons and
the economy was a shambles. In addition, Hutu refugees in the French safe haven
presented new opportunities for inverted refugee-inspired instability. Jan Vansina
suggests that a result o f the biased and incorrect information is that there are two general
views on the RPF military move through R w anda32 First, renewed myths o f Tutsi

30. Jones, Peacem aking in Rwanda, 61.
31. For a clear explanation o f the international military component o f the Rwanda crisis, see Larry
Minear and Philippe Guillot, S oldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian L essons fro m R w anda (Paris, France:
Organisation for Econom ic Co-operation and Development, 1996).
32. Jan Vansina, “The Politics o f History and the Crisis in the Great Lakes,” Africa Today 45, no. 1
(1998).
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superiority credit Tutsi with vanquishing the morally deficient Hutu and saving Rwanda
from extremists, even though the Tutsi fought for survival. Second, the RPF conquered
the weakened Habyarimana regime in a move o f geopolitical opportunism.
The crisis in Rwanda occurred in three distinct periods: October 1990 to 6 April
1994 (sporadic civil war), between April 6 and June 23 (the genocide), and after June 23
(severe refugee movement). During the first period, the international effort led to the
Arusha Accord and was followed by attempts to keep the peace agreement in force. The
second period began with the assassination o f the presidents o f Rwanda and Burundi by
extremists, who seized the opportunity to commit genocide. The third period began with
unilateral military intervention by France in Operation Turquoise, and includes U.S.
humanitarian relief effort Operation Support Hope, which ended 27 August 1994.

U.S. ALLIES
France and Belgium were the primary U.S. allies that concerned themselves with
the crisis in Rwanda. Other countries that showed interest included regional actors
concerned with instability and massive refugee movements. Indeed, the genocide set off
a chain reaction that led several African nations into war in the Congo (former Zaire).
The secondary regional actors included Britain, Zaire, Uganda, Burundi, Ghana, Ethiopia,
Senegal, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. These secondary actors are addressed in the analysis of
primary actors, such as France, Belgium, and the Organization o f African Unity, or in
later sections.
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France
French involvement in this crisis complicated the strained relationship between
the Hutu and Tutsi peoples, because France remained supportive o f Hutu leadership in
Rwanda, and partly because of the belief that political legitimacy is derived from
majority representation. This ideology left little room for Tutsi minority in a Hutudominated Rwanda. Thus, the political implications o f the Rwanda genocide suggest that
even though Habyarimana made promises o f integrating Tutsi into political
representation, they remained marginalized because they represented only 7-10 percent
of the Rwandese population. Therefore, a democratic system was insufficient to quell the
fears o f opposing Tutsi and Hutu parties, and the Tutsi were compelled to fight for a
voice in leadership.
In repeated exchanges between the Hutu and Tutsi, Hutu extremists massacred an
estimated 300 Tutsi in 1993, raising the number o f victims to around 2,000 since 1990,
and confounding ongoing peace negotiations. The Tutsi rebels in the RPF retaliated by
launching a well-organized offensive toward Kigali, the capital o f Rwanda. In response,
France nearly doubled the 250 troops already in country. The RPF agreed to a cease-fire,
lest they appear overly militant and thereby risk losing international diplomatic support.
France wanted to reduce its troop levels, but this step might have threatened Hutu rule
since French military support was essential for Habyarimana to maintain power.
Consequently, France maintained a military contingent in Rwanda, even though Tutsi
rebels retreated to the mountains along the Ugandan border.
Around that time, Belgium withdrew its forces, and France absorbed the Belgian
sphere o f influence. According to some analysts, France experienced competitive
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concerns about the waxing influence o f the United States. For example, Peter Schraeder
recently described the U.S.-French relationship as one o f competition— for a sphere o f
influence in francophone Africa—that functioned as a zero-sum game. He argues that
due to “ongoing changes in the foreign policy regime o f the cold war era that we are
witnessing the rise o f U.S.-French competition and conflict in francophone Africa.”33 He
based his analysis on growing economic blocks that are a result o f competition between
France, the United States, Germany, and Japan. He explained that democratization was
made a precondition for improvement of economic and political relations between the
two countries. Moreover, he stated that bold “rhetoric was obviated by the reality o f
ongoing foreign aid programs designed to keep pro-French elites in power.”34 Thus, the
French involvement in the Rwanda humanitarian crisis had everything to do with
perceptions o f democratization that were the trappings o f a zero-sum game between Paris
and Washington.
To take this argument one step further, the civil war in Rwanda was carried out
between French-speaking Hutu and English-speaking Tutsi. France therefore supported
the Hutu, a longtime ally, and the United States would have had more interest in seeing
the RPF gain dominance in Rwanda, since it used English and was trained in the
Ugandan army by the British.35 In addition, France has been charged with finding it
difficult to adapt to its changed role in francophone Africa—including Rwanda—despite
the fact that Rwanda had not been French but rather a German colony and a Belgian trust.

33. Peter J. Schraeder, “Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining United States— French Competition in
Francophone Africa,” P olitical Science Q uarterly 115, no. 3 (2000): 405.
34. Ibid., 407.
35. See Marlise Simons, “France’s Rwanda Connection: Military Intervention by Paris Reveals Some
African Links,” N ew York Times, 3 July 1994, 6L.
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To illustrate, American officials indicated that Secretary o f State Warren Christopher’s
bitter position against a U.S. visit to Africa was due to “French anxiety over losing its
grip on a region it has long controlled.”36 Although denied by U.S. officials, the United
States stood to gain an English-speaking ally in Rwanda with RPF leadership, an ally
with pre-existing and attractive ties to the U.K.37 Mahmood Mamdani argues that France
has not been held accountable for its imperialist intervention, which was explained away
as a humanitarian intervention, regardless o f the fact that it stepped in to save the very
government which had only a short time earlier committed genocide.38
To its credit, France’s threat o f withdrawal placed increasing political, military,
and financial pressure on Habyarimana to implement democratic reforms. The Rwandan
army remained heavily dependent on French military support, since the Tutsi rebels
claimed a small territory in the north, and by 1990 it had advanced to within forty miles
of the capital city o f Kigali. Tutsi rebel alliances with political parties in Rwanda
generated internal political threats to Habyarimana. Hutu elite fears were exacerbated
with the departure o f French troops and the arrival o f a UN peacekeeping force in late
1993, because they saw their influence slip away.
Beyond language ties between France and Rwanda, the Hutu government had
enjoyed strong relations with France for many years, which were particularly close
between Fran?ois Mitterrand and Habyarimana. For example, Habyarimana’s private
Mystere Falcon airplane had been a personal gift from M itterrand’s son Jean-Christophe,

36. Howard W. French, “United States and French Sniping Heats up over Paris’s Links to Africa,”
N ew York Times, 17 October 1996, A13.
37. Simons, “France’s Rwanda Connection,” 6L.
38. Mahmood Mamdani, “Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum,” The N ation 270, no. 18, 8 May

2000 : 22 .
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who served as special advisor at the Elysee Palace. Despite such close relations with
Rwanda, France adamantly opposed Belgium’s April 1994 UN request to authorize a
multinational militarily force to intervene, France worried that the RPF would stand by its
earlier pledge to fight the French. More disconcerting was the fear that past French
involvement in Rwandan politics could make any military intervention, even a UN
authorized mission, to “be mistaken for an attempt at supporting the provisional
government and lead to military clashes with the RPF.”

These worries compelled

France to initiate Operation Amaryllis, on the same day, to evacuate foreign nationals
from Rwanda, and from the French embassy in Kigali, which was closed on 12 April.
Despite its earlier hesitation, France “offered” to conduct a UN humanitarian
intervention under Chapter VII o f the UN Charter,40 an offer that was eventually accepted
with UN Security Council Resolution 929 o f 22 June 1994. “Operation Turquoise,”
launched the very next day,41 revealed the poor condition o f the Hutu army. The Hutu
were disappointed that France refused to lend military assistance to their cause, but
France wanted to avoid confrontation with the RPF whenever possible. Its troops secured
a Safe Humanitarian Zone (SHZ) to protect Hutu from Tutsi reprisals. In spite o f such
caution, an exchange of fire with the RPF in mid-July convinced the French that the RPF
was not afraid to confront their troops, even though it did not want a full-blown military
confrontation. Consequently, the RPF accepted French presence even though they

39. Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: H istory o f a G enocide (N ew York: Columbia University
Press, 1995), 2 3 4 -3 5 .
40. J. Matthew Vaccaro, “The Politics o f Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster R elief in Rwanda,” in
UN Peacekeeping, Am erican Politics and the Uncivil Wars o f the 1990s, ed. W illiam J. Durch (N ew York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 385.
41. For background on the development in Paris o f Operation Turquoise, see Prunier, The R w anda
Crisis, 2 8 1 -3 1 1 . For more about Operation Turquoise, see Kuperman, Lim its o f H umanitarian Intervention,
44-51.
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divided Rwanda and protected Hutu. For the most part, the RPF had control o f Rwanda
and was in the process of institutionalizing its legitimacy.
By mid-July, France was the only country that still acknowledged the former
Hutu regime as the legitimate government of Rwanda. By this time, it had become clear
that this regime had planned, initiated, and committed genocide o f Tutsi in Rwanda.
Moreover, the French presence in southwest Rwanda was increasingly criticized for
protecting and assisting a genocidal regime. France stayed in Rwanda for two more
months, but withdrew on 21 August as agreed. As the time for French departure came,
an estimated two million refugees streamed out o f the SHZ in July and August.42 Despite
the now well-known fact that Operation Turquoise assisted and protected the Hutu
government in Rwanda, “France has never sought to apologize, admitted any fault or
even publicly questioned its backing o f the Hutu-dominated regime before, during and
after the massacre.”43 A 1998 parliamentary inquiry initiated an investigation into the
question of French complicity in the genocide, including providing arms to the Rwandan
government during the time after Habyarimana’s assassination.
Not only did the French intervention in Rwanda protect the French sphere of
influence in Africa, but also, more importantly, when France unilaterally intervened in
Rwanda, no one else needed to. Thus, the French intervention took the pressure off the
United States to end the genocide. As will be shown, the United States only reconsidered
inaction after France departed Rwanda, leaving the Hutu to flee in fear o f reprisal killings
at the hands of angry Tutsi. Thus, the United States would not need to take action until a
new refugee problem appeared.

42. See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 312.
43. “Humanitarian? France and Rwanda,” Economist 347, no. 8065 (1998): 48.
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Belgium
As a post-colonial power, Belgium had troubled relations with the Hutu regime in
Rwanda partly because it had historically supported Tutsi rule, and relations in Rwanda
deteriorated severely for the Belgians during the time leading up to April 1994.
Habyarimana already felt betrayed when the sale o f Belgian weapons to Rwanda was
stalled after the October 1990 RPF invasion. When Belgium supported the 1993 Arusha
Accord, which favored the RPF, relations with Rwanda worsened further.
Habyarimana started a pro-government radio station, Radio et Television Libre
Mille (RTLM), that accused Belgium of supporting the RPF. Reasons for this mistrust
were varied. First, the RPF located its European office in Brussels— lending credence to
the idea that Belgium was the enemy alongside the RPF. Second, Belgium sought to
enlarge the UN mandate several times in early 1994, but remained unable to conduct
security operations without prior notification o f the Rwandese government. Fearing an
explosive violent outburst, Belgium again asked the UN for a less restrictive mandate.
The United States and the U.K. opposed such requests however, because they would have
changed the peacekeeping mission into a more confrontational peace-making mission.
Third, Belgium aimed at stopping the violence, but only as part of a multilateral UN
operation. When asked later, Dallaire said that his forces were neither sufficient nor
trained to perform such rescue operations, even if he had known what was happening at
the time where Belgian soldiers were killed. He later said that if he had been given 5,000
well-trained troops in April, he could have stopped much o f the killing.44 But having

44.
See Scott R. Feil, Preventing Genocide: H ow the E arly Use o f F orce might have S uceeded in
Rwanda (N ew York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998), 33.
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already been humiliated in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali objected to converting peacekeeping
into peacemaking in Rwanda.
The UN response was to provide Belgium with 200 Ghanaian peacekeepers in
Kigali, who redeployed from the northern demilitarized zone o f Rwanda. In essence, this
adjustment was o f little help to Belgium because it needed well-equipped and
experienced peacekeepers. In mid-March, the Belgium government again asked the UN
to reconsider its mandate. These efforts convinced Habyarimana that Belgium could not
be trusted, and he authorized propaganda that resulted in Belgians being the only foreign
nationals targeted by RTLM after the killings began.45
In a horrible incident on the morning after Habyarimana was killed, ten Belgian
Blue Helmets were killed while protecting the moderate Prime M inister Agathe
Uwilingiyimana, who was assassinated. UN Commander Dallaire had not rescued the
Belgian peacekeepers held hostage at the army base, because he was en route to a crisis
meeting called by Hutu extremist Colonel Bagosora. Here is a description o f his ride:
In the car with him were a Rwandan and a Belgian officer. All were unarmed.
As Dallaire later recalls events, when passing Camp Kigali he saw bodies on the
ground inside the compound; they appeared to be Europeans. Making inquiries,
he was told that they were not Belgians, and that he could not enter to investigate
due to chaotic conditions in the compound where the soldiers were rebelling.
Just as Somalia shocked the U.S. public, this event shocked Belgium, and it recoiled.
Within three days, Belgium sent 250 soldiers to rescue nationals from Kigali. Belgian
foreign minister, Willy Claes, asked the UN to modify the UN Assistance Mission in

45. African Rights, Rwanda: D eath, D espair, an d Defiance, rev. ed. (London: African Rights, 1995),
1114.
46. Astri Suhrke, “Dilemmas o f Protection: The Log o f the Kigali Battalion,” in The P ath o f a
Genocide: The R w anda C risis from U ganda to Zaire, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 261.
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Rwanda (UNAMIR) mandate, allowing military intervention to stop the killing in
Rwanda, because he believed that removing foreign nationals from Rwanda would give a
free reign to the violence. France and the United States again opposed military
intervention. As a result, Belgium formally withdrew its troops from UNAMIR on 14
April, partly because of increased domestic ethical and financial objections, not to
mention growing military discomfort since the violent end o f its colonial power in
Congo.47 The last Belgian peacekeeper departed Kigali five days later.
The departure o f the Belgian forces from UNAMIR severely hampered the UN
capabilities to operate in Rwanda. Belgian withdrawal meant the loss o f the most
specialized and highly trained UN troops in Rwanda at the time. As a result, Commander
Dallaire ordered UN troops to follow strict rules o f conduct, including a curfew and
restricting movements.
The Belgian withdrawal from UNAMIR reverberated through the international
community. For this study, it is relevant to note that the UN peacekeeping force in
Rwanda depended greatly on the experienced and well-equipped Belgians. Moreover,
Belgium had long-term interests in Rwanda, and to pull out overnight surprised the UN
and the United States. Their withdrawal disheartened and weakened remaining
peacekeeping forces, and increased the belief in the UN and the United States that
nothing could be done to help Rwanda.

The Organization of African Unity
The OAU is charged with promoting regional stability, but its efforts to resolve

47.
See Alain R ouvez with the assistance o f Michael Coco and Jean Paul Paddack, D isconsolate
Empires: French, British, and Belgian M ilitary Involvement in P ost-C olon ial Sub-Saharan Africa

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94
the conflict were hampered by structural weaknesses common to post-colonial African
states, and suffered from limited economic means. The OAU’s mission was based on
principles o f nonintervention, noninterference, and the sanctity o f colonial boundaries,
with a jurisdiction limited to interstate conflict. The OAU’s deep concern with the crisis
in Rwanda was limited because its mission is conflict resolution, not prevention. It
established a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG), as spelled out in the N ’sele
cease-fire agreement o f 29 March 1991, to monitor the cease-fire between the RPF and
the Rwandan Army. Even though the NMOG reported to the OAU Secretary o f the
Security Council, it was plagued with severe logistical and financial limitations that left
the it dependent on contributions from wealthier and more capable non-member states
such as France, Belgium, Germany, and the United States.48
Despite its shortcomings, the OAU succeeded in negotiating an agreement that
was signed in Arusha, Tanzania in 1993. Because the OAU recognized early the
potential for regional instability and violence from civil war in Rwanda, it attempted to
enforce the Arusha Accord negotiations, and even delayed fifty monitors in Rwanda to
keep a watch on its border with Uganda. Yet, due to limitations in mission and
capabilities, the OAU could not stop the civil war in Rwanda prior to, during, or after the
April genocide, and the OAS sought international assistance from the UN, thus reducing
its role. Furthermore, member states resisted sponsoring OAU missions in Rwanda for
three reasons. First, the Rwandan government viewed the OAU as “predisposed to the
RPF position and not reliable.”49 Second, the unsatisfactory performance o f the OAUsponsored troops during the NMOG mission, meant that the troops it could muster were

(Lanham, MD: University Press o f America, 1994), 378.
48. Tekle, “The O A U 119.
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mostly poorly trained, and did not have the necessary equipment or resources for
peacekeeping. As a result, the UN requested other members to provide equipment and
training. Third, the UN opposed the proposal, because the inability o f the OAU to
effectively promote peace in Rwanda was often due to a breakdown in negotiations
caused by disputes over the performance o f NMOG. Such division led to increased
involvement o f the UN in peacekeeping operations, and the NMOG was absorbed into
the UN Uganda-Rwanda Observation Mission (UNUROM) operations in June 1993.
Despite the OAU’s interest in resolving the crisis, it was no more ready than the
UN “to call genocide by its rightful name,” 50 but instead called the massacres “carnage
and bloodletting” and “massacres and wanton killings.”51 Like the rest o f the
international community, the OAU publicly recognized the genocide in early June, as
France was preparing for intervention.

THE UNITED NATIONS
The Arusha Accord notified the UN that the government o f Rwanda would work
honorably with the RPF to build a new nation based on shared power. This misjudgment
contributed to the international misunderstanding that it was, in fact, the Rwanda
government that was committing genocide against the Tutsi minority, and that the Tutsiled RPF was invading Rwanda to protect Tutsi civilians. This error allowed the Rwandan
representative to remain in the UN Security Council, where he misconstrued facts. The
resulting inaction on the part o f the international community to stop the genocide in

49. Jones, Peacekeeping in Rwanda, 104.
50. D es Forges, L eave None, 643.
51. United Nations Security Council, 3377th Meeting, Monday, 16 May 1994, S/PV /3377, quoted in
Des Forges, L eave None, 643.
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Rwanda, therefore, generated an ethical morass for all involved— or not involved, as the
case may be.
The UN approached the crisis in Rwanda by demanding that a cease-fire be
maintained prior to UN assistance, and underscored the lack o f understanding o f the
situation at hand. Despite warnings from the field, UN headquarters did not recognize
the genocide in a timely manner. As Turid Laegreid explains, UN operations in Rwanda
were implemented according to political and financial considerations to avoid another
Somalia, leaving those in the field ineffective due to logistical incapacity,52 and helpless
to convince headquarters of what was happening around them.
To bring the warring sides together, UN Resolution 846 on 23 June 1993 created
the UN Uganda-Rwanda Observer Mission (UNUROM) to facilitate ongoing
negotiations o f the Arusha Accord and to monitor troop movements at the UgandaCO

Rwanda border.

Commander Romeo Dallaire was appointed commander of

UNUROM, but securing troops for UNUROM was very slow, and it was deployed after
the Arusha Accord was signed on 4 August 1993. To support the cease-fire agreement,
the UN Secretary-General recommended in September that the Security Council send a
peacekeeping force, and on 5 October UN Resolution 872 created UNAMIR to arrange
and deploy a 2,500 neutral military monitoring force to ensure implementation o f the
Arusha Accord. A t this time UNUROM was integrated into UNAMIR.
After the unfortunate peacekeeping humiliation in Mogadishu in early October
1993, UN members pressured for reduced peacekeeping operations. The Somalia

52. Turid Laegreid, “U .N . Peacekeeping in Rwanda,” in The P ath o f a G enocide, ed. Adelman and
Suhrke, chap. 11.
53. UN, “SC/RES 846,” 23 June 1993Reprinted in United Nations, “The United Nations and
Rwanda, 1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 6 ,” 167-8.
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debacle happened just two days before the date that the UN was to vote on sending troops
to Rwanda and generated pressure against peacekeeping altogether, particularly from the
United States and U.K. The world thought that it was seeing a renewed civil war in
Rwanda, and therefore placed a mandate into effect, which required the warring parties to
come to a cease-fire prior to making peacekeeping arrangements. This belief was, as we
now know, incorrect.
Rwanda received its seat as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in
January 1994. Given that Rwanda held a revolving seat on the Security Council at the
time, it is highly plausible that extreme versions o f the situation were either not presented
or were misconstrued to the Council by the Rwandan representative. Linda Melvem
evaluated the ability o f the UN to handle complicated peacekeeping missions and argued
that secrecy in Security Council decision-making had made the Security Council
“unaccountable.”54 In addition, Jan Vansina argued that “the small volume o f more
valuable evidence remains unavailable” to researchers.55 Many accounts testify to the
fact that the Hutu Rwanda representative in the Security Council at the time presented the
situation to the Council as a civil war in which both sides were equally involved, and it
could therefore not be considered genocide. Thus, if the Security Council had been
presented the intelligence indicating preparations for genocide, it is likely that it would
have been rebuffed or misconstrued by the Rwanda representative. Under such
conditions, it is likely that the Security Council could have remained unconvinced for a

54. Linda M elvem , “The Security Council: Behind the Scenes,” International Affairs 77, no. 1
(January 2001): 102.
55. Vansina, “The Politics o f History,” 38. Vansina argues that this scarcity o f valuable information
makes historiography o f the Rwanda crisis problematic.
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longer period of time than would have been the case had Rwanda not held a seat on the
Security Council.
Adding to the response time, it is not uncommon to seek confirmation o f initial
reports in the field, especially if they are extreme. In this case, President Habyarimana
was linked to the genocide, so confirmation requests may have prolonged Hutu extremist
leadership, rather than stopped it. This issue is complex, however, because the UN
peacekeepers were only in Kigali with the permission o f the Rwanda government and
therefore could just as easily be asked to leave.
On 11 January 1994, UNAMIR Commander Romeo Dallaire faxed the UN about
a report from an informant that extremists were planning to provoke new civil war. They
were also planning to kill Belgian peacekeepers in hopes o f prompting their withdrawal,
and use a 1,700-member interahamwe militia to kill Tutsi. Dallaire was denied an
expanded mandate for permission to conduct arms seizures. Linda Melvem argues that
the Secretariat staff, who received the 11 January fax from Dallaire, failed to convey its
contents or other dire warnings to the Security Council.56 Moreover, what little
information held by the United States and France was not shared with the Security
Council. The failure to inform the Security Council o f Dallaire’s fax or requests for
increased mandate was to avoid clashing with such major powers as the United States.57
It could have also happened to avoid sticky relations within the Council— on which the
genocidal Rwandan government held a rotating seat— or because the fax was o f such an
extreme nature that it was dismissed as overreaction on the part o f Dallaire. Such claims
needed to be substantiated by other sources. Thus, the Secretariat staff failed to fully

56. M elvem , “The Security Council,” 103.
57. D es Forges, Leave None, 19.
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inform the Security Council regarding the severity o f the situation in Rwanda as the
momentum toward genocide grew. It is possible, however, that France, Belgium, and the
United States had at least an inkling o f what was happening, because “Dallaire, on
Annan’s orders, passed along the informant’s allegations to those ambassadors.”58
It was difficult for Dallaire to convince headquarters that preparations for
genocide were being made, partly because he was forced to work through the Rwandan
government. On 14 January, the UN denied Dallaire permission to raid arms caches
without seeking prior confirmation o f such information from President Habyarimana.
Such prior confirmation from Habyarimana ultimately compromised the success o f any
future raid, because it was under the Habyarimana regime that preparations for genocide
were made. In February 1994, Dallaire learned about the deteriorating situation,
continued weapons distribution, and lists o f targets for death squads, and requested
reinforcements from UN headquarters in New York to no avail.
In an attempt to reach a cease-fire, the UN Security Council passed Resolution
909 on 5 April 1994, renewing the UNAMIR mandate, but threatening to pull out within
six weeks unless the Arusha Accord was implemented. At the time o f President
Habyarimana’s assassination, UNAMIR had three infantry battalions in Rwanda
authorized under Chapter VI, and was therefore not mandated to intervene with force.
After Habyarimana’s plane crash on 6 April, the UN peacekeeping troops initially tried
for a few hours to hold the peace according to the terms o f the Arusha Accord, but they
were neither outfitted nor trained for such operations, and were therefore ordered to
withdraw to their posts. While this left the local population more vulnerable to the

58.
Bruce Wallace, “The Rwanda Debacle: United Nations Issues Report on Rwandan G enocide,”
M aclean ’s, 10 Jan 2000, 34.
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impending genocide, the UN mission was one o f peacekeeping, not peace making or
enforcement. Other reasons that the international community did not intervene include
the lack o f accurate intelligence, the speed o f the killings, the difficulties o f airlifting
sufficient forces to Africa, and the lack o f political will to intervene.
In the initial days after 6 April, it was widely thought that the violence was due to
the resumption o f the civil war, since there were both Hutu and Tutsi casualties. As a
result, the UN was more concerned with stopping the spiraling costs o f peacekeeping, or
helping to settle a civil war, than in the possibilities that the unthinkable was taking place
in the middle of Africa.
With the deaths o f the Belgian peacekeepers, Western countries began evacuation
o f all foreign nationals beginning on 9 April. France began Operation Amaryllis, in
which 190 French paratroopers took control o f the Kigali airport for emergency
evacuations. The next day, Operation Silverback brought in 450 Belgian and 80 Italian
troops to evacuate nationals. By 13 April, almost all Westerners had been evacuated.
Belgium’s withdrawal from UNAMIR on April 14 generated concern among
other troop contributors, because o f the low number o f troops in the country during the
genocide, who were not trained or equipped to deal with attackers in confrontational
situations (such as protecting large groups while being pursued by attackers). The
withdrawal o f the highly trained Belgians diminished international confidence, and
member states grew less willing to commit troops. The deaths of the Belgian
peacekeepers demonstrated that violence would extend to anyone attempting to interfere,
including the UN. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote a letter to the Security
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Council President Colin Keating o f New Zealand with concerns about the possibility of
ending the UN peacekeeping mission to Rwanda, after the pull-out o f the Belgians.59
On 15 April, Dallaire identified local unrest as mutual violence in which both
sides were pounding “each other.”50 Such early reports portrayed violence as a civil war
type o f conflict, rather than as genocide. Former UN diplomat Bruce Jones explains that
UN actions were not o f neglect, or aimed to prevent genocide, but “to prevent an
escalation of the crisis and to lay the groundwork for peace.”61
Three weeks into the crisis, the killings and massacres were clearly suspicious,
and it became clear that the violence was highly centralized and that chaos and anarchy
did not rule the day as thought. Carefully planned propaganda campaigns represented
chaotic internal turmoil to the outside world. Initially, fears of another debacle in a
decentralized African state, such as occurred in Somalia, increased pressure to hold down
peacekeeping costs and mandates from the UN. This led to a reduction o f the Rwanda
mission force to 270, one-third the size of that originally proposed. Moreover, the
mandate was further reduced from that spelled out in the Arusha Accord. Thus, the crisis
in Rwanda found the UN ill-prepared and without mandate to counteract the highly
organized genocide that took place in April 1994. On 1 May 1994, Dallaire again
requested 5,000 troops.
After Oxfam announced genocide against the Tutsi was underway in Rwanda, the
Security Council debated the official use o f the word at length, because using the word
“genocide” would invoke the 1948 Geneva Convention and automatically require the UN

59.
See Reuters, “U .N . Considers Pulling Troops Out o f Rwanda,” The Washington Post, 14 April
1994, A26.
60. Quoted in Kuperman, Limits o f Humanitarian Intervention, 25.
61. Jones, Peacem aking in Rwanda, 2 -3 .
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to intervene. Six weeks into the crisis, the world understood that it was genocide, not
civil war. Reports o f genocide led to an international public outcry, and the UN passed
Resolution 918, authorizing military intervention under UNAMIR II on 17 May. The
resolution declared that the crisis “constituted a threat to peace and security in the
region,” placed an arms embargo against Rwanda, increased the number o f authorized
troops to 5,500, and authorized safe zones for “displaced persons, refugees and civilians,”
and to “provide security and support for the distribution o f relief supplies and
humanitarian relief operations.”62
Securing troops was very slow; however, the United States did not want to place
troops into a confrontation between the RPF and the Rwandan army, and required
additional information on the situation in the field. The delay was also partly due to
unwillingness o f other members to commit troops and the inability o f those willing to
actually get their troops into the theater. On 25 May, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Senegal
committed to provide 800 troops each with Zimbabwe and Nigeria making similar
promises quickly. Actual deployment was slow because until mid-August there was no
transportation for the 800 troops that were promised by Ethiopia. On 1 June 1994,
Dallaire publicly appealed to the United States to supply fifty armored personnel carriers
(APCs) to UNAMIR to use in evacuating trapped civilians.63 In less than a month, the
United States had Dallaire’s APCs in Uganda ready to use.
UN Security Council Resolution 925, adopted on 8 June employed the term

62.
U N , “SC/RES 918,” 17 May 1994 (ww w.un.org/docs/scres/1994/9421836e, accessed on 21
September 2001), 4 (hereafter cited as U N “SC/RES”).
63. See “U N Commander in Rwanda Asks United States A id ," N ew York Times, 2 June 1994, A5.
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“genocide” for the first time in a Security Council document., agreed to dispatch troops.54
It also banned the use o f the media as a vehicle to incite violence and ethnic hatred.
UNAMIR II never fully got off the ground, and by the time troops arrived in Rwanda it
was too late to stop the genocide. On 11 June, the UN sent special rapporteur DegniSegui to Rwanda to investigate human rights violations. His report was published in
Geneva in late June, and revealed that massacres had occurred across Rwanda as part o f a
planned and systematic genocide campaign. The early genocide in Rwanda had been
perpetrated by the Hutu extremist government by using special forces called the
Interhamwe that had been specially recruited and trained. The Rwandan army helped the
Interhamwe. Once the RPF began to advance through Rwanda and the genocide against
the Tutsi stopped; however, killings o f soldiers, political, and military leaders with their
families began to arise in RPF held territories. UN Security Council Resolution 928
reiterated a general and complete arms embargo against Rwanda.65
W ith a new understanding o f the nature o f the violence, UN Security Council
Resolution 929 authorized France to intervene in Rwanda on 22 June 1994 after France
announced that it would unilaterally intervene. The mandate was o f “strictly
humanitarian character” to be “conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion,” rather than
as “an interposition between opposing forces.”66 The mission was only authorized to

64. U N , “SC/RES 925,” 8 June 1994 (w w w .un.org/docs/scres/1994/944454e, accessed on 21
September 2001).
65. See U N , “SC/RES 928,” 22 June 1994 (w w w .un.org/docs/scres/1994/9425620e, accessed on 21
September 2001).
66. U N , “SC/RES 929,” 22 June 1994 (w w w .un.org/docs/scres/1994/9426027e, accessed on 21
September 2001).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104
operate for two months, and Operation Turquoise began at dawn on 23 June and fell
under considerable international critique.
As a result o f these killings, the UN began further investigations on 1 July 1994
with UN Security Council Resolution 935, establishing an “impartial Commission of
Experts” to investigate allegations o f serious violations o f human rights, including
“possible acts o f genocide.” 67 Moreover, it spelled out that an international tribunal
would handle prosecutions. Robert Gersony, a consultant to the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, determined in August that the “RPF had engaged in widespread and
systematic slaughter o f unarmed civilians.”68 In September, the UN “suppressed the
culminating report,” but demanded that the RPF stop the killings, after which they
subsided.69
The violence in Rwanda generated the fastest mass exodus o f refugees that the
international system had ever faced. On 5 July, French forces established a humanitarian
sector in southwest Rwanda, again triggering extreme refugee movement into and out of
the area. When the violence began in April, there were a quarter o f a million refugees
crossing into Tanzania within the first 24 hours. Many o f these were Tutsi fleeing from
Hutu violence. Within a few days, that number swelled to half a million. By the end o f
July, numbers of refugees in Goma had reached a million. The later refugees not only
included Tutsi, but also many Hutu, who were fleeing from possible Tutsi reprisal
violence. Conditions in Goma during this time worsened as the camps there were
overwhelmed, and a Cholera outbreak took the lives o f around 50,000 in a few weeks.

67. U N , “SC/RES 935,” 1 July 1994 (w w w.un.org/docs/scres/1994/9427351e.htm , accessed on 29
January 2002).
68. D es Forges, L eave None, 14.
69. Ibid.
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By August, there were around 1.3 million refugees in Zaire, 530,000 in Tanzania, and
200,000 in Burundi.70
The UN Security Council decided on 25 August that it would not allow Rwanda
to take its turn as the revolving president o f the council. Ironically, this decision came
after the Hutu regime was replaced by the RPF led regime, thereby removing the regime
that stopped the genocide rather than the one that committed it.
It was approximately six months before the UN could gather the troops and
equipment to fill the May mandate. By then the fighting had largely ceased the RPF had
control. The Chapter VI mandate was insufficient for the monumental task at hand:
humanitarian assistance and reconstruct. Additionally, in the aftermath o f the crisis,
bringing genocide perpetrators to justice was very slow and problematic, despite UN
Security Council Resolution 955, which established an international criminal court for
criminals in Rwanda in November 1994.

THE U.S. CONGRESS
In March 1993, even before the Somalia humiliation, Congress debated financial
issues in conjunction with UN peacekeeping missions. At the time, there were 12 UN
peacekeeping missions, with the mission in Cambodia thought to be the most costly ever.
With over 22,000 people involved in the country, that mission had already cost $2 billion,
and corruption was a problem. As a result, in June 1993, Congress rejected Clinton’s
request for $293 million for additional 1993 peacekeeping assessments and in July, “both

70. These figures are from United States House, “Testimony o f Dennis McNamara, Director,
Division o f International Protection, UN High Commissioner for Refugees,” in H earing before the
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights o f the Com m ittee on International Relations
House o f Representatives, 105 Cong., 2nd sess., 5 May 1 998,21.
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the House and the Senate approved fiscal 1994 spending bills that cut the
administration’s peacekeeping request by 32 percent.”

71

This legislation killed the

possibility o f a UN proposed peacekeeping contingency fund, allowing U.S. funds to be
used for emergency startup for yet unknown peacekeeping operations.
Indeed, the Congress was so preoccupied with domestic issues, that it removed all
international organization assessments from the budget for 1993. This alarmed some, for
example, House Foreign Affairs committee Chair Lee Hamilton (D, Indiana) wrote a
letter to Clinton to appeal that we “have reached a crisis point in U.S. financial support
for U.N. peacekeeping” and urged Clinton “to make a personal public appeal for this
funding.”

77

After Clinton appeared before the assembly on 27 September 1993, Congress

began with a $533 million ($233 million to the regular budget and 300 million to
peacekeeping) payment on October 6 to pay for its UN arrears.73 In October 1993, the
United States owed $900 million in assessments for peacekeeping and other expenses.
Congress voiced concerns that the United States would over-commit to peace operations,
thereby compromising U.S. credibility abroad.
As explained, the October debacle in Somalia occurred only days prior to the UN
vote on troop deployment in Rwanda, and held significant persuasion on policy-makers
in Washington. Congress prepared a Peace Powers Act in response to Somalia’s efforts,
to make it impossible for the president to commit U.S. troops to UN operations. As early
as 10 April, Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole indicated “that he opposed any

71. Steven A. Dim off, “Congress’s Budget-Cutting Fervor threatens United States Standing at U .N .,”
United Nations Association o f the USA, Interdependent 19 (1993): 6.
72. Quoted in ibid.
73. This payment left $472 million in arrears: $284 million to the regular budget and $188 million to
peacekeeping.
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American role in Rwanda as no vital national interest was at stake there.”74 Dole insisted
that the United States stop placing the UN agenda before the interests o f the US.75
Congress categorically resisted placing U.S. troops under UN command. Assistant
Secretary o f State for African Affairs, George Moose, testified to Congress that the U.S.
response to the crisis in Rwanda was to pursue a strategy with five main goals. These
goals were to: stop the killings, achieve a durable cease-fire, return the parties to the
negotiating table, contain the conflict, and address humanitarian relief needs.

As such,

the position in the United States was not conducive for increasing either troop levels or
mandates in the Rwanda crisis.
The response o f Congress to the crisis in Rwanda was plagued by fears brought
on by the Somalia debacle, especially that humanitarian aid could become more involved.
Such “mission creep” could lead the United States into a “political quagmire.” Here is an
example to illustrate the significance of this point. In the After Action Review, the
comments of the Commanding officer LTG Daniel Schroeder, indicated that mission
creep was difficult to avoid because “maintaining the focus on what we had been told to
do— avoiding ‘mission creep’— took constant attention and emphasis at all levels o f
command.”

77

Moreover, fears o f spiraling dangers were reinforced after ten Belgian

peacekeepers were killed in Kigali, and Belgium pulled out o f the Rwanda mission. In
response, the United States supported withdrawing the bulk o f the UN force for its own

74. Referenced in Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The International D im ension o f G enocide in R w anda
(Washington Square: N ew York University Press, 1998), 91.
75. Quoted in M elvem , A P eople Betrayed, 78.
76. See United States House, prepared statement o f George E. M oose, “Testimony o f Assistant
Secretary o f State before the House Subcommittee on Africa on the Crisis in Rwanda,” in H earing before
the Subcom m ittee, 4 M ay 1 9 9 4 ,4 5 .
77. United States European Command Headquarters, O peration Support Hope, 1994: A fter Action
Review (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The U.S. Army Peace Keeping Institute, 1995), 1.
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safety. The United States demanded that the mission to Rwanda be only peacekeeping,
not an intervention for peacemaking or enforcing.
Apathy in Congress was demonstrated in a hearing on 4 May 1994, when the
Chair o f the Subcommittee on Africa, Harry L. Johnston o f Florida, said that reductions
in the UN presence “demonstrates the urgent needs for Africans to find an African
solution to their problems.”78 In his testimony, Assistant Secretary o f State George
Moose, backed this up, saying that “in the end, only the Rwandans can bring peace to
their country, and no outside effort can succeed without a commitment to peace by the
combatants themselves.”79 He explained that the U.S. position demanded that the RPF
and the Rwandan Army come to negotiations. Indeed, this demand expressed the U.S.
misunderstanding of the situation in which the Rwandan government was bent on
eliminating the Tutsi opposition, and therefore the RPF could not stop fighting as long as
Hutu extremists ran the Rwandan government. Moreover, by continuing to recognize and
negotiate with the Rwandan government, the international community legitimated the
continuation o f a genocidal regime.
There were those in Congress who endorsed strong support for a more active U.S.
role in Rwanda. In late April, nine representatives from the House African Affairs
Subcommittee wrote a letter to Clinton to ask for support, but they stopped short o f being
DA

willing to commit troops.

Senator Paul Simon (D, Illinois), a member o f the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations and Chair o f the Subcommittee on African Affairs, hand
delivered a letter to President Clinton on May 14, asking that the United States

78. United States House, H earing Before the Subcommittee, 4 May 1994, 1.
79. Ibid, 47.
80. M elvem ,/I P eople B etrayed, 190.
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immediately request the UN to send troops to Rwanda to stop the slaughter. The letter
went unanswered for twenty-seven days, and the reply on 9 June was a long list o f efforts
and initiatives that the administration had made to resolve the crisis, including a
statement that the President agreed that an effective UN mission was needed.
The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) also petitioned the White House to take a
leading role on Rwanda. One CBC letter dated 4 May, signed by the then-Chair, Kweisi
Mfume and Donald Payne Congressman o f New Jersey, requested that the United States
“urge the UN to move.”81 A second letter dated 16 June, suggested three steps for
improving the situation in Rwanda. In the third letter dated 20 July, the CBC requested
the president send assistance to Rwanda. In addition to these efforts by the CBC, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged Clinton in a letter 16 June to “acknowledge
formally that genocide is occurring in Rwanda,” and the letter was “signed by virtually
all the committee members, including Senator Claiborne Pelt o f Rhode Island, the
ranking Democrat, and Senator Jesse Helms o f North Carolina, the senior Republican.”82
In June, these members o f Congress criticized Clinton for allowing delays in assistance
and deployments. After this, Clinton stepped up efforts to help for UN forces to Rwanda,
for example by delivering Dallaire’s APCs to Uganda on 23 June.
On 25 July there was a hearing before the Committee on Armed Services. Mainly
the hearing consisted of a briefing about logistics and problems involved in humanitarian
relief in Rwanda. There were four main concerns: numbers o f displaced persons, water,
distribution capabilities and reducing negative media reports. In a country o f 8 million

81. See United States House, “Testimony by Donald M. Payne,” in H earing before the
Subcommittee, 5 May 1998, 18.
82. Michael R. Gordon, “United States to supply 60 Vehicles for U .N . Troops in Rwanda,” N ew York
Times, 16 June 1994, A12L.
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people, 8 to 12 percent had been killed, 40 percent o f the people were refugees out of
country, and 60 percent were either refugees, displaced or both.83
The sheer numbers o f refugees and displaced persons resulted in overcrowding
camps. To alleviate this condition, airdrops were sent to “demagnetize the refugee
attraction” of the camps to further numbers.84 Moreover, efforts were made to convince
Rwandans to return home, where crops awaited them. The water in camps available to
most refugees was contaminated, contributing to the spread o f Cholera. Water
purification systems were brought in from many countries to alleviate this problem,
however, distributing water, food, and other relief items was complicated because of poor
infrastructure and refugee clogged roads.
In the hearing, there was considerable attention to the role played by the media.
Some effort had been made to strategically place the press within range o f relief efforts,
however negative reports continued to place pressure on Congress to be more efficient.
Estimates for the cost o f the operation were at $250 million and the Department o f
Defense raised this supplemental total to $370 million. To demonstrate Congress’s
change o f heart, $100 million was ear marked to restore the Emergency Response Fund,
which Congress had offered earlier, and it was agreed that efforts needed to be
undertaken to increase public awareness and support for relief efforts in Rwanda.85 In
general, the committee supported U.S. relief efforts.
In a 26 July hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Illinois
Senator Paul Simon questioned whether the United States responded “as adequately as

83. See United States Senate, H earing before the Com mittee on A rm ed Services U nited States Senate:
D epartm ent o f D efense Briefing on the Situation in Rwanda, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 25 July 1994, 2 3 -4 .
84. Ibid., 15.
85. Ibid., 16-7, 24.
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we should have early on.”86 Brian Atwood, Administrator for the Agency for
International Development said, “I think the response o f the United States since the
exodus began, only a few days ago on the 13th o f July has been beyond reproach.”87 The
subcommittee largely credited the United States for responding to the plight o f the
refugees, even though it began to question why and how the United States had failed to
take action earlier in response to catastrophes abroad.
Congress did not support involvement in Rwanda until the media became
involved and CNN began to broadcast images o f refugees in Goma. Once public
pressure came to bear, Congress was more willing to commit financial resources to
reduce the humanitarian suffering. In late July, Congress was more willing to allocate
funds for the relief effort, and also contributed to the Emergency Relief Fund that had
been cut completely after Somalia. W hen it came to sending troops, however, Congress
stipulated that funds were to be used only for non-military, humanitarian operations and
on

set a pull out deadline for 1 October 1994.

Increased willingness to assist those in need

did not mean injecting American troops into civil conflict.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA
During the early weeks o f the crisis in Rwanda events were understood by the
American public as violence in a collapsing state that was tom apart by ancient tribal
hatred. A front-page article in the Washington Post on 14 April 1994, reported a: “Free-

86. United States Senate, H earing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs o f the Com m ittee on
Foreign Relations, 103 Cong., 2nd sess., 26 July 1994, 1.
87. “Testimony o f Honorable Brian A tw ood,” in ibid., 5.
88. See Klinghoffer, International D im ension o f G enocide, 94.
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QQ

For-All Slaughter ... Among Tribes, Rebels, Army and Roving Gangs.”

The media,

like the international community, did not understand the planned genocide in Rwanda for
what it was: violence by the Rwandan government against its own people, while being
misrepresented to the outside world. According to Linda Melvem, the “media’s failure to
report that genocide was taking place, and thereby generate public pressure for something
to be done to stop it, contributed to the international inaction.”90 Certainly, this failure
contributed to the fact that the American public was unwilling to sacrifice American
soldiers to settle an ongoing conflict on a distant continent, until the injustice of it all
came to light. As Catherine Newbury stated, “the deaths and brutality that have most
mesmerized public attention.”91
While American public opinion was generally not in favor o f military intervention
in Rwanda, this shifted once the media showed the suffering in the Goma refugee camps.
Steven Livingson and Todd Eachus examine the impact o f television coverage in Rwanda
on public opinion.

The television coverage is broken into three phases: no coverage

prior to April 6, little coverage from April 6 until mid-July, and exclusive coverage o f the
Goma refugee camp but not the civil war after July. Livingston and Eachus conclude that
television coverage almost exclusively focused on images o f suffering after the genocide
mainly because in April 1994, conditions in Rwanda were too dangerous to send
reporters, not to mention inadequate staffing levels in African offices. Livingston and
Eachus also point out that those “who carry out the massacre o f civilians have no qualms

89. Jennifer Parmelee, “Rwanda’s ‘Sad, Sad, Sad’ Self-Imolation: Free-For-All Slaughter Continues
among Tribes, Rebels, Army and Roving Gangs,” The Washington Post, 14 April 1994, A l.
90. M elvem , “The Security Council,” 109-10.
91. Catherine Newbury, “Background to Genocide: Rwanda,” A Journal o f Opinion 23, no. 2 (1995):
12.

92. They used quantitative analysis o f ABC World New s, CNN, N B C N ightly N ew s, and CBS
Nightly N ew s for the five-month period o f April to August 1994.
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about killing journalists, as data from the Committee for the Protection o f Journalists can
attest.”93 Reporting was therefore largely left up to parachute journalists, who knew little
or nothing about the region and its history.
Media coverage followed the development o f U.S. policy, rather than informed it.
Therefore, television coverage had a “minimal effect” on policy and gave the president
latitude for a “limited policy response.”94 In addition to the low amount o f media
coverage of the Rwanda crisis, there was an emergence o f other news, which was
“actually eclipsing coverage of Rwanda by a significant degree.”95 These included the 0 .
J. Simpson trial and the growing situation with Haitian refugees.
There were three news “stories” from the crisis in Rwanda. The first began in
October 1990 with the Tutsi offensive into Rwandan territory that ultimately brought the
French in to assist the Hutu government. The second began w ith the downing of
Habyarimana’s plane that killed not only the president o f Rwanda, but also the president
of Burundi. This event, the beginning o f the genocide, was largely missed by outside
viewers due to extremely hazardous conditions in Rwanda at the time. The third story
began with Operation Turquoise, as it sparked the tremendous flow o f displaced persons
in Rwanda and refugees across the borders. It was during this time that the media made
compelling footage o f human suffering and consequently drew attention to the plight of
the people there. As a result, the United States was pressured to act after CNN aired
disturbing images o f refugees and the American public saw them, then the Clinton
administration expressed sympathy and horror with the victims.

93. Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, “Rwanda: United States Policy and Television Coverage,”
in The Path o f A G enocide, ed. Adelman, and Suhrke, 223.
94. Ibid., 224, and 210.
95. Ibid., 218.
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The role o f the international and U.S. media during the Rwanda crisis was that it
missed reporting the genocide, until it was nearly over. This was because few reporters
in Africa received information, as outside attention was diverted. Besides,
misinformation campaigns from within, Rwanda decried accusations o f atrocities.
Moreover, leadership in Rwanda shut down communications so that information was
difficult to receive.
The Director o f the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Roger Winter, attempted to
dispel the belief that the conflict was merely tribal in nature, but his article was only
picked up by a Toronto paper and made little impact in the United States.96 On 28 April
Oxfam published a report with the first use o f the term “genocide.” This article
reportedly placed pressure on the Clinton administration shifting rhetoric from hard line
noninvolvement to sympathy and concern. An international inquiry determined that
“although the coverage had been handicapped by danger on the ground, the press, in
characterizing the genocide as tribal anarchy, was fundamentally irresponsible.”97 Such
reporting contributed to the ability o f the Rwandan government to commit genocide
without being discovered until too late to save lives. Moreover, this type o f reporting
also increased the impunity o f those involved, as events and names were not documented
and were more easily forgotten or covered up.
In an oft-cited article from 10 June, Douglas Jehl explains that “the Clinton
administration has instructed its spokesmen not to describe the deaths there as genocide,

96. Roger Winter, “Power, not Tribalism, Stokes Rwanda’s Slaughter,” G lobe a n d M ail, Toronto, 14
April 1994.
97. Linda M elvem , A P eople B etrayed, 138.
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QQ

even though some senior officials believe that is exactly what they represent.”

The

check on rhetoric was partly aimed at the American public, according to administration
officials, if the United States used the word genocide, then “it would be natural— and
unwelcome— for voters to expect that the response would include dispatching troops.”99
Media reports about U.S. delaying tactics to provide assistance in Rwanda helped
pressure the administration to move faster on delivering promised APCs by air, rather
than surface, saving three weeks delivery time.100 When the French intervened to create a
safe zone on 23 June 1994, Hutu refugees went into, and Tutsi fled away from the area.
Photographs taken from the refugee camp in Goma were published around the world, and
increased pressure on the international community to help. Thus, the “CNN factor”
prompted an “uproar o f public outrage,”101 and within three days, U.S. troops were in
Goma distributing humanitarian aid.
Polling data regarding public opinion at the time o f the crisis in Rwanda is largely
unavailable. However, there were two relevant questions regarding Rwanda in a Gallup
poll taken between 7 and 25 October 1994.102 Responding to the first question, only 3
percent o f those polled thought the U.S. response to the Rwanda situation was excellent,
while 17 percent thought the U.S. response was good, 28 percent thought it was fair, 29
percent dismissed it as poor, and 23 percent were unsure. Even though 29 percent o f the
respondents found the U.S. response to the Rwanda situation poor, among the majority of

98. Douglas Jehl, “Officials Told to A void Calling Rwanda Killings ‘G enocide,’” N ew York Times,
10 June 1994, 8A.
99. Ibid.
100. See for example, Gordon, “United States to Supply 60 V ehicles.”
101. M elvem , A P eople Betrayed, 219.
102. “Government Ratings Africa Diplomacy,” Gallup O rganization, 15 October 1995. The author
received questions USGALLUP.94CFRP.R15E and USG ALLUP.94CFRP.R16BX upon request on 19
February 2002.
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respondents who held an opinion, 62 percent were not opposed.

1m

This suggests that

public opinion was more likely to agree with Clinton’s response to the Rwanda crisis,
even after a media event had taken place.
Based on the responses to this question, a larger portion o f the American public
believed that the United States should not have intervened militarily in Rwanda to halt
the civil war, the ethnic hostilities, or the genocide. It also indicates that the majority of
Americans felt that Clinton did the right thing to help provide humanitarian assistance to
the refugee camps. In light o f the media attention to the refugees in Goma in July,
August and later, it is telling that 29 percent of the respondents were unsure o f how they
felt about the way the United States responded to the situation in Rwanda. This is not
unusual in polls, especially when there is a low level o f knowledge in the United States
about the area in question.
The second question in the poll asked whether the respondent believed that the
United States does or does not have a vital political, economic, or security interest in
Rwanda. Among the respondents, 35 percent said that the United States does have
interest in Rwanda, 46 percent said that it does not have interest in Rwanda, and 19
percent were not sure. O f those respondents with an opinion, a majority o f 57 percent
thought the United States did not have any interests in Rwanda.104 While this is not an
overwhelming majority, it does confirm that more Americans believed there was no
reason to go to Rwanda. As we have already seen in the previous section, this position
was reflected in the U.S. Congress as well.
Public opinion held a good deal o f sway on policy makers, and television images

103. This figure is a percentage o f only those with an opinion. It excludes those without an opinion.
104. This number excludes those without an opinion.
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played a large role in increasing public awareness and subsequently prompting the United
States to take action. While the media remained largely critical o f U.S. inaction during
the genocide, television coverage in Rwanda did not develop until reporters were able to
safely enter the area and to document refugee flows and increased suffering in
surrounding camps.
Although polling evidence indicates that American public opinion mildly
supported the policy set by the Clinton administration in not becoming involved in what
was thought to be a long-term civil and ethnic conflict, the media coverage o f human
suffering brought about a reevaluation o f U.S. policy. Therefore, early media coverage
o f the situation in Rwanda, including civil war and genocide, was a key missing element
for prompting the United States to intervene and stop bloodshed in Rwanda. In
conjunction, the television coverage, particularly o f the Goma refugee situation beginning
in late June 1994, brought attention to the crisis in July and August and led the American
public to support relief efforts. Indeed, the change o f heart in public opinion increased
the likelihood that policy makers would follow suit.

U.S. INTERESTS
This section explains the actions and the rhetoric o f the Clinton administration
during the crisis in Rwanda. As already explained, the United States initially perceived
the violence as renewed civil war. After witnessing Belgian peacekeepers suffer a similar
fate as had the American Rangers in Somalia, and the United States was more convinced
than ever not to intervene with force. Barry Blechman shows that a lack o f public
interest in paying the price o f foreign intervention is an important part o f what he calls
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the “intervention dilemma,” in which “intervening governments can only rarely use
peaceful instruments o f conflict resolution knowing that they could credibly threaten
military intervention should peaceful means fail.” 105 Blechman points to the key reason
for Clinton’s decision not to intervene with force in Rwanda: the UN went along with the
United States, until France decided in late June to unilaterally intervene to save their
Hutu allies.
This was an important time in this crisis, because during June and July Clinton
changed policy on Rwanda. This shift was a direct result o f the increasing numbers of
displaced persons and refugees in and around Rwanda, who were fleeing violence. Once
conditions in refugee camps became known in the United States, the public and the
Congress shifted to favoring humanitarian assistance. Clinton responded to this domestic
pressure and sent troops, but only to distribute humanitarian relief.
In January 1994, the CIA reported that renewed hostilities in Rwanda could kill as
many as 500,000 people. Their estimate was low. A month later, the United States
issued a travel advisory for Rwanda and opposed Belgian requests to enlarge the
UNAMIR mandate, force levels, or rules o f engagement. The United States resisted
action in Rwanda, because o f high costs associated with operations in Africa. Besides,
the United States did not want to become embroiled in another Somalia situation, in
which peacemaking operations failed.
Initial Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports o f the 7 April violence in
Rwanda were largely interpreted as renewed civil war. The stated White House policy
regarding intervening in civil war stipulated that the United States had nothing to do in

105. Barry M. Blechman, “The Intervention Dilemma,” The Washington Q uarterly 18, no. 3 (1995):
65.
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Rwanda. Moreover, Jones asserts that the United States “had exactly one foreign direct
investment in Rwanda, a minimal presence, and in general no special interest in the
country.” 106 After U.S. nationals were evacuated to Burundi, the U.S. embassy in Kigali
closed on 10 April. The interpretation of early massacres as genocide reduced to civil
war delayed reports from reaching President Clinton until around April 20, when the CIA
published a report o f genocide. The DIA made estimates o f the initial killings based on
satellite photographic intelligence taken on 7 April. These estimates were low, because
the figures were extrapolations o f counted observable bodies in the outdoor areas that
were visible to the satellite. Possibly due to the low figures, this intelligence was
dismissed as renewed civil war by other agencies such as the Pentagon, Department of
State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council. As a result,
Kuperman asserts that “key agencies in W ashington. . . either failed to absorb this
information or explicitly rejected it as unreliable and thus did not become aware o f the
genocide until further evidence emerged on or after April 20.”107
When Belgium formally withdrew from UNAMIR on 14 April 1994, one State
Department official said, “you can’t overstate the impact on our policy process o f the
Belgians leaving. People were saying, ‘How can we get in, if it is so bad the Belgians
have to leave?” ’108 Immediately, the United States said that without a cease-fire in
Rwanda, there was no role for a peacekeeping m ission,109 and after some debate in the
UN Security Council, the United States on April 15 considered withdrawing completely
from UNAMIR, but reduced UNAMIR instead.

106.
107.
108.
behind the

Jones, Peacem aking in Rwanda, 75.
Kuperman, L im its o f Humanitarian Intervention, 3 6 -3 7 .
Quoted in Burkhalter, “Question o f Genocide,”46. Burkhalter outlines the bureaucratic politics
U.S. decision to stay out o f Rwanda.
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The United States first used the term “genocide” in a CIA report on April 19,
which translated and published a 17 April RPF radio announcement that the “world
cannot and should not forget the genocide which is being perpetrated in Rwanda
today.” 110 Human Rights Watch immediately wrote to the UN Security Council about
concerns regarding genocide, and on 21 April 1994, the UN Security Council Resolution
912 withdrew most o f the UNAMIR troops.
After Oxfam’s press release on 28 April and lengthy debate in the Security
Council on the official use of the word genocide, the United States and the U.K. decided
to refrain from using the word. On 30 April, Clinton made a one-minute radio address to
Rwanda, saying that he “hoped that all Rwandans would recognize their common bonds
of humanity.” Rather than a reproach for the massacres, the speech reassured the
Rwandan extremists that the United States would take no action.
In a 29 April letter, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali petitioned the
Security Council to increase UNAMIR troops and mandate, but by 30 April, the U.S.
position on Rwanda had become key to UN Security Council decisions. U.S.
representative to the UN, Ambassador Madeleine Albright worked to block the dispatch
o f troops by delaying negotiations in the UN Security Council in two ways. First, it
applied PDD 25 closely, limiting U.S. involvement in peacekeeping missions by insisting
that a ceasefire be reached in Rwanda’s civil war prior to deployment o f UNAMIR II,
and that clear pre-planning should be solidified before deployment, and only a few
hundred troops should be dispatched to secure the area. Second, there was considerable

109. For a thorough discussion o f the debate in the U N Security Council, see D es Forges, Leave
None, 629.
110. (Clandestine) Radio Muhabura, 1900 GMT, 17 April 1994, in F B IS -A F R -9 4 -0 7 5 , 19 April
1994, quoted in Kuperman, Limits o f Humanitarian Intervention, 31.
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debate about whether it was appropriate to use the term genocide in the situation in
Rwanda. If the international community were to employ the word, then it would
automatically invoke the 1948 Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f
the Crime o f Genocide. This would require that the international community take action
to halt the genocide immediately, regardless o f where it was taking place. Thus, military
intervention into a conflict would require high costs, both monetarily and in terms o f
human life. In early May, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali began to solicit
African states to contribute forces. A few days later, on 5 May, Clinton’s PDD 25
officially responded to Somalia, specifying that U.S. ground troops should not be
deployed to humanitarian interventions in the midst o f ongoing civil wars.
Increased pressure from the UN, Congress, the media, and public opinion led the
Clinton administration to gradually give way, change its rhetoric, and take steps to
provide some assistance. On 27 May, the United States imposed an arms embargo
against Rwanda. Commander Dallaire asked on 1 June that the United States supply
APCs, but the vehicles were delayed for several weeks, due to negotiations between the
United States and UN on cost sharing.111 After the UN used the term “genocide” on 8
June, international pressure increased to at least stop the killings and to provide
humanitarian assistance. Congress for its part opposed military intervention, but agreed
to humanitarian relief operations if they were ended by 1 October. Clinton complied and
ended Operation Support Hope on 27 August 1994. Congressional criticism o f Clinton
for allowing delays in assistance and deployments to Rwanda pressured Clinton move
more quickly to get UN forces to Rwanda.112

111. See Gordon, “United States to Supply 60 V ehicles.”
112. See discussion in the above Congress section.
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A shift occurred in White House rhetoric amidst public pressure for not calling
the genocide by its proper name. The widely read Jehl article appeared against Clinton
not using the word genocide.113 On the same day, 10 June, Secretary o f State Warren
Christopher admitted that genocide had occurred and that “if there is any particular magic
in calling it genocide, I have ho hesitancy in saying that.” 114 However, on 17 June, the
Washington Post reported that administration officials claimed that the 1948 Genocide
Convention “enables,” but does not require states to detect genocide and intervene
against it.115
France’s Operation Turquoise began on 23 June, the same day that the U.S. APCs
arrived in Uganda for training and the $10 million bill was sent to the U N .116 On the
surface, Operation Turquoise relieved the international community o f the responsibility
for helping Rwanda, and it “did more to slow the U.N. force’s recruitment and
deployment than to hasten it.” 117 Regional security began to emerge as a more pressing
issue with never-before-seen numbers o f refugees overwhelmed the entire region.
M edia attention to the plight o f the refugees brought pressure on Clinton from the
public. By 15 July 1994, the Clinton administration announced that the United States no
longer recognized the interim government o f Rwanda. The White House issued a
statement that the United States would no longer “allow representatives o f a regime that
supports genocidal massacres to remain on our soil.” 118 The United States stated that it

113. Jehl, “O fficials Told.”
114. Quoted by Gordon, “United States to Supply 60 V ehicles.”
115. Thomas W. Lippman, “United States Aides Fear N ew V iolence in Burundi,” Washington P ost
17 June 1994, A 19.
116. “France Helps in Rwanda— so far,” N ew York Times, 14 July 1994, A 16N , A22L.
117. Burkhalter, “Question o f G enocide,” 53.
118. The White H ouse, Statement by the Press Secretary, 15 July 1994, quoted in D es Forges, Leave
None, 690.
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would move to remove the Rwandan representative from the Security Council. On the
same day, the administration ordered the Rwandan embassy closed and froze its assets.
More importantly, on 16 July, Clinton announced “an increase in aid o f $35 million to
handle this problem” in the Goma refugee camps.119 On 19 July, the Cholera epidemic
was rapidly taking lives and the United States announced an additional $41 million to
respond. After pictures o f the horrible conditions in the refugee camps began to hit the
international media, the Clinton administration dispatched 4000 troops to reinforce
hundreds o f civilian relief workers to the Goma refugee camp in Zaire. On 22 July,
Clinton announced that it was preparing to send troops to help refugees, and he described
the camps conditions as the worst humanitarian crisis in a generation.
The U.S. mandate in Rwanda “was to provide humanitarian assistance as opposed
to nation-building or peacekeeping,” despite continuing violence and lack of
infrastructure.120 The After Action Review for Operation Support Hope hails the Joint
Task Force mission a complete success from beginning to end, using 3600 troops without
casualties. Davis Thomas defends Clinton, writing that the president “made the right
choice” according to U.S. strategic interests, because Central Africa poses little security
threat to the United States, little threat o f economic loss, and little threat o f diminished
U.S. sphere o f influence.

191

Clearly, Clinton could and did remain highly cautious after

Somalia, as exemplified by PDD 25. Moreover, Clinton kept a close eye on public

119. These figures are taken from United States House, “Testimony o f Honorable Brian Atwood,” in
United States Senate, H earing before the Subcom m ittee on African Affairs, 26 July 1994, 5.
120. See United States European Command Headquarters, O peration S upport Hope, 1.
121. Davis M. Thomas, “Commentary; Bill Clinton May be Sorry, but the President Made the Right
Choice; Rwanda: After Somalia, with Haiti and Bosnia Looming, Sending Troops would have been a
Strategic and Political Mistake,” Los Angeles Times, 1 April 1998, B7.
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opinion and followed a course that generated least public disapproval. Indeed, it was not
until images o f refugee suffering reached the American public and brought them to
demand action that the Clinton administration sent relief troops. By then, however, the
civil war was mostly resolved and the troops were sent into a relatively safe situation. In
sum, there were vital and peripheral interests: vital for France, which intervened; and
peripheral for the United States, which did not intervene.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter set out to examine the extent o f influence exerted by the five
variables of foreign policy decisions regarding intervention, and how they shaped the
foreign policy o f President Clinton. The overarching consideration in this case study is
that the United States blocked international timely action to stop the progress o f
genocide. As a result, the United States contributed to inaction, and obstructing a
multilateral effort to halt the genocide.122 The Clinton administration has been
thoroughly criticized for refusing to become involved in Rwanda.
Four years after the crisis in Rwanda, Clinton gave a speech at the Airport in
Kigali on 26 March 1998. Clinton apologized to Rwanda and the world for not
responding in a more timely fashion to those needing help in Rwanda. He said that at the
time, he “did not fully appreciate the depth and speed, with which you were being
engulfed by this unimaginable terror,” and admitted that “we did not immediately call

122.
One o f the most critical essays about the Clinton Rwanda policy is found in Samantha Power,
“Bystanders to Genocide: W hy the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen,” The A tlantic
Monthly, September 2001: 84-108.
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these crimes by their rightful name: genocide,”

107

He said that there had been three main

errors made by the international community, including: “not acting quickly to halt the
killing; permitting refugee camps in neighboring Zaire to become havens for Hutu killers,
and not immediately labeling the slaughter ‘genocide.’”124
Many sources point at the United States’ inconsistent and apathetic behavior as
the main reason that little action was seen from the West, and base their analysis on the
morality of foreign policy, rather than questions o f national interest.125 The United
States began to provide humanitarian aid on 22 July 1994 in the aftermath o f the
genocide.

123. Quoted in James Bennet, “Clinton Declares United States, with World, Failed Rwandans, ” N ew
York Times, 26 March 1998, A l, A12L; and Tim Weiner, “Critics Say United States Ignored C.I.A.
Warnings o f Genocide in Rwanda,” N ew York Times, 26 March 1998, A 12.
124. Ibid.
125. For an excellent example, see African Rights, Rwanda.
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CHAPTERV
CASE STUDY ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN HAITI

This chapter focuses on the 1991 democratic crisis in Haiti, and the subsequent
U.S. intervention to restore Haiti’s democratically elected President Bertrand Aristide in
1994. In assessing why, how, and when the Clinton administration decided to intervene,
this study begins with a brief historical section and then looks specifically at the five
international political variables outlined in Chapter III.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The 1991-94 crisis is yet another chapter in Haiti’s tumultuous history that
sparked the interest o f the largest hemispheric power, the United States.1 There are at
least six important themes found in the history o f Haiti. These include: 1) colonization,
2) tension between the elites and the masses, 3) U.S. occupation that brought the military
to the political fore, 4) a tradition o f authoritarian leadership that lacks respect for human
rights, 5) long-term demographic shifts in regional refugee movement, and 6) U.S.
responses to refugee issues within the context o f larger security interests in the region.
Historian Anthony Maingot identifies three basic layers throughout Haitian history,
including the importance o f hard won independence, a fierce sense o f autonomy among
Haitian elites above the masses, and the pervasive poverty stricken post-plantation

1.
For good overviews o f Haitian history, language and culture, see Joan Dayan, Haiti, History, a n d
the G ods (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1995); A lex Dupuy, H aiti in the N ew W orld
O rder: Limits o f the D em ocratic Revolution (Oxford: W estview Press, 1997); and Charles R. Foster and
Albert Valdman, ed., H aiti—Today and Tomorrow: An Interdisciplinary Study (Lanham, MD: University
Press o f America, 1984).
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economy.2 U.S. responses to regional instability varied throughout Haiti’s history,
covering the range from occupation, to monetary aid, to refugee repatriation, to embargo,
and back to military intervention.
Early colonization o f Haiti by the Spanish and French created lasting ties between
Europe and Haiti. During its colonial period, Haiti developed a plantation economy
based on slavery and designed primarily for exporting luxury consumables, such as sugar,
molasses, rum, coffee, and tobacco to Europe. Trade in the region improved consistently
until 1790, at which time the “Caribbean was the epicenter o f the New World due to
novel food items.”
Over time, a three-tiered society developed and social tension between groups led
to long-lasting political instability. The upper layer o f the social hierarchy was
dominated by wealthy plantation owning Europeans. Racial boundaries within Saint
Dominique, as Haiti was known then, grew complicated because children stemming from
the union o f French colonial planters and female slaves were “frequently recognized by
their fathers, sent to France to be educated and empowered to inherit.”4 Thus, a powerful
middle class sprang up from these land-owning children that maintained deep ties to the
French.
The introduction o f this middle class into the colonial arrangement made for
resentment between groups, destabilizing the internal balance o f power in Haiti. The
lowest strata in the social hierarchy consisted o f the majority o f people, who were of

2. Anthony P. Maingot, The U nited States and the Caribbean: Challenges o f an Asym m etrical
Relationship (Boulder, CO: W estview Press, 1994), 205.
3. Sidney W. Mintz, “Can Haiti Change?” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (1995): 74.
4. Ibid., 75.
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African descent, owned no land and were mainly slaves. By 1791 social tensions erupted
in a slave revolution lasting until 1804. It ended colonial rule and destroyed much o f the
existing plantation economy. Saint Dominique ceased to exist and Haiti was bom. Even
though Haiti had won independence, it remained haunted by its colonial past, as the
masses replaced earlier resentment o f colonial rulers with the new resentment o f lighter
skinned leadership that would lead to renewed revolution.
Long before the end o f the cold war, the United States came to view the
Caribbean as part o f a vital sphere o f influence— its backyard. In 1832, the Monroe
Doctrine placed Latin America within the U.S. sphere o f influence and warned Europe’s
colonial powers to stay clear. Viewed by some as coercive, the Monroe Doctrine set the
course of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America.5 The United States dominated the
Western Hemisphere, and increasingly justified intervention as efforts to maintain
regional stability.
German investment in Haiti on the eve of the First World War increased U.S.
security concerns in the region. Anthony Maingot explains that in 1910, about 200
Germans “controlled 80 percent o f the island’s international trade, all the major utilities,
and the one railroad and tramcar line.”6 To stem the tide o f German influence, the United
States occupied Haiti from 1915 until 1934. Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach state that
during the early twentieth century, “the islands o f the Caribbean were perceived as
strategic points o f control over the primary crossroads o f global commerce and a

5. See Martha L. Cottam, Images and Interventions: U.S. Policies in Latin A m erica (Pittsburgh, PA:
University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 4 , 1 41 .
6. Anthony P. Maingot, “Haiti: The Political Rot Within,” Current H istory 94, no. 589 (1995): 59.
For more information on German interests in Haiti, see Gaddis Smith, “From Intervention to Intervasion,”
Current H istory 94, no. 589 (1995): 54 -5 5 .
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permanent U.S. presence in the region became a key element o f the nation's security
agenda.”7 Haiti, situated just 90 miles off the coast o f Florida, was too close to the
United States to allow either a German presence, or the pirate vessels that threatened
budding trade.
U.S. occupation marked a shift in Haitian culture and politics, by creating a
military in Haiti, which provided a new path, aside from the priesthood, for peasants to
o

rise to power.

Military loyalties bred and institutionalized corruption in Haiti over the

years, and enabled the rise of General Duvalier, who used social division to lead the
Duvalier Revolution. The majority black population revolted against the elite light
skinned upper class and made Jean Claude Duvalier president in 1958. He ruled Haiti
with an iron fist and in 1971, made himself president-for-life by law. Duvalier reinforced
a long tradition of authoritarian repression that eliminated many o f the wealthy elites in
Haiti, but failed to improve living conditions for the people at large, and resistance
mounted.
Increased population contributed to severe environmental and economic
degradation, and depleted land resources including agriculture and forestation. By 1980,
the arable land was cut by more than half and worsening humanitarian and economic
conditions left many without hope o f escaping extreme poverty. In 1982, President
Ronald Reagan’s Caribbean Basin Initiative was a stopgap measure to improve the
regional economy and, more importantly, to stem increasing numbers o f refugees moving
to America.

7.
Joseph S. Tulchin, and Ralph H. Espach, ed., Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge o f
R egional C ooperation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 2.
8. See Mintz, “Can Haiti Change?” 85.
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A new era dawned over Haiti, as emerging signs o f democratic institution
building brought the first municipal elections in 1983. Jorge Dominguez asserts that
Haitians are deeply attached to liberal democratic institutions and respect human rights as
a result o f experiences o f subjugation.9 Haiti was the poorest country in the Western
Hemisphere, and by 1990, poverty was unavoidable for m ost people. Migration
increasingly functioned as a population pressure-valve, as people moved to towns, cities,
and other countries. The Dominican Republic just next door was unable to absorb the
large numbers o f Haitian refugees and they spilled into the region.

The Crisis
In a free election on 16 December 1990, Catholic Priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
was elected President o f a “bankrupt” Haiti.10 Victory for democracy in Haiti lasted less
than a year, because Aristide's policies advocated sweeping reform, and threatened elites,
the military and the small middle class. As a result, the crisis in Haiti began on 30
September 1991, when General Raoul Cedras overthrew Aristide and installed a military
government. Brutality under the Cedras regime increased the numbers o f migrants and
presented a security challenge to the larger region.
The U.S. response to increased numbers o f Haitian refugees was mostly to return
them to Haiti. White House figures show that o f the 34,000 refugees picked up in the
Caribbean between September 1991 and May 1992, around 9,000 were allowed to claim

9.
Jorge I. Dom inguez, “The Caribbean Question: Why Has Liberal Dem ocracy (Surprisingly)
Flourished?” in D em ocracy in the Caribbean, ed. Jorge I. Dominguez, Robert A. Pastor, and R. D elisle
Worrel (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 1 -25.
10. Maingot, The U nited S tates a n d the Caribbean, 217.
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political asylum w ith 6,000 of those in the United States,11 which accepted more than
10,000 refugees in the month o f May alone. The refugee holding site at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba quickly filled to capacity at 12,000. Despite international criticism, former
President Bush thought that most refugees had fled for economic, rather than political
reasons, and were therefore not eligible for asylum in the United States.
After Cedras took power, the OAS imposed sanctions on Haiti in October 1991,
but the Bush administration’s policies largely circumvented the embargo for U.S.-based
firms in Haiti. Dupuy argues that this “supported the interests o f the Haitian military and
bourgeoisie and was more responsive to the Right within the U.S. Congress, the CIA, and
the State Department, all o f which opposed Aristide’s return.” 12 Bush’s strategy
weakened the embargo, downplayed human rights abuses, accused Aristide o f
intransigence, and always wanted more concessions from Aristide. This approach
possibly conveyed a lack o f credible threat to Cedras, because he refused to step
down.
To force Cedras out of power, the OAS amended its charter with the Protocol of
Washington on 23 February 1992, condemning the overthrow o f democracy in Haiti and
granting general amnesty for Cedras and his supporters if they would step down.13 For
some, “Washington was reluctant to commit itself to a formula based on substituting

11. See Michael W ines, “Switching Policy, U.S. W ill Return Refugees to Haiti,” N ew York Times, 25
May 1 992:4L.
12. Dupuy, H aiti in the N ew W orld O rder, 139.
13. Organization o f American States (hereafter cited as OAS), “Protocol o f Amendments to the
Charter o f the Organization o f the American States: The Protocol o f Washington,” 14 December 1992
(www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/a-56.htm, accessed on 20 September 2001).
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Aristide for the Duvalierist armed forces.”14 The lack o f U.S. resolve to hold the
embargo rewarded Cedras, the Haitian Parliament declared the Protocol o f Washington
illegal on 6 March 1992. A few days later, the Haitian Parliament rejected the
international plan to restore Aristide. By late May, the refugee situation threatened to
increase further and Bush reinstated the policy to intercept refugee boats and return all
undocumented passengers. In the United States, the refugee issue grew more politically
charged, particularly in Florida.
In his campaign, Clinton promised to end Bush’s repatriation policy. He fulfilled
this promise as president, however, the reversal lasted only a matter of days. Clinton was
compelled to reinstate Bush’s repatriation policy, when numbers o f migrants became
unmanageable despite temporary facilities in the Dominican Republic and Florida. As
numbers o f migrants outpaced capacity, the immigration process was put into place
onboard naval vessels. In the case o f the Haitian crisis, outward migration drew
international attention, and heightened regional security concerns. The United States was
compelled to intervene due to a growing regional culture o f migration.

U.S. ALLIES
U.S. allies demonstrated considerable support for the establishment and
maintenance o f democracy in Haiti. Early on, the international community heavily
funded the elections that brought Aristide to the presidency in 1990. The bankrupt
Haitian economy received an estimated $40 million o f foreign funding with foreign

14.
Morris Morley, and Chris McGillion, “‘Disobedient’ Generals and the Politics o f
Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti,” P o litical Science Q uarterly 112, no. 3 (Fall
1997): 366.
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civilian and military election supervision assistance for managing and conducting the
election.15 The most important U.S. ally in this case study was the Organization o f
American States (OAS), however the Caribbean Community 16also strongly supported
the intervention efforts. The OAS was “the first international organization to act in
defense o f democracy in Haiti.” 17 Furthermore, the OAS was instrumental in
crystallizing international consensus regarding action in Haiti, and then the United States
stepped in to provide further leadership. The United States responded to a call from the
OAS to protect regional stability. The actions o f the OAS and the United States were
received well in the UN and it authorized military intervention.

The Organization of American States (OAS)
The OAS response became the launching board for international action to
reinstate democracy in Haiti and as a result, shaped international policy regarding Haiti
throughout the crisis. The OAS in particular demonstrated significant interest in seeing
democracy upheld in Haiti, and especially when exiled President Aristide asked the OAS
t o

for help, it was ready to comply.

The same day o f the coup, the OAS Permanent

Council condemned it, calling for an immediate meeting o f the Ministers o f Foreign

15. See Anthony P. Maingot, “Haiti and Aristide: The Legacy o f History,” Current H istory 91, no.
562 (1992): 68.
16. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a collection o f 12 independent English-speaking
states and one U.K . dependency in the Caribbean. CARICOM strongly supported U N Resolution 940 in a
12 August 1994 statement. See Statement by Strobe Talbott and John Deutch, “U.S.-CARICOM Efforts to
Support U N Security Council Resolution 940,” U.S. D epartm ent o f State D ispatch 5, no. 36, 5 September
1 9 9 4 ,5 8 9 -9 3 . (http://netserv.lib.odu.edu:2263/itw/infom ark/972/49/16121572w4/purl=rcl_EAIM _0_A
15 8 ..., accessed on 3 October 2001)
17. John C. Pierce, “The Haitian Crisis and the Future o f C ollective Enforcement o f Democratic
Governance,” L aw an d P o licy in International Business 27, no. 2 (1996): 482.
18. For analysis regarding the impact o f diaspora on the struggle o f overseas communities to unseat
authoritarian regimes, including a case study on how Haitians in the United States impacted U.S. foreign
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Affairs. On 3 October 1991 the Foreign Ministers passed OAS Resolution 1/91
supporting democratic governance in Haiti. A few days later, Aristide sent a letter to the
OAS Secretary General to request assistance in restoring democratic leadership in Haiti.19
In resolution 2/91 on 8 October, the OAS again condemned the coup, rebuffed the
illegal Haitian government, and urged “all member states to proceed immediately to
freeze the assets o f the Haitian State and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti.”20 The
OAS wanted to force the military leaders to negotiate. In addition, the resolution
requested UN members “to adopt the same measures” as those adopted by the OAS.21 By
doing so, the OAS Ministers made two significant decisions that influenced the unfolding
o f events after the coup and before the reinstatement o f Aristide. Although, the ministers
agreed to impose sanctions against Haiti, they preferred to forgo military intervention as
stipulated in the OAS charter.
In a meeting on 10 October, the OAS Foreign Ministers considered a 7 October
letter from Aristide and pledged further support. On the same day, the UN General
Assembly drafted a resolution to uphold OAS sanctions. The OAS called upon its
members to respect sanctions by placing an embargo on Haiti yet, to uphold sanctions in
reality presented difficult challenges.22 Some critics identified OAS actions as a “porous

policy and intervention, see Y ossi Shain, “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign P olicy,” P olitical Science
Q uarterly 109, no. 5 (1994-5): 811-41.
19. See OAS, “The Ministers o f Foreign Affairs Resolution 1/91: Support for Democrativ
Government o f Haiti,” 3 October 1991.
20. OAS, “MRE/RES. 2/91: Support for Democracy in Haiti,” 8 October 1991
(www.upd.oas.org/documents/basic/mreres%202%2091eng.htm, accessed on 21 September 2001).
21. Claudette Antoine Werleigh, “Haiti and the Halfhearted,” The Bulletin o f the Atom ic Scientists
49, no. 9 (1993): 21.
22. See UN, “General A ssem bly Resolution 7,” 7 October 1992 (hereafter cited as: UN GA RES)
(www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r007.htm, accessed on 6 October 2001).
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embargo,” which made high profits for a few well-positioned people in Haiti,

and

countries, such as Panama, Venezuela and Colombia openly violated the embargo, while
the United States partially lifted the embargo as early as November 1992 for U.S.
companies. Moreover, the Dominican Republic remained a pipeline for goods flowing
into Haiti. Monroe Leigh outlines some problems with imposing economic embargoes in
general. He explains that
they seldom achieve their declared objectives; that they deny trading
opportunities to enterprises in the embargo-imposing country; that they
bestow windfall profits on third-country traders; that economic embargoes
are inherently illegal; that they despoil the poor and enrich the wealthy;
that they fail to unseat the dictatorial regimes; that they are inherently
immoral; that in American practice they almost always include extreme
assertions o f extraterritorial jurisdiction; and that most o f our allies . . .
consider American claims o f extraterritorial jurisdiction violative o f
international l a w . . . and they usually entail serious domestic political
embarrassment.24
Regardless of policy shortcomings, the OAS embargo made a strong enough statement
that the United States considered complying.
A n important breakthrough for the OAS came on 23 February 1992, when
President-in-exile Aristide signed the Protocol o f Washington. This document consists of
amendments to the OAS Charter, condemning and suspending any member “whose
democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force.”25 Unfortunately,
the agreement failed to provide a deadline for the reinstatement o f democracy. It also
called for an interim prime minister in Haiti, as well as offered general amnesty for
Cedras and his supporters, if they would to step down. On 6 March 1992, Cedras defied

23. For a critical internal economic analysis o f the effects o f the Haitian embargo on Haiti and how it
profited the few, see Werleigh, “Haiti and the Halfhearted,” 2 2 -2 3 .
24. Monroe Leigh, “The Political Consequences o f Economic Embargoes,” The Am erican Journal o f
International Law 89, no. 1 (1995): 74.
25. OAS, “Protocol o f Washington.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

136
the agreement by appointing Joseph Nerette as president and declared the Protocol of
Washington illegal.26
In the 17 May 1992 meeting o f the Ministers o f Foreign Affairs, the OAS
condemned “the disruption of the democratic system in Haiti and recommended the
isolation o f the de facto regime.”27 Cedras probably learned that there was little
international resolve, and as Naom Chomsky stated, “the criminals are informed that they
can do their work with impunity.”28 Cedras repeatedly rebuffed outside attempts to
negotiate or restore President Aristide to power. OAS Resolution 3/92 on 17 May
expressed hardened resolve to restore democratic rule in Haiti, as it intensified sanctions
(excluding humanitarian assistance), and increased isolation o f the military regime.29
Member states were urged to deny port access to Haitian vessels, deny visas to Haitians,
and freeze Haitian assets.
By the summer o f 1992, the inability o f the OAS to bring about a political
solution became evident, and a major shift in policy was set into action. For example, the
9 June OAS Ministers o f Foreign Affairs meeting passed resolution 6/94 to strengthen the
mandate o f the UN Mission In Haiti (UNMIH), passed by the UN on 16 June for a global
oil and arms embargo.

Sanctions were credited with pressuring Cedras to negotiate the

Governor's Island July 1993 agreement, which brought hope that the crisis could be
resolved without force. The agreement consisted o f eight main points. First, the UN

26. “Haiti’s President W on’t Step Down,” M iam i H erald, 7 March 1992, A6.
27. OAS, “MRE/RES. 3/92: Restoration o f Democracy in Haiti,” 17 May 1992 (www.upd.oas.org,
accessed on 20 September 2001).
28. Naom Chomsky, “Democracy Restored? Intervention in Haiti, its M eaning and Prospects,” Z
M agazine 7, no. 11 (1994): 51.
29. OAS, “M RE/RES, 3/92.”
30. See UN, “Security Council Resolution 841,” 16 June 1993 (hereafter cited as “SC/RES”)
(www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 6 October 2001).
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embargo would continue in force until ratification by the Haitian Assembly. Second, the
Haitian Assembly would legislate reforms for the police and armed forces. Third, the
preparations for Aristide’s return would be made. Fourth, plans would be made for
Haiti’s economic recovery. Fifth, Cedras and his supporters would receive amnesty and
go into retirement. Sixth, Aristide would name a new Prime Minister. Seventh, UN
peacekeeping forces would assist in rebuilding the infrastructure o f Haiti. Eighth,
October 30 was set for Aristide’s return and Haiti was given until 15 January 1994 to
fulfill the agreement. An encouraging sign that Cedras would uphold the agreement was
when he made a televised address urging Haitians to accept the agreement. The Haiti
Assembly approved Aristide’s appointment o f Robert Malval as Prime Minister, and
sanctions were quickly lifted.
Kate Doyle argues that the Governor’s Island agreement was “profoundly
flawed,” mainly because o f the assumption that Cedras was reliable to act as an “honest
n |

broker.”

Generous measures of lifting sanctions unfortunately encouraged the Cedras

regime, which immediately increased human rights violations, as the “army and police
unleashed their thuggish paramilitary ‘attaches,’ who threatened Malval and a number o f
his cabinet ministers, and assassinated or attempted to murder prominent Aristide civilian
and political supporters.”

These practices indicated Cedras’ intention to hold on to

power as long as possible.
Despite these setbacks, the UN continued to implement the Governor’s Island
agreement in good faith, and dispatched peacekeepers to Haiti to address infrastructure

31. Kate D oyle, “H ollow Diplomacy in Haiti,” W orld P olicy Journal 11, no. 1 (1994): 5 3 -4 .
32. Morris M oreley and Chris McGillion, “‘Disobedient’ Generals,” 369.
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weaknesses.33 On 11 October, the USS Harlan County set sail for Haiti carrying 200
lightly armed U.S. soldiers and 25 Canadian military trainers, but when it arrived, found
the port blocked by vessels and a Cuban tanker was moored at the dock. The trip turned
into a disaster for international negotiations, and the Haitian crisis took on a new urgency.
Cedras’ supporters blocked the docks, shouting Somalia, Somalia, and in the wake of the
Somalia debacle only days before, the ship’s captain U.S. Navy Commander Marvin E.
Butcher ordered it to return to the United States.34 The Harlan County incident was a
clear victory for Cedras and served to embolden his home-front activities and
intimidation tactics continued to increase. Yet, the incident also bolstered international
resolve to reinstate democracy, partly because it embarrassed Clinton, who reinstated
sanctions against Haiti, but also began planning a military alternative. Thus, the Harlan
County incident was a turning point in the Haitian crisis, as hopes o f restored democracy
were dashed. Some argued that this event generated “an unintended but unmistakable
sign of international disengagement from the Haitian crisis.”35 The incident brought
pause to the international community, but deepened international understanding.
After the Harlan County incident, the UN Security Council took action without
prompting by the OAS. UN Security Council Resolution 873 on 13 October 1993
confirmed UN readiness for additional measures if Cedras continued to violate the
Governor’s Island agreement. The spiral of violence in Haiti hit a high point with the 14

33. See U N , “SC/RES 867,” 23 September 1993 (www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 6
October 2001).
34. For details, see Walter E. Kratchick, Robert F. Bauman, and John T. Fishel, A Concise H istory o f
the U.S. Arm y in O peration U phold D em ocracy (Fort Leavenworth, KA: United States Army Command
and General Staff C ollege Press, 1997).
35. Pamela Constable, “Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift,” Current H istory 93, no. 581
(1994): 108.
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October assassination o f Justice Minister Guy Malary, since it marked the breakdown of
the Governor’s Island agreement, and this time, the UN Security Council responded
quickly by increasing UN sanctions within two days. In addition, the failure o f the
Governor’s Island agreement allowed the OAS to step aside so that others, especially the
UN and United States, could engage. Restrained by its charter, the OAS profile
diminished. By the 15 January 1994 deadline, none o f the conditions set out in the
Governor’s Island agreement had been met by the Cedras regime.
After the Harlan County incident, the OAS prompted the UN to up its profile and
spearhead international policy, and the OAS fell from the lead, even though it continued
to support and pressure the UN to restore democracy to Haiti. The OAS by its charter
could support sanctions, but not military force, and asked the UN and the United States to
find alternatives other than the use o f force. As the time for intervention approached a
new OAS General Secretary took office. The United States favored former Colombian
President Cesar Gaviria as the candidate o f choice for the office, and “lobbied hard on
Gaviria’s behalf.”

The new OAS Secretary General, Gaviria refused “to take a stand on

plans for a U.S.-led invasion.”37 In his inaugural address, he said, “no one doubts that
Cuba must undertake reforms leading to the restoration o f democracy,” indicating his
support for the promotion o f democracy in the region, if not specifically in Haiti.38
In summary, while the OAS initialized the international response to the coup in
Haiti, the United States and the UN eventually took over leading the effort. Nonetheless,

36. George Gedda, “N ew OAS C hief predicts Democracy will return to Haiti,” The A ssociated Press
Political Service, 15 September 1994 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 2 April

2002).
37. Ibid.
38. “Colombian Sworn as N ew OAS Chief,” The Boston G lobe, 16 September 1994.
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regional allies were a very necessary component for bringing about a military solution to
the Haitian crisis, if only by catalyzing initial international response.

THE UNITED NATIONS
This section discusses the UN response to the September 1991 coup in Haiti. The
argument made here is that UN success in Haiti was a result o f cooperation between
international organizations at the request o f member states. More specifically, the UN
supported the effort to restore democracy to Haiti only after the OAS requested action. In
fact, the OAS set the tone for international action against the Haitian military leaders
until momentum in the UN led it to spearhead the effort. Moreover, once the UN began
to lead, the United States stepped up its involvement, and leadership rotated between
them.
After the coup, the OAS immediately convened and formulated a plan for
international action against the illegal military government in Haiti. Despite the fact the
Aristide addressed the UN General Assembly at the end o f September, the first resolution
passed in the UN on 8 October. The resolution sought member action “consistent with
the steps already taken by the OAS,”39 and on 10 October 1991, the UN Security Council
passed a further resolution to uphold OAS sanctions.40 The next day, the UN General
Assembly requested that the Secretary-General consider implementing OAS requests.41
As already explained, increased flows of refugees in 1991 heightened regional

39. John C. Pierce, “The Haitian Crisis and the Future,” 481.
40. See UN, “SC/RES 45 /2 ,” U nited Nations, 10 October 1991.
41. U N , “General A ssem bly Resolution 46/7,” 11 October 1991 (hereafter cited as U N “GA/RES/”)
(un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r007.htm, accessed on 16 October 2001).
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tension and brought the problem into the international limelight. International concerns
increased because o f the threat to regional stability generated by Haitian refugees in
neighboring countries, and merited UN General Assembly Resolution 46/138, requesting
assistance and calling international attention to the “fate o f the Haitian nationals who are
fleeing the country.”42 UN Resolution 47/20 reiterated concerns put forth earlier
regarding refugees and human rights violations in Haiti, and urged increased
humanitarian assistance from the international community.43 It further called on member
states to abide by international law within the UN framework and to cease providing
Haitian illegal leaders with military assistance, petroleum, munitions, or arms. The
resolution also authorized the deployment o f the International Civilian Mission to Haiti, a
joint project with the OAS, to verify human rights compliance.
The UN played an increasingly significant role in pressuring Cedras beginning in
December 1992, and UN General Assembly Resolution 47/143 reported that Cedras’
regime was practicing “flagrant human rights violations,” including “summary
executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, searches without warrant, rape,
restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, assembly and association and the
repression o f popular demonstrations calling for the return o f President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide.”44 Further, it expressed concern regarding refugees and urged humanitarian
assistance.
On 16 June 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 841, imposing a

42. UN, “G A /R ES/46/138,” 17 December 1991 (un.org/docum ents/ga/res/46/a46rl38, accessed on
16 October 2001).
43. UN, “G A /R ES/47/20,” 24 November 1992 (un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r20, accessed on 16
October 2001).
44. U N , “G A /R ES/47/143,” 18 December 1992 (un.org/docum ents/ga/res/47/a47rl43, accessed on
16 October 2001).
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global oil and arms embargo on Haiti. It was widely thought that UN sanctions against
Haiti were “responsible for the major breakthrough o f the Governor’s Island agreement”
on 3 July 1993.45 The agreement brought hope that the crisis could be resolved without
military force, and on 27 and 31 August 1993, UN Security Council resolutions 86land
862 lifted sanctions against Haiti in good faith. Thus, the international community
rewarded the Haitian junta by suspending all regional and global sanctions. In keeping
with the Governor’s Island agreement, the UN Security Council Resolution 867 on 23
September 1993 approved the dispatch o f United States and Canadian peacekeepers to go
to Haiti to help with infrastructure issues. Unfortunately, these measures o f generosity
encouraged the Cedras regime to break the agreement, and negotiations stalled in the next
months. As discussed above, the early October USS Harlan County diplomatic disaster
forced the UN to take action, and Resolution 873 on 13 October 1993, prepared for
additional measures as necessary. After the 14 October assassination of Justice Minister
Guy Malary, the UN responded quickly with UN Security Council Resolution 875. The
resolution increased UN sanctions, and included an oil and arms embargo. The 30
October date for Aristide’s reinstatement came and went without fulfillment, and by the
15 January 1994 deadline, Cedras had clearly not complied with any o f the Governor’s
Island agreement conditions.
During the first half o f 1994, the UN rhetoric sharpened considerably leading up
to the momentous July resolution that authorized the use o f military force. Following the
Clinton administration’s late April appeal, the UN shift took place in the form o f UN
Security Council Resolution 917 on 6 May. It marked a strong departure from previous

45. Pierce, “The Haitian Crisis and the Future,” 106.
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resolutions, as is noticeable in the extended length o f the document (just over six pages),
as compared to previous resolutions (usually two to three pages). Moreover, the
document employed rhetoric that was more severe than previous documents, for example,
using stronger phrases, such as “commending” efforts to bring compliance, “strongly
condemning” the extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, abductions,
rape and enforced disappearances, and “strongly urges.” The urgency o f the document is
evident in the use o f words such as “without delay” (used three times), expeditiously
(used once), and “in the shortest time possible.” Not only is this document more severe
than earlier resolutions, but it repeats an earlier warning o f “additional measures.” It lists
sanctions imposed that are in line with those requested by Clinton, including limitations
on flights, visas, assets, imports/exports/trade, and traffic by sea. It also reiterates
demands and other conditions found in the Governor’s Island agreement and promises to
end sanctions with compliance. When the content o f UN Security Council Resolution
917 is compared to Clinton’s April appeal, it is surprisingly similar. Two shifts had
occurred: 1) the United States began to take on a more assertive role in determining the
direction o f international policy on the Haitian Crisis, and 2) the UN had shifted its
rhetoric.
On 9 June, the OAS Ministers o f Foreign Affairs made Resolution 6/94, which
calls on the UN to further strengthen the mandate o f UNMIH. The following day,
Clinton broadened UN sanctions on Haiti, but it took the UN until the end o f the month to
draft a reply. The next UN resolution occurred on 30 June with UN Security Council
Resolution 933, extending UNMIH and authorizing preparation for rapid deployment o f
UNMIH, and inviting members to supply troops. Resolution 933 emphasized that the
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UN Security Council “strongly deplores the refusal o f the military authorities to
implement the Governor’s Island agreement.”46 Despite the sanctions, strong language
and repeated warnings from the UN, the Cedras regime disregarded the gravity o f the
situation and surprised the world with the expulsion o f the International Civilian Mission
(MICIVIH) from Haiti on 12 July 1994. At the end o f the month, Aristide made a further
appeal to the UN for support.
Two days later, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940, at the high point
o f UN legitimacy in Haiti. Resolution 940 authorized intervention with military force to
restore democracy to Haiti. Resolution 940 paragraph four authorized
member states to form a multinational force under unified command and control
and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from
Haiti o f the military leadership, consistent with the Governor’s Island agreement,
the prompt return o f the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the
legitimate authorities of the Government o f Haiti, and to establish and maintain a
secure and stable environment that will permit implementation o f the Governor’s
Island agreem ent47
In paragraph five, the resolution approves an advance team to enter Haiti to coordinate
and monitor multinational force operations.
On 26 August 1994, Clinton authorized the final invasion plan for Operation
Restore Democracy, and the United States took the lead in the intervention, on 18
September. Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe and Roger Coate argue that the UN “resorted
to the ‘sheriffs posse’ approach” to the Haitian crisis, meaning that the UN contracted
one o f its member states to actually run the intervention it had authorized.48 The United

46. U N , “SC/RES 933,” 3 0 June 1994 (www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 21 September

2001).
47. U N , “SC/RES 940,” 31 July 1 9 9 4 ,2 (www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 6 October

2001).
48. Thomas G. W eiss, D avid P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, ed., The U nited N ations and
Changing W orld P olitics, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: W estview Press, 20 0 1 ), 37; see also Richard Haass, The
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States fulfilled this function for the UN by taking the lead on military action when the
time came.
The next UN action took place with Resolution 944 on 29 September, laying the
plans to end sanctions after Aristide’s return. On 4 October the UNMIH Advance
Planning Team arrived in Port-au-Prince to plan the transition from Cedras to Aristide.
Eleven days later, Aristide returned to Haiti, and was welcomed home by UN Security
Council Resolution 948.
There were three phases o f UN involvement during the crisis in Haiti. The first
occurred between the coup on 30 September 1991 and lasted until December 1992.
During this time, the OAS led the campaign against the military junta in Haiti and
favored reinstating democracy. The second phase began in December 1992, when the
flow of refugees in the Caribbean region became destabilizing. At this point, the United
Nations sought an understanding with the Cedras regime, however failed. The third
phase began with Clinton’s April 1994 appeal to the UN to increase its mandate, after
which active U.S involvement grew. After UN Security Council Resolution 944
authorized intervention, the United States stepped into the lead role. The UN gained
legitimacy as a useful world organization, and came away from the Haitian crisis more
empowered to exercise authority at the international level, as UN efforts to resolve the
crisis set precedents for intervention to restore democracy.

THE U.S. CONGRESS
Divisions in Congress regarding U.S. policy in Haiti largely led to inaction. Some

Reluctant Sheriff: The U nited S tates after the C o ld War (N ew York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations
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of the issues behind this division included the recent humiliation in Somalia, bureaucratic
power struggles, strategic interests, immigration and refugee movement, and partisan
politics. Congressional apathy about supporting democracy in Haiti stemmed partly from
nervousness after the recent U.S. humiliation in Somalia on 3 October 1993 that made the
killing o f 18 U.S. soldiers a world media event, and no one wanted to see this happen
again. Moreover, after Somalia, there was concern that “there was and now remains the
danger that the entire democratic trend could unravel as quickly and decisively as it was
assembled.”49 Indeed, on 21 October 1993, the Senate rejected (81to 19) an attempt to
prohibit defense appropriations from being spent on a Haiti invasion, except if U.S.
citizens were at risk.50 On the same day, the Senate approved (98 to 2) an amendment
requiring the president to have prior approval from Congress for all military activities in
Haiti, unless U.S. citizens there were in imminent risk.
For the most part the bureaucratic struggle between the Clinton administration,
the Pentagon and the CIA over which Haitian leader was preferable generated conflicting
information in congressional hearings, especially those regarding Aristide’s mental
stability. Bureaucratic analysis o f the Haitian crisis has already been done by others,
however, and is not repeated here.51 Misinformation given to Congress about Aristide
brought out sharp criticism of Clinton’s policy to support him, and complicated the

Press, Brookings Institution Press, 1997).
49. Introductory comments by Robert G. Torricelli, H earing before the Subcom m ittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs o f the Com mittee on Foreign Affairs H ouse o f R epresentatives, 102nd Congress, 1st
session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 31 October 1991), 1.
50. See “Senate Vote: Foreign Policy 1993-S Haiti,” P roject Vote Smart, 21 October 1993
(http://www.vote-smart.org/index.phtml, accessed on 24 May 2002).
51. For an excellent explanation o f this behind-the-scenes struggle, see MacKinnon, The Evolution o f
U.S. Peacekeeping-, Brune, The United States and P ost-C old War Interventions, 5 0 -6 2 ; and Morely and
McGillion, “’D isobedient’ Generals,” 363 -8 4 .
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debate regarding his reinstatement. Many in Congress believed that Haiti had no
strategic value and produced no valuable exports, but they failed to acknowledge the
impact of refugees or the rising drug trade through this impoverished country. Pamela
Constable claims that the central issue in Congress over Haiti involved immigration and
illegal refugees that generated constituency undercurrents and complicated the lives o f
representatives in Congress.52 Florida was the main state to be affected by refugee influx,
due to costs of caring for them and local resentments that can influence politicians.
Large numbers refugees contributed to regional instability in the Caribbean and
therefore affected foreign policy. Deputy Secretary o f State, Strobe Talbot explained it
this way:
in many cases around the world, including this one, the disintegration o f a
political situation in one country can produce an outflow o f refugees who, in
various ways, impinge on the interests and capacities and resources o f
neighboring countries. And we saw that in spectacular and alarming fashion this
summer in the case of Haiti.53
Despite the fact that Clinton had criticized Bush for refugee repatriation, it would
continue, like it or not. According to William Berman, even though “Clinton earlier had
been critical of Bush’s handling of the Haitian refugee problem, claiming that it had not
been humane in practice, he now felt the need to stem the tide coming from Haiti to
Florida, or face intense risk o f losing Democratic seats in Congress in 1994 and the state
to a Republican challenger in 1996.”54 Rightly so, Clinton feared a resurgent Republican
Congress in the midterm election o f 1994.

52. Constable, “Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift.”
53. Statement by Strobe Talbot, in United States House, Hearings and M arkup before the Com m ittee
on Foreign Affairs H ouse o f Representatives, 103rd Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 27 September 1994), 17.
54. Berman, From the Center to the Edge, 36.
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During the Haitian crisis, the Black Caucus rose up within Congress as a powerful
proponent for military intervention, but was unable to sway congressional consensus
overall. The Black Caucus criticized the refugee policy as racist and supported Aristide.
They opposed Clinton’s demands on Aristide to accept measures that would appease the
military regime. In March, the Black Caucus introduced a bill to tighten the economic
embargo against Haiti, sever flight links, and stop refugee repatriation. Moreover, the
Black Caucus introduced legislation calling for the resignation o f Clinton’s special envoy
to Haiti since M arch 1993, Lawrence Pezzullo, who had tried to set up a “mini-plan” in
hopes that Aristide would accept a deal that would neutralize him and protect Cedras.55
Pezzullo was fired in April 1994, and Clinton announced on 18 May that the new Envoy
to Haiti was the head o f the Black Caucus, William H. Gray, a well-known proponent for
intervention in Haiti.56 Gray’s appointment marked a shift in Clinton’s refugee policy.
Henceforth, Haitian refugees would be granted asylum hearings on board U.S. ships or in
other countries. The Black Caucus wanted tougher measures against Haiti, particularly
harsher sanctions, and by April that meant considering a military alternative.57
The influence o f the Black Caucus on the Clinton administration was further
demonstrated, when Clinton had implemented most o f the Black Caucus’ earlier
legislative policies, despite the fact that it had not passed by July. The New York Times
reported that “one lawmaker who follows Haiti grumbled that administration officials
consult more with key members o f the black caucus than they do with the chairmen and

55. See Dupuy, H aiti in the N ew W orld Order, 155.
56. See Elaine Scioliono, “Clinton’s N ew Policy on Haiti Y ields little Progress, so far,” N ew York
Times, 18 M ay 1994, A l, A10.
57. See Christopher Marquis, “Legislators prod U.S. on Haiti,” M iam i H erald, 16 January 1994.
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ranking members o f the House and Senate committees with jurisdiction over policy on
Caribbean affairs.”58
Congress debated intervention in Haiti via a reexamination o f presidential war
powers and concluded that, at least in the case of Haiti, it would not block Clinton’s use
of military force. Congressional inactivity is a long-term issue for foreign policy, and
House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Lee Hamilton, D-Indiana, critiques the way
Congress shirks its responsibility to shape solid foreign policy by remaining inactive and
apathetic, because “in almost every case over the past 15 years, save for the Gulf War,
Congress has failed to grant prior authority for intervention.”59 Congress was divided
though, because some thought that Clinton overstepped his war powers authority by
ordering military intervention in Haiti. Lori Fisler Damrosch argues that without prior
congressional approval, Clinton’s military actions would have been illegal if the military
had actually landed in Haiti in 1994, regardless o f UN authorization.60 There were those
who argued that it would have been illegal, because Congress had not yet approved the
invasion and the War Powers Act was intended to allow for military defense, but not
attack.61 In a vote on 29 June 1994, the Senate rejected by 65 to 34 the requirement that
the president must “seek congressional authorization before ordering military action
•

•

•

against Haiti.”

f\)

The Senate also rejected (57-42) a proposal to establish a congressional

58. Steven A. Holmes, “With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti Policy,” New
York Times, 14 July 1994, A10.
59. The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, “The Role o f the Congress in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Washington
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 19 November 1 9 9 8 ,4 (www.csis.org/htmlsp98ham
ilton.html, accessed on 21 June 2001).
60. Lori Fisler Damrosch, “AGORA: The 1994 Action in Haiti: The Constitutional Responsibility o f
Congress for Military Engagements,” Am erican Journal o f International Law 89, no. 1 (1995): 5 8 -7 0 .
61. The War Powers Act allows the president 60 days o f freedom to use military force. There is a
debate however whether this includes attack without provocation.
62. “Senate Vote: Foreign Policy 1994-S Congressional Approval for Action in Haiti,” P roject Vote
Smart, 29 June 1994 (http://www.vote-smart.org/index.phtml, accessed on 24 May 2002).
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commission on Haiti in the middle o f July, and in early August tabled (63-31) an
amendment requiring the Clinton administration to have congressional approval before
using military force.
In a hearing on U.S. policy toward Haiti only a few days before the intervention,
Republicans again called for further hearings about the appropriateness o f using military
force against Haiti to restore democracy and redress human rights violations. For
example, Representative Benjamin Gilman argued that “If the grounds for using military
force are undergoing redefinition, then Congress, I say, has an obligation to hear those
grounds and to make their views known before the ships and planes are launched.”64 The
Chair of the House of Foreign Affairs Committee, Lee Hamilton, defended Clinton’s war
powers authority on 13 September 1994 just before the intervention took place, saying:
let me observe that whether you have prior authorization o f military action is a
constant question in American political history. And I think history will show
that the Congress has on occasion granted prior authorization for military action,
on occasion we have not. On occasion we have done nothing at all. I don’t know
that there is anything in the Constitution or in the War Powers Resolution that
requires prior authorization.65
As a result o f the debate over war powers, Congress was deadlocked, which resulted in
inaction. This deadlock allowed the president to use his authority to order military
intervention. In an interview on 19 September 1994, Clinton explained his position on
the war powers issue. He said, “I think that every President and all my predecessors in
both parties have clearly maintained that they did not require, by constitution, did not

63. S ee “Senate Vote: Foreign Policy 1994-S Congressional Commission on Haiti,” P roject Vote
Smart, 14 July 1994 (http://www.vote-smart.org/indexphtml, accessed on 24 M ay 2002).
64. Statement o f Benjamin A. Gilman, in United States House, “U.S. Policy toward, and Presence in,
Haiti,” in H earings a n d M arkup before the Com mittee on Foreign Affairs H ouse o f R epresentatives, 103rd
Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 13 September 1994), 5.
65. Statement o f Dana Rohrbacher, in ibid., 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151
have to have congressional approval for every kind o f military action.”66 It was not until
some days past the actual peak of the crisis, and after military intervention, that Congress
came to a resolution on the matter. House Joint Resolution 416, introduced on 24
September, heavily stressed congressional prohibition o f continued use o f U.S. armed
forces in Haiti, and requested detailed reports from the administration.67 President
Clinton signed Senate Joint Resolution 229 on 25 October 1994, which criticized the
president for not seeking congressional approval prior to deploying forces to Haiti.68 The
resolution again called for a “prompt and orderly withdrawal o f all United States Armed
Forces from Haiti.”69 The fact that Congress did not come to resolution on intervention
until after it was over gave Clinton “a free hand” to carry out foreign policy as he deemed
appropriate.

70

Congressional debate served as an ever-present reminder to President Clinton that
a military alternative could be difficult to get past a reluctant Congress. John Sweeny
described congressional opposition to intervention in Haiti as a “collision course”
between the executive and the legislature.71 This is an overstatement; however, it does
portray the potential for Congress to counter foreign policy decisions taken by the

66. William J. Clinton, “The President’s N ew s Conference with President Carter, General Powell,
and Senator Nunn on Haiti,” Weekly Com pilation o f Presidential D ocum ents 30, no. 38, 19 September
1994 (http://frw ebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID=56249622997+4+0+0& W A ISaction=retrieve,
accessed on 19 March 2002).
67. United States House, “House Joint Resolution 416: Limited Authorization for the United Statesled Force in Haiti,” 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 28 September 1994 (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
D ?cl03:l:./tem p /~cl03tj9e85::, accessed on 24 May 2002).
68. See William J. Clinton, “Statement on Signing Legislation on United States Policy on Haiti,”
Weekly Com pilation o f P residen tial D ocum ents 30, no. 43, 31 October 1 9 9 4 ,2 1 8 2 -4 .
69. United States Senate, “Senate Joint Resolution 229: Regarding United States Policy toward
Haiti,” 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 25 October 1994 (http://thom as.loc.gov/cgi-bin/queiy/D ?cl03:5:./
tem p/~cl03tj9e85::, accessed on 24 May 2002).
70. Carroll J. Doherty, “Congress, after a Sharp Debate, gives Clinton a Free Hand,” Congressional
Q uarterly Weekly R eport 52, no. 39 (1994): 2 8 9 5 -6 .
71. John Sweeney, “Stuck in Haiti,” Foreign P olicy no. 102 (1996): 144.
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president. Debate in Congress fueled a reexamination o f presidential war powers in
general, mainly over who has the power to do what. Opposition in Congress lacked the
backing to impede the intervention effort, because Congress “had ample time and
opportunity to act” but did not.72
Overall, the Haitian crisis did not move Congress to overwhelmingly support or
oppose Clinton’s plans for intervention, because Congress was divided on many issues.
This analysis finds that division over issues basically incapacitated Congress to fully
support or reject Clinton’s plans for intervention beyond sanctions. As a result, Congress
neither hindered, nor helped, Clinton’s foreign policy in Haiti. Moreover, regardless o f
complaints, the inability o f Congress to form a mandate on the course o f U.S. policy in
Haiti ultimately left the president to decide the best course o f action.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA
American public opinion regarding the crisis in Haiti neither favored, nor opposed
intervention. A Gallup Poll published in July 1993 showed that 65 percent o f the
American public believed that the presence o f Haitian immigrants “generally created
problems for the country.”73 This likely stems from the fact that Haitian refugees were
often illiterate and unskilled. In the same poll, only 19 percent o f the American public
believed that “their presence has benefited the country.”74 Such measurements indicated
that bias against Haitian immigration was nearly 3 and one-half times greater than that
favoring it. Clearly, this would seem to be an indication that a stringent repatriation

72. Trimble, “The President’s Constitutional Authority to U se Limited Military Force,” 84.
73. “Immigration Prejudices: Selected Nations,” The G allup P o ll M onthly, no. 334 (1993): 14.
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policy regarding Haitian boat people would be more welcomed than opposed. Only half
of Americans believed that Clinton was doing a good job with foreign affairs and many
Americans held no opinion at all regarding foreign policy in general. There was a slight
rise in public approval o f the way Clinton was handling foreign affairs after 16 June
1994, when the UN placed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti.
The results of a poll taken on 15-17 July 1994 indicated that 54 percent of the
public thought that the United States should send troops to Haiti to restore democracy.75
O f these, 43 percent felt that the United States should send troops to Haiti only in a
multilateral action, and a further 11 percent believed that the United States should send
troops whether or not other countries participated. While 54 percent is over half, it is
only slightly more than half and is therefore less convincing, as it could quickly turn
either way. Clinton addressed the nation on 15 September 1994 to present his case in
favor of sending troops to remove the military regime in Haiti. The speech inspired a
frequently seen “rally around the president” effect, which was measured in a two part
Gallup poll taken before and after the speech.76 For example, prior to the speech 35
percent o f those surveyed approved o f the way Clinton was handling the situation in
Haiti, whereas after the speech, this percentage jumped to 53 percent. Those
disapproving fell from 49 percent to 43 percent and those with no opinion fell from 16 to
4 percent. When asked if the United States should send troops in a multilateral effort
after all other diplomatic efforts failed, those who agreed in sending troops rose after the

74. The same figures were published in a similar poll in January 1994, see “United States
Immigration Prejudices,” W orld Opinion Update 18, no. 1 (1994): 2.
75. David W. Moore, “America Hesitant about War in Haiti,” The G allup P o ll Monthly, no. 346
(1994): 18.
76. David W. Moore and Lydia Saad, “After Clinton Speech: Public Shifts in Favor o f Haiti
Invasion,” The G allup P o ll Monthly, no. 348 (1994): 16-17.
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speech from 40 percent to 56 percent, while those who said not to fell from 48 percent to
41 percent. While these figures are more amenable toward intervention than earlier
figures, they show a divided public.
In his September 15 address to the nation, Clinton outlined several reasons for
justifying military action. According to a poll done at the time o f the speech, the most
persuasive reason (supported by viewers at 67 percent) was to stop human rights
violations by the Cedras regime in Haiti.

77

Clearly, this is a very close tie-in to the

Clinton Doctrine, since protecting human rights contains stopping ethnic genocide, albeit
in Haiti the political killings were not ethnic genocide, but would, however, support the
argument that Clinton did wish to promote human rights abroad. In the same poll, more
than half (56 percent) of the viewers supported a military alternative to reduce the flow of
Haitian refugees, and 55 percent were convinced that the United States should intervene
to promote democracy. The mixed message from the public for intervention increase
Clinton’s available alternatives. Moreover, a majority o f 58 percent did not believe that
intervention was merited to maintain U.S. credibility abroad. Overall, 66 percent were
convinced by Clinton’s reasons for the United States to intervene, while 33 percent were
not.
Despite increased public support for Clinton’s upcoming intervention, 63 percent
believed that the president should seek approval from Congress prior to sending troops to
Haiti. Clearly, “going public” had a favorable impact on public opinion for intervention,
but the approval rate o f 53 percent in favor o f intervention was a fragile majority. This is

77. Ibid., 16.
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especially true given the possible sampling error set at plus or minus 6 percent for this
poll.
Polls showed that popular opinion regarding U.S. activity in Haiti received mixed
reviews, and a majority o f Americans were “skeptical that many o f the basic goals o f the
intervention will ever be achieved.”78 Table 3 shows public approval regarding how
Clinton handled the Haiti crisis.

Table 3
Ratings on Clinton’s Handling the Situation in Haiti79
Approve
1994Jul 15-17
1994 Sep 6-7
1994 Sep 16-18
1994 Sep 19
1994 Sep 23-25

28
27
35
Intervention
48

Disapprove
56
58
55
48

Source: Frank Newport and Leslie McAneny, “Haiti Yields Clinton Small ‘Rally
Effect,’” The Gallup Poll Monthly, no. 348 (1994): 31.

The approval ratings improved from 27 percent in early September to 48 percent after the
speech in late September. In the week following the arrival o f troops in Haiti, American
support for troops in Haiti increased from 46 percent on 19 September to 54 percent on
23-25 September. The pattern o f public opinion regarding Operation Restore Democracy
clearly reveals that approval for the intervention increased as intervention showed
success. It is likely that this increase in public opinion regarding intervention reflected

78. Frank Newport and L eslie M cAneny, “Haiti Y ields Clinton Small ‘Rally E ffect,’” The G allup
P oll Monthly, no. 348 (1994): 3 0 -2 .
79. It is important to note that different polls do not always reflect the exact same results in data
percentages; however, it is valid to consider similar trends.
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the phenomenon in which the public typically rallies around the president during times o f
crisis.
While the President’s address to the nation improved levels o f public support for
intervention, critical media reports may have reduced popular support for Clinton around
the same time. Despite the majority approval in the polls, reports accused Clinton of
exhibiting insecurity about public opinion, and criticized him for couching the
intervention in terms o f humanitarian concern rather than boldly explaining the true
interests involved,80 or o f being “ashamed o f tough-mindedness,”81 or o f using the
successful intervention to boost his political credibility while claiming it was an issue o f
U.S. credibility.82 Additionally, reports o f U.S. troops standing by while the Haitian
Police used “brutal crowd control tactics” against demonstrators tainted White House
declarations regarding a “much stronger and safer position” in Haiti.83 Such negative
media attention regarding intervention and the president did not improve the public view
OA

o f U.S. policy.

One report, however, explained that the press unjustly criticized

Clinton’s diplomatic and military decisions regarding Haiti, because he was successful in
accomplishing what he set out to do.85
Michael Mandelbaum claimed that Clinton’s “distinctive vision o f post-cold war
American foreign policy failed because it did not command public support.”86 Public

80. See M ichael Kramer, “The Case for Intervention,” Time 144, no. 13 (1994): 28.
81. William Safire, “Jimmy Clinton, II,” N ew York Times, 22 September 1994, A 27L.
82. Gloria Borger, “W hose Credibility is it anyway?” U.S. N ew s & W orld R eport 117, no. 12 (1994):
54.
83. John H. Cushman, Jr., “Haitian Police Crush Rally as American Troops Watch,” N ew York Times,
21 September 1994, A l.
84. For a discussion o f humanitarian measures exercised by the U .S. troops regarding detainees in
Haiti after the intervention, see Theodor Meron, “Extraterritoriality o f Human Rights Treaties,” The
Am erican Journal o f International Law 89, no. 1 (1995): 7 8 -8 2 .
85. Hendrik Hertzberg, “Haiti so Far,” The N ew Yorker 70, no. 33 (1994): 7.
86. Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (1996): 16.
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opinion early in the Haitian crisis was generally against intervention, however, as
intervention came closer public opinion grew mixed to favorable. This phenomenon also
happened prior to the Persian Gulf War for George Bush, but like Clinton, this did not
severely hamper his ability to achieve his goals.
The Haiti crisis is an example o f how the media intervenes between the president
and the public to convey a message of its own. Here, the message was more against
intervention. Thus, the president went directly to the public with his message, and
improved public support for action in Haiti. According to this analysis, the variable
public opinion was not a decisive factor in influencing the decision to intervene in Haiti.

U.S. INTERESTS
At first glimpse, the role the Clinton administration played in resolving the
Haitian crisis appears varied and occasionally ad hoc. While this has much to do with the
president’s personality and personal style, upon deeper examination, the Haitian crisis,
was about protecting U.S. interests. For this reason, official rhetoric during the crisis
favored supporting democracy in the Caribbean, as a strategy to induce potential refugees
to stay home. In addition, Clinton pressured Aristide to remain flexible,87 and to implore
Haitian masses to remain in Haiti. As explained in an earlier chapter, situations o f
refugee movement often pose difficult challenges to countries, which then take steps to
ensure the safety o f citizens and refugees. This was also true during the Haitian crisis.
Democratic enlargement, as vital strategic interest, has highlighted a newer more
abstract peripheral interest for human rights, which emerged during the Carter
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administration. When faced with human rights violations, Bill Clinton, could not ignore
the disruption o f democracy in Haiti, just next door, when such an approach goes against
the fundamental nature o f America, which protects democracy and human rights and yet
allows the freedom to refuse to do the same. This dilemma brings vigorous debate to the
floor o f the U.S. Congress, to clarify what the American public wants from policy
makers.
In a sense, the president found himself in a “catch 22” during the crisis in Haiti.
Some argued that Clinton’s lack of attention to U.S. interests led him to deepen the
commitment to Aristide, which left him “with no obvious way out other than prolonged
sanctions or the intervention of foreign peacekeepers.”88 It is questionable however, how
deep Clinton’s commitment to Aristide was in actuality, because the United States
pressured Aristide to negotiate and concede until Aristide was forced to comply or give
up. Clearly Aristide needed the United States far more than the other way around, but we
must not overlook a very real reason for U.S. action in Haiti, to stabilize demographic
shifts. As such, Clinton did in fact operate to protect U.S. interests by supporting
democracy.
Without congressional or public support o f using military force, Clinton
consistently considered all viable alternatives. For example, he said,
Just because the cold war is over does not mean the United States can
withdraw from the world. Just because it is almost always not necessary
to resort to force, and we must always do everything we can to avoid it,
does not mean there are never circumstances in which it might be
necessary ... And that is why we have sought for 3 years to restore
democracy to Haiti, to end violence and terrorism and human rights
87.
A lex D oyle argues that this was a hold over from the Bush administration, which lacked support
for Aristide reinstatement.
88. Paul D. W olfowitz, “Clinton’s First Year,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (1994): 41.
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violations, to see that all parties lived up to their commitments, to keep
democracy on the move in our hemisphere and to encourage those
fledgling democracies to be brave and to go forward, to stabilize the
borders and the territorial integrity o f all countries, including ours.89
Here, Clinton used rhetoric akin to the Clinton Doctrine to explain U.S. action in Haiti.
As one U.S. official said: “We are using every means at our disposal to get rid o f this
regime in the hopes o f avoiding the necessity o f an invasion.. . . Every means.”90 U.S.
progress toward eventual military alternatives was therefore slow and cautious.
The key strategy for regional stabilization was to return democratic rule to Haiti
in hopes that such steps would ease human suffering and restore demographic stability.
Initially, Clinton had some difficulty to overcome momentum set in place by Bush, but
Clinton’s policy suffered because of a cleavage between conservative and liberal forces
in the U.S. bureaucracy. The Washington bureaucracy complicated matters for the
Clinton administration, because it lacked consensus on which Haitian leader was
preferable. In a biting critique, Naom Chomsky explains that not only did the CIA give
Congress misinformation about the Aristide’s psychological soundness, but it maintained
connections to Cedras’ military establishment that were contrary to removing him from
power.91 For example, the CIA worked against Clinton’s policy by inciting the junta to
block the docks that led to the USS Harlan County incident. Moreover, thirty-year CIA
national intelligence officer, Brian Latell, gave Congress counterfactual information in a

89. William J. Clinton, “Remarks at the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation Dinner,” Weekly
Com pilation o f P residen tial D ocum ents 30, no. 3 8 ,2 6 September 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin...D =5624962297+47+0+0& W A ISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2001).
90. Quoted in D oyle McManus and Robin Wright, “U.S. Tried Covert Action to Rid Haiti o f Rulers,”
Los A ngeles Times, 16 September 1994.
91. N aom Chomsky, “Democracy Restored,” 50.
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secret briefing about Aristide’s mental health.92 This report increased deadlock in
Congress over backing Aristide. Second, this bureaucratic split was compounded by
Clinton’s initial decision to retain Bush’s key personnel in the State Department as they
undermined Clinton’s efforts to negotiate the removal o f Cedras in a legitimate fashion.
Under Clinton’s strategy, Aristide needed to be reinstated as legitimate ruler of
Haiti, and it was hoped that these steps would better the humanitarian situation, restore
political and regional stability, and lessen refugee migration. As one commentator noted,
“Clinton and most people in Haiti are pinning their hopes on a political settlement that
will make Haitians want to stay home.”93 Clinton argued in his presidential campaign
that when elected his policy on Haitian refugees would look much different than that of
the Bush administration, but as explained earlier, this policy did not last long. The
presidential campaign therefore complicated domestic pressures regarding the influx of
Haitian refugees, because Clinton campaigned against forced repatriation. Once in
office, however, he quickly learned the unfeasibility o f fulfilling his campaign rhetoric,
because “Haitians took his election victory as a guarantee o f Uncle Sam’s embrace and
began to build more boats.”94 Accepting one wave o f immigrants seemed innocuous, but
in light o f potential waves to follow, Clinton found himself constrained by a reducing
number o f foreign policy choices, and he quickly returned to the Bush policy o f returning
Haitian refugees.
When the UN imposed a global oil and arms embargo in mid-June 1993, Clinton

92. See details o f the report in Mark Danner, “The Fall o f a Prophet,” N ew York Review o f Books 40,
no. 20 (1993): 4 4 -5 3 .
93. J. F. 0 . M cAllister, “Lives on Hold,” Time 141, no. 5 (1993): 51.
94. Ibid., 50.
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followed suit and announced tougher sanctions at the end o f June. Less than a month
later, the military junta in Haiti signed the Governor’s Island agreement, and the approval
of Robert Malval as Prime Minister o f Haiti was an encouraging development in late
August, as it fulfilled one o f the Governor’s Island conditions. Taking this appointment
as an act of good faith, the international community suspended sanctions, but the Cedras
regime immediately increased violence and international concern elevated.95 In
September, Clinton sought “support for imposing a global trade embargo on the country,
together with financial sanctions (the freezing o f overseas assets) and travel bans against
600 military officers who supported the autocratic regime or participated in the
September 1991 coup.”96
The USS Harlan County incident on 11 October 1993 posed problems for the
Clinton administration for several reasons. First, reports surfaced that the Department o f
Internal Affairs (DIA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were behind Haitian
militant activities to block the ports, and anti-Aristide DIA and CIA agents reportedly
encouraged resistance by advising Cedras that the UN could be easily run off. Indeed,
the United States, having recently experienced humiliation in Somalia was hesitant to
take further injuries and was reluctant to enter into combat type exchanges. Second,
Haitian intimidation tactics were successful for Cedras, because the Harlan County
withdrew, causing the loss o f credibility, not only for Clinton, but also for the United
States. As misinformation about Aristide circulated, Clinton was forced to regroup, as
Congress debated the soundness o f intervention in Haiti.97

95. See M orely and M cGillion, “‘Disobedient’ Generals,” 369.
96. Ibid., 374.
97. See ibid., 370.
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Third, Cedras continued to ignore hard won agreements to restore democracy.
Pamela Constable argues that the Clinton administration had “to an astonishing degree
. . , underestimated the cynicism, greed, ruthlessness, and deep hostility to Aristide
among military leaders and their civilian confederates, who also include conservative
businessmen and criminal gangs.”98 Newly appointed Justice Minister, Guy Malary, was
assassinated in broad daylight as he drove from his Port-au-Prince office on 14 October
1993. Malary, an aggressive reformist trained in the United States, was preparing
legislation to bring the Haitian police under civilian control.99 Even though Malary’s
attackers were never identified, the murder was widely interpreted as a direct military
right-wing civilian challenge to international authority. The assassination was
immediately met with reimposed U.S. and UN sanctions, which were enforced by six
U.S. Navy warships. On 18 October 1993, Clinton imposed additional sanctions on Haiti
to block properties held by certain Haitians.
The Governor’s Island agreement did what the Protocol o f Washington had failed
to do: set a deadline o f 30 October 1993 for Aristide’s return. Clinton had worked hard
to get Aristide to bend to political negotiations, and the administration was more likely
frustrated than surprised when the 30 October Governor’s Island agreement deadline to
restore Aristide came and went, and persecution o f Haitian citizens heightened.
International concerns arose that a new wave o f refugees could move out o f Haiti.100
Fourth, the failure of economic sanctions often embarrasses the administration,

98. Constable, “Haiti,” 110.
99. See Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief, “Haiti: The Struggle for Democracy and
Congressional Concerns in 1994,” Congressional Research Service, 22 September 1994: 9.
100. “Thousands in Haiti ask Asylum in the U .S .,” N ew York Times, 9 Decem ber 1993, A7L.
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which imposes them, because they hurt the poor more than the wealthy who find
loopholes to exploit the embargo. Once made public, this situation showed the world the
hollowness o f diplomatic efforts, and given the futility o f his approach, Clinton moved to
a stronger and more direct policy, even though Congress and the American public
remained uncommitted to the use o f force. In a move to toughen the U.S. stance on 21
April 1994, and after being pressured by Senate legislation for stiffer sanctions against
Haiti, Clinton announced strict enforcement of the economic embargo and sent a naval
blockade to enforce it.101 Thus, in late April 1994 there was a mild shift between the
United States and United Nations, as the United States began to take the lead and
requested a global trade embargo from the UN Security Council.
Shortly thereafter, further policy reversals were apparent, as Clinton displayed a
new understanding o f real-politik in the context o f the Haitian crisis. On 5 May Clinton
issued PDD 25, limiting U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, as explained
in Chapter I. PDD 25 revised U.S. strategic rationale behind peacekeeping within the
broader context of foreign policy, and proposed reform for UN peace operations. On 6
May 1994, the UN called for increased sanctions against Haiti in Security Council
Resolution 814, and a day later, the United States also increased import restrictions.102 In
his remarks on 10 June, President Clinton expressed concern regarding refugee flows into
the United States, saying “I want to be clear about this issue, I continue to urge all

101. See Mary E. Kortanek, “Democrats push Clinton to Toughen Embargo, ” Congressional
Q uarterly Weekly R eport 52, no. 16 (1994): 1015.
102. For more details, see William J. Clinton, “M essage to the Congress on H aiti," Weekly
Com pilation o f P residen tial Documents 30, no. 21, 30 May 1994 (http://frwebgate5.accessgpo.gov/cgibin...D =56249622997+12++0+0& W A ISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2001).
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Haitians to avoid risking lives in treacherous boat voyages.”

Strobe Talbot went

before the OAS in mid-June and delivered four points on policy: the United States would
1) strictly enforce tight, comprehensive sanctions “as a primary element o f pressure”; 2)
provide “massive aid for economic and social reconstruction once democracy is
restored”; 3) encourage “nations in the hemisphere to provide asylum for Haitian political
refugees”; and 4) work to reform and strengthen UN efforts in UNMIH.104
By 30 June, the UN authorized rapid deployment of UNMIH and invited member
states to commit troops to the mission. Clinton announced on 6 July, that the United
States would only allow into the United States those refugees who applied for asylum
from offices in Haiti. Otherwise, boat people would be returned to Haiti or to other “safe
havens.”105 By 25 June, the Clinton administration cut U.S. commercial flights to Haiti
and tightened other sanctions. When the Haitian military regime expulsed the
International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) on 12 July, Clinton began seeking a UN
resolution authorizing member countries to use “all necessary means” to restore President
Aristide to power. The same day, Clinton went before the UN to request approval for an
invasion o f Haiti. At the end of July, Aristide appealed to the UN for support and the
next day, on 31 July 1994, the UN Security Council authorized a “multinational force
under unified command and control. . . to use all necessary means to facilitate the

103. William J. Clinton, “Remarks Announcing Additional Sanctions against Haiti,” Weekly
Compilation o f P residential Documents 30, no. 2 3 ,1 3 June 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgibin...D=56249622997+30+0+0& W AISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
104. Statement by Strobe Talbott, see Organization o f American States, U.S. D epartm ent o f State
D ispatch 5, no. 24 (June 1994): 384-5.
105. Quoted in Elizabeth A. Palmer, “A Haitian Chronology," Congressional Q uarterly Weekly
Report 52, no. 36 (1994): 2579.
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departure from Haiti of the military leadership.” 106 Thus, the UN approved military
intervention in Haiti and cleared the way for Clinton’s leadership in the military mission.
At the beginning of August, Clinton countered opposition saying that he did not
believe he was mandated to receive approval from Congress prior to intervention.107 On
26 August, Clinton authorized the final version o f the invasion plan that the military had
been drafting for m onths.108 Thus, the momentum toward intervention had already begun
some time before intervention was mentioned publicly.
As explained earlier, in his 14 September address to the nation, Clinton outlined
several reasons for justifying military action. He said, the United States “must protect
our interests, to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens o f thousands o f Haitians, to
secure our hemisphere and to uphold the reliability o f the commitments we make and the
commitments others make to us.”109 Clinton explained in strong language that Cedras
was responsible for atrocities and must step down, and he had already ordered military
intervention.
Three days later he made another address in which he reiterated the U.S. reasons
for going to Haiti: to restore democracy, reduce suffering, uphold commitments, “avert
the flow o f thousands o f more refugees and to secure our borders.”110 While on the air,
Clinton warned that “the Cedras regime’s time is up. Their time is up. The remaining

106. U N , “SC R ES/940,” 31 July 1994.
107. See “ 140 Congressional Record,” at S10, Congressional R ecord, daily ed., 5 August 1994, 663.
108. See John C. Cushman, Jr., Steven Greenhouse, Douglas Jehl, and Elaine Sciolino, “On the Brink
o f War, A Tense Battle o f W ills,” N ew York Times, 20 September 1994, A l, A13.
109. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Haiti.”
110. William J. Clinton, “The President’s Radio Address,” Weekly Com pilation o f P residential
Documents. 30, no. 3 8 ,1 7 September 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...D =56249622
997+20+0+0&W AISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
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question is not whether they will leave but how they will leave. They can go peacefully
. . . or they will be removed by force.”111 President Clinton sent a letter to congressional
leaders regarding the crisis in Haiti dated 18 September 1994, the necessity, objectives
and risks, the U.S. interests in the region, entry and exit-strategies, and projected costs (at
levels of $500-600 million) o f military intervention.

110

Both Congress and the American

public remained ambivalent that a military intervention was necessary, but plans went
forward.
As part o f the plan, Clinton sent former-President Carter to Haiti to negotiate with
the Cedras regime on the eve o f the invasion. Richard Betts points out that compromise
is most probable, when “both sides believe that they have more to lose than to gain from
fighting” and that peace agreements more often occur prior to the breakout o f violence.113
Clinton’s intervention worked well as the U.S. military backed Carter, and the U.S.-led
multinational force launched Operation Restore Democracy from Pope Air Force Base in
North Carolina, at 6:47 p.m. During negotiations, Cedras learned that 61 American
planes were already in the air on the way to Haiti with more behind them. He reached
agreement within hours o f their arrival in Haiti.
Carter’s agreement with Cedras was vague, but allowed U.S. entry into Haiti, and
forced Cedras to step down by mid-October.114 In addition, it stipulated conditions for
Aristide’s subsequent reinstatement, and granted general amnesty to Cedras. The

111. Ibid.
112. The text o f the letter can be view ed in William J. Clinton, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on
Haiti,” Weekly Com pilation o f P residen tial Docum ents 30, no. 38 (1994): 1801-3 (http://frwebgate5.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID=56249622997+0+0+0& W A ISaction=retreive, accessed on 19 March 2002).
113. Richard K. Betts, “The Delusion o f Impartial Intervention,” F oreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (1994): 21.
114. A text o f the one page document can be viewed in “Text o f Agreement Averting U .S. Invasion
o f Haiti,” N ew York Times, 20 September 1994, A 12.
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agreement seemed to have “caught the Clinton administration by surprise and forced a
rethink o f the invasion plans literally in mid-flight,”115 but military use o f force was
averted and, even though the military junta would remain for a month, Aristide
successfully returned on 15 October 1994. Haiti scholar and staunch intervention
supporter, Robert Rotberg, argues that despite continued economic turmoil and political
instability after the intervention, Haiti had become “much better and much more livable”
than before.116
On 14 October 1994 Clinton signed an executive order to lift all economic
sanctions against Haiti as soon as Aristide was returned to power and the crisis ended.117
A demonstrable shift in policy from “assertive multilateralism” to a more moderate
stance could be seen, as Clinton learned from experiences, such as the Harlan County
incident and Somalia. PDD 25 demonstrated this shift in early August 1994, after the
Somalia debacle, when there was a distancing from a policy o f assertive multilateralism.
Clinton used economic sanctions against Haiti throughout the crisis,118 arguing that these
steps “demonstrated my determination and that o f the international community to see that
Haiti and the Haitian people resume their rightful place in our hemispheric community o f
democracies.”119 Despite many frustrations and setbacks, Clinton pursued restoring
democracy in Haiti as a way to stabilize the region. Clinton intervened on 18 September

115. Morely and M cGillion, “ ‘Disobedient’ Generals,” 381.
116. Robert Rotberg, “Clinton was Right,” Foreign P o licy 102 (1996): 140.
117. William J. Clinton, “Executive Order 12932: Termination o f Emergency with Respect to Haiti,”
Weekly Com pilation o f P residen tial Documents 30, no. 41, 14 October 1994 (http://Frwebgate5.access.gp
o.gov/cgi-bin...D =56249622997+32+0+0& W A ISsction=retrieve, accessed on 19 M arch2002).
118. For a detailed account o f U.S. sanctions against Haiti from Decem ber 1990 through October
1994, see William J. Clinton, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti,” W eekly Com pilation o f
Presidential Docum ents 30, no. 41, 13 October 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID56249622997+0+0+0& W AISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
119. William J. Clinton, “M essage to the Congress on Haiti,” Weekly Com pilation o f P residential
Documents 30, no. 1 7 ,2 5 April 1994 (http://frwebgate5 .access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID = 56249622997+
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1994 to restore democratically elected Aristide as president o f Haiti. Despite initial
inclinations to soften the U.S. stance on Haiti, Clinton followed a cautious and reserved
strategy that ultimately exhausted alternatives to military intervention.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter set out to examine the extent o f influence exerted by the five
variables on decisions regarding intervention, and how they shaped the foreign policy of
President Clinton. There are three overarching considerations in this case study. First,
the United States was concerned about the numbers o f refugees leaving Haiti. Second,
the Clinton administration wanted to restore democracy in Haiti. Third, responsibility
and leadership for the intervention ultimately fell to the United States.
The general debate on intervention in Haiti points out many sides o f the issues.
Critics argued that intervention was too costly and only marginally held to U.S. security
interests.

For example, the 1994 mission cost the United States over $1.5 billion and

triggered a $1.2 billion multinational reconstruction commitment. Fareed Zakaria
cautioned that by getting distracted in small hot spots in peripheral areas, conflicts, and
crises, the United States could risk long-term strategic interests and that “America, like
Britain before it, will lose the core.”121 Moreover, critics decried intervention in this
small and overpopulated country, claiming that the goal of institutionalizing democracy
in Haiti was unachievable. This was especially disconcerting for the short-run, but there

l+0+0&W AISaction=retreive, accessed on 19 March 2002).
120. See Georges A. Fauriol, “Before the House Government Reform Committee Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources: The N ew Haitian End-Game,” Washington, D.C.:
Center f o r Strategic an d International Studies, 12 April 2000, 2 (www.csis.org/hill/ts000816fauriol.htm l,
accessed on 21 June 2001).
121. Fareed Zakaria, “The Core vs. the Periphery,” Com mentary 96, no. 6 (1993): 26.
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were also concerns over potential costs o f long-term involvement and unintended
consequences, such as a backlash against the United States, due to resentment similar to
what is found in post-colonial states.122 On this note, Richard Betts charged that the
Clinton short-term strategy was problematic partly because o f the initial limited character
o f the intervention that prolonged suffering brought on by embargoes.123 He also argued
that the long-term strategy of intervention failed, because it was not impartial, leaving the
internal political balance-of-power off-kilter in Haiti. This points to the question o f what
will become o f Haiti in the future after the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) peacekeeping
forces withdraw, and whether this expensive undertaking is in vain. Along this line, Eirin
Mobekk writes that the intervention in Haiti did not succeed in reinstating the type of
democracy envisioned by many Haitians.124 When speaking o f long-term commitments,
Peter Rodman argues that the liberal “new age” internationalism was overdone by the
Clinton administration, producing an isolationist backlash in the United States, which
discredits intervention per se, and which will be difficult to overcome in the future.125
Michael Mandelbaum picks up where Rodman leaves off, warning that intervention for
purely humanitarian purposes is too costly considering the return on investment in terms
of promoting U.S. interests, or in terms of resolving more pressing issues that merit a
higher priority, such as strengthening relations with important allies around the world.
Moreover, he points out that “restoration” o f democracy in Haiti is a misnomer and is
more accurately called creation of democracy in Haiti.126 Critics charged that

122. Zachary Karabell, “D on’t Do It,” Tikkim 9, no. 5 (1994): 12.
123. Betts, “The Delusion o f Impartial Intervention,” 25.
124. Eirin Mobekk, “Enforcement o f Democracy in Haiti,” D em ocratization 8, no. 3 (2001): 173-88.
125. Peter Rodman, “Points o f Order: Flaws in the N ew Paradigm,” N ational Review 47, no. 8
(1995): 36.
126. Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

170
intervention in Haiti to restore democracy was unrealistic, because the political history
there was not democratic until the election o f Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and that
government held out less than a year. In addition, they argued that intervention
constituted a diversion o f U.S. assets and attention from more important issues.
Those favoring intervention in Haiti pointed to destabilization o f U.S. security
interests in the region due to drug trafficking, irritations due to disruption o f trade, and
especially an infusion o f poverty stricken refugees. The United States had waged war
against drugs for at least two decades and by 1996, the Caribbean Basin had become a
“key trafficking route and location for money laundering.” 127 Allowing instability to
continue unhampered would serve the lawless interests o f those in the lucrative drug
trade. Thus, stopping the drug trade was a long established U.S. interest.
The potential for new waves o f refugees setting sail for the United States proved
enough to pressure Clinton to reverse campaign promises (although, according to some,
the refugee quagmire was largely a side effect o f the economic embargo).128 In addition,
intervention proponents wanted to promote and export traditional American principles o f
democracy and human rights. W. Michael Reisman points out that those, who criticize
intervention on the grounds o f humanitarian service, have “already dismissed human
rights as a valid foreign policy concern.”129 Accordingly, this precedent should put to
rest the question o f whether human rights violations generate security concerns meriting
intervention. Moreover, if action against Haiti was not warranted, then one could

127. Elliott Abrams, “The Shiprider Solution,” The N ation al Interest, no. 43 (1996): 87.
128. There are many articles on this topic, see for exam ple, J. F. O. M cAllister, “Lives on Hold.”
129. W. M ichael Reisman, “Haiti and the Validity o f International A ction,” Am erican Journal o f Law
89, no. 1 (1995): 83.
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question why did the United States impose sanctions against Haiti in the first place.
Besides, proponents argued that an ignored crisis ultimately costs more to fix than an
early intervention.130

130.
For an econom ic analysis o f the reconstruction o f Haiti after the 1994 intervention, see Anthony
Bryan, “Haiti: Kick Starting the Econom y,” Current H istory 94, no. 589 (1995): 6 5 -7 1 ; and on institution
building after intervention, see C olin Granderson, Sofia Clark D ’Escoto, and Christelle Loupforest, “The
Haiti Challenge: Following the Restoration o f Constitutional Order in October 1994,” O AS N ew sletter
(www.upd.oas.org/newsletter/thc.htm, accessed on 21 September 2001).
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CHAPTER VI
CASE STUDY ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN EAST TIMOR

This chapter focuses on the 1999 crisis in East Timor. It entails an examination o f
U.S. foreign policy during the crisis to reveal, why, how and when the Clinton
administration chose not to intervene in this crisis. This chapter begins with a brief
historical overview and then examines the five political variables that are outlined in
Chapter III, and concludes with a summary o f findings.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Historically, both Europe and the United States shaped developments in Southeast
Asia. Until April 1974, Portugal colonized East Timor, when preparations were made for
a transitional government away from colonial rule until democratic elections could be
held in 1976. Decolonization deteriorated into civil war in the latter half o f 1975.
President Ford and Secretary o f State Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta on 6 December
1975, and established that “Indonesia was o f strategic U.S. economic and military interest
because o f its location near vital sea lanes used by U.S. military and commercial fleets.” 1
The following day, Indonesia invaded East Timor, and despite reservations voiced in the
UN, Indonesia began in mid-1976 to integrate East Timor into Indonesia.2 From 1976
until 1981, the UN General Assembly passed annual resolutions reaffirming East Timor’s

1. Comments made by Cynthia McKinney, see United States House, H earing before the
Subcommittee on International Operations a n d Human Rights o f the Com m ittee on International Relations,
106 Cong., 1st sess., 30 September 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 4.
2. For more on Indonesia’s occupation o f East Timor, see John Taylor, E ast Timor: The P rice o f
Freedom (London: Zed Books, 1999); and James Dunn, Timor: A P eo p le B etrayed (Sydney, Australia:
ABC Books, 1996).
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right to self-determination. Despite these resolutions, U.S. policy on East Timor was
couched in anti-Communist rhetoric, highlighting broader policy goals and sublimating
human rights.
Throughout the next fifteen years, Indonesia’s suppression o f the opposition
generated hundreds o f thousands o f internally displaced persons. Until 1999, the United
States supported and trained Indonesian military officers and special forces, despite its
occupation o f East Timor.

Over time, only Portugal maintained interest in developments

in East Timor and kept the issue alive.

The Crisis
Despite human rights violations, the crisis in East Timor received little
international attention until Indonesian forces open-fired on a pro-independence
demonstration in Dili in November 1991. This date marks the beginning o f the crisis in
East Timor. Journalists at the demonstration brought international attention to the
situation, and UN redoubled its efforts to resolve the persistent issue o f selfdetermination for East Timor. After learning o f the Indonesian military’s continued
human rights violations in East Timor, the U.S. Congress cut military aid to Indonesia in
1992, but the Department o f Defense rerouted aid through a different program.
Indonesia resisted the involvement of East Timorese political leaders in
international politics. East Timor resistance leader Jose Alexandre Xanana Gusmao

3.
For an overview o f U .S. policy from N ixon to Carter, see Robert J. McMahon, The Limits o f
Empire: The U.S. an d Southeast A sia since W orld War II { 1999); and Daniel Southerland, “U.S. Role in
Plight o f Timor: An Issue That W on’t Go Away,” The Christian Science M onitor, 6 March 1980, 7.
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remained imprisoned for seven years after his capture in 1992.4 Gusmao, who would
become president o f East Timor after independence, had a significant following. He
advocated a transitional period for East Timor, followed by referendum to decide how the
East Timorese wished to be governed. He also influenced pro-independence resistance in
East Timor to absorb tremendous amounts o f violence before retaliation, bringing favor
from international community on the resistance.
Michael Gordon Jackson argues that the international community’s response to
the crisis in East Timor was a “new phenomenon,” because “many states, backed by
military muscle, are increasingly not willing to allow genocide to occur without
challenge.”5 The Security Council wanted to maintain stability in Indonesia, yet was
forced to face events in East Timor, as had not been the case previously.
By the mid-1990s, the resistance movement in East Timor had grown due to
increasing disillusionment with Indonesian rule. The formation o f the National Council
o f Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in April 1998 strengthened and unified the resistance
movement, and clashes with Indonesian security forces grew in frequency and intensity
during 1998.
The fall o f President Suharto6 in May 1998 left Indonesia at the doorstep of
democracy and offered a window opportunity for East Timor’s independence, as Portugal
again raised the issue in the UN. The new president o f Indonesia, B. J. Habibie, proposed

4. For a personal account o f East Timor’s history, see Sarah Niner, ed., To R esist is to Win: The
A utobiography o f X an ana Gusm ao (Victoria, Australia: Aurora Books, 2000).
5. M ichael Gordon Jackson, “Something must be done? Genocidal Chaos and World Responses to
Mass Murder in East Timor between 1975 and 1999,” International Journal o f P o litics a n d Ethics 1, no. 1
(2001): 58 (web4.infotrac.galegroup.com /itw/i..._A82651431& dyn=60!ar_fm t?sw_aep=viva.odu, accessed
on 15 March 2002), 45.
6. This name is spelled in three different ways: Suharto, Sueharto, and S ’Harto. President Suharto,
like many Indonesians, only had one name. For more, see O. G. Roeder, The Sm iling G eneral: President
Soeharto o f Indonesia, 2nd ed. (Djakarta, Indonesia: Gunnung A gung Ltd., 1970).
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autonomy for East Timor, in which Indonesia would retain power over foreign affairs,
external defense and some aspects o f monetary and fiscal policy. In the UN, Portugal
and Indonesia agreed in August 1998 to discuss preparations for autonomy o f East Timor.
Indonesia agreed in August 1998 to involve East Timor’s resistance leaders in political
negotiations. In November 1998, however, after the East Timor resistance killed
Indonesian soldiers and captured arms in Alas, Indonesian forces retaliated. As a result,
there were increased numbers of displaced persons in East Timor, as Indonesians and
East Timorese fled, and by the end o f 1998, a weary Indonesia was ready to “let Timor
go.”8
Australia supported Indonesian mle in East Timor since the 1970s, but in
December 1998 surprised Habibie by pressuring him to seek more active negotiations
with East Timorese leaders. This shift in Australian policy possibly “tipped the balance”
in convincing Habibie to negotiate over East Timor.9 Thus, Indonesia’s goal for special
autonomy for East Timor shifted during late 1998 and early 1999, when Habibie
announced that if East Timor rejected its offer o f autonomy, then the 1976 law
integrating East Timor into Indonesia might be revoked.
Regardless o f this shift in policy, Indonesia quickly began a paramilitary
campaign against East Timor’s pro-independence leaders and supporters. Gross
violations of human rights increased as independence activists and supporters were taken
captive, tortured, and sometimes killed. It was not uncommon in pro-independence

7. See Ian Martin, Self-Determ ination in East Timor: The U nited Nations, the Ballot, and
International Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2001), 19.
8. David Lamb, “Indonesia Tries to Pull ‘Thom ’ o f Timor Asia: The Annexed Ex-Portuguese Colony
is Offered Autonomy— or Independence,” Los Angeles Times, 11 February 1999, A 12.
9. Paul Daley, “Protecting Timor Riches a Priority,” The A ge, 29 January 1999 (http://ptg.djnr.eom/c
croot/asp/publib/story/asp, accessed on 25 February 2002).
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communities to find rape and mistreatment o f women, “who in some cases were
subjected to continuing sexual slavery.” 10 As a result, many homes were destroyed and
many citizens displaced. The worst o f the killings occurred on 6 April 1999 at a church
in Lequifa, where around 2000 people had taken refuge. The Besi Merah Putih (BMP)
militia along with the Indonesian military attacked a church, and killing at least 30
people. On 17 April, the BMP and the Aitarak militia began attacking pro-independence
leaders.
The international community largely placed responsibility for calming the
violence and restoring peace on Indonesia, because Indonesian military indicated that if
the UN were to intervene with force, then it would be considered in Jakarta as an act o f
war. Thus, before sending any kind of force into East Timor, an agreement had to be
reached regarding Indonesian sovereignty. Such an agreement was reached in New York
on 5 May 1999 between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN, giving special autonomy to East
Timor, and allowing an August referendum on independence.
In preparation for the referendum, the Security Council approved the UN Mission
in East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999. This date marks the beginning o f the second
phase o f the crisis in East Timor. To a large extent, violence eased once a UN presence
was established, however, there were areas where militia violence impeded UN
operations, as evidenced by militia found with stolen UN humanitarian delivery and
transport vehicles. The referendum was postponed due to violence, but independence
voters won the majority in the August 30 referendum. The Indonesian supported militia
immediately began a punitive campaign. Mass mayhem ended the lives o f many in East

10. Martin, Self-Determination, 45.
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Timor, uprooted many others and threatened the presence o f UN representatives. As the
situation escalated, UNAMET was besieged and fired upon, and several UNAMET
personnel were killed, leading to partial withdrawal o f UNAMET from East Timor. The
international community remained largely inactive however, and called on Indonesia to
fulfill its agreement to quell the violence.
The violence targeted pro-independence East Timorese, but reached into the
religious division, since Indonesia is mainly Muslim and East Timor Christian. Churches
were defaced and some clergy murdered. Church artifacts dating to the 1600s were
destroyed or defaced.11 Paramilitary attacks on the church increasingly fell into disfavor
at the UN. Nobel laureate Bishop Belo, whose parish and home were completely
destroyed and many parishioners killed, went to Rome, after which the Pope denounced
the violence in East Timor. The papal support o f the independence option helped
increase international pressure on Habibie, and the UN to find closure to the crisis. O f a
pre-referendum population of roughly 850,000, about 300,000 East Timorese were
displaced and an additional 200,000 or more people were forcibly moved across the to
other parts o f Indonesia.12
The violence caused dislocation and refugees, which resulted in a humanitarian
crisis. Indonesian forces intimidated refugees and kept them from reaching UN officials
and relief agencies. The crisis came to a head on 12 September and Indonesian leaders
gave in to international diplomatic and economic pressure and invited a UN military
force into East Timor. The UN quickly authorized the Australian-led the International

11. For more details, see Arnold Kohen, “Going Home with Bishop Belo: Eyewitness,” The Tablet,
23 October 1999.
12. Human Rights Watch, Indonesia/East Timor: F o rced Expulsions to West Timor a n d The Refugee
Crisis, vol. 11, no. 7 (N ew York: Human Rights Watch, December 1999), 2.
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Force for East Timor (INTERFET) with a Chapter VII mandate to restore order in East
Timor on 15 September, which marks the beginning o f the third phase o f the crisis in
East Timor. Even though order was swiftly restored, there were nearly 230,000 refugees
moving to West Timor by the end o f September.
On 28 September 1999 a new tripartite agreement was reached between the UN,
Portugal and Indonesia. The agreement acknowledged that Indonesia remained
responsible for maintaining order until East Timor could become independent, however,
the UN filled the vacuum of power in East Timor during the transition. On 19 October,
among claims that the referendum had been rigged, Indonesia invalidated the integration
o f East Timor and cleared the way for its independence.
With order restored, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET) began on 25 October 1999 peacekeeping and humanitarian mission to
institutionalize democracy, and marks the fourth phase o f the crisis. To a large extent,
the violence had destroyed the infrastructure in East Timor, and around 70 percent o f the
homes were destroyed. As a result o f the widespread destruction in East Timor, recovery
and democratic transition was challenging. As time passed, the UN increased the
numbers o f civil police due to intense poverty and increased crime. Claims arose that at
the expense o f member nations the UN was institutionalizing itself to rule East Timor.13
In addition, the UN bureaucracy in East Timor failed to embrace East Timorese in the

13.
See for example, Jarat Chopra, “The U N ’s Kingdom o f East Timor,” Survival 42, no. 3 (autumn
2000): 2 7 -4 0 ; and Astri Suhrke, “Peacekeepers as Nation-builders: Dilemmas o f the U N in East Timor,”
International P eacekeepin g 8, no. 4 (2001): 3.
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transitional governing process. Because o f prolonged UN governance without East
Timorese participation, leaders in East Timor had virtually disappeared.14

U.S. ALLIES
The countries that played a main role in the crisis in East Timor were Indonesia,
Portugal, and Australia. Indonesia was a critical component o f the crisis as is addressed
throughout this chapter. Portugal was a very important player in the developing crisis,
because it initially supported the move toward autonomy in the UN, keeping international
pressure on Indonesia. Australia however, proved to be the key element that influenced
Indonesia’s decision to hold the referendum. Moreover, it remained a pivotal player
throughout the crisis and afterwards, as it led the UN mission to establish order in the
newly independent East Timor.

Portugal
As discussed above, Portugal colonized East Timor until 1975, when the UN
pressured for decolonization, which intended to lead to democratic self-rule in East
Timor. Portugal remained the legal administrator of the tiny half-island, and was not
pleased when Indonesia took possession o f East Timor. As a result, relations between
Portugal and Indonesia were troubled and a dispute transpired in the UN over many
years. Even though the UN condemned Indonesia’s occupation o f East Timor, it did
nothing. It seemed unfair that Indonesia remained, but Portugal could not.
Consequently, Portugal pursued the issue through UN legal channels.

14.
For assessments o f the challenges facing East Timor, see Hal H ill and Joano M Saldanha, ed.,
E ast Timor: D evelopm ent Challenges f o r the World's N ew est N ation (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 2001).
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Once Habibie succeeded Suharto as president o f Indonesia, Portugal redoubled
the pressure on the UN for talks on self-determination for East Timor. Finally Habibie
agreed to discuss preparations for the autonomy o f East Timor and entered into talks with
Portugal under UN auspices in 1983. By 1986, Indonesia promised to allow East Timor
to participate in the 1987 elections, and extended the right to vote to the East Timorese.
With this compromise, Portugal eased pressure.
After the 1991 Indonesian killing o f demonstrators in Dili, however, it became
clear that Indonesia had not institutionalized reforms. The violence brought human rights
to the fore o f international concerns over East Timor. Portugal again defended the tiny
fledgling state, especially since “many Portuguese regret dumping East Timor and feel
some guilt for the deaths of many thousands o f Timorese during the campaign that
Indonesia has carried out against opponents o f its occupation.” 15 Once again, Portugal
went to the UN with complaints against Indonesia.
Indonesia offered a type o f autonomy to East Timor, in which Indonesia would
retain control of East Timor in a similar manner as before. This time, however, Portugal
insisted that autonomy could only be acceptable as a transitional state o f affairs until a
form o f self-governance could be reached. By renewing discussion in the UN, Portugal
initiated and shaped international involvement to resolve the democratic crisis in East
Timor. The UN continued to support self-determination for East Timor, as it had since
the 1970s, however this time mandated a mission to hold a referendum on the matter.
The referendum determined that East Timor overwhelmingly voted for independence
from Indonesia, but was followed by days o f heavy punitive violence against East

15. “Lost Leader: East Timor,” The Econom ist 325, no. 7 7 8 7 ,2 8 N ovem ber 1992, 38.
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Timorese. In mid-September, Portugal turned to the international media to remind the
United States of its own participation in peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo and in return,
expected U.S. participation in East Timor.

Indonesia
Once violence broke out in East Timor in 1991, the UN became increasingly
concerned with human rights and security in the region. The Indonesian position on a
UN peacekeeping force in East Timor however, was tentative at best, and insisted on the
need for an agreement that would ensure its sovereignty. On 5 May 1999, Indonesia
signed an agreement, and appended the Indonesian Constitution, giving special autonomy
to East Timor. The same day, however, the Indonesian Deputy Chief o f Staff o f the
Indonesian Army sent orders for preparations to “prevent the outbreak o f civil war,”
including “repressive/coercive actions as well as plans for moving back evacuation of
[East Timorese].” 16 A referendum date was set for Sunday, 8 August 1999 and the UN
was invited to establish a mission in East Timor.
Despite the invitation, Indonesia did not want the referendum to take place. As a
result, the Indonesian military in East Timor used violence to delay the referendum,
which was rescheduled for 30 August. The UNTAET began to register East Timorese for
the upcoming referendum despite unsafe conditions, and intimidation from local militia
bands did not stop the referendum, which had a remarkable turnout o f 98.5 percent.
Theresults tilted heavily in favor o f independence (78.5 percent) at 344,580 votes and

16. Document reproduced in Human Rights Watch, Appendix to Indonesia/E ast Timor, 18.
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94,388 against.17 Indonesia accused the UN o f bias and fraud and rejected the
referendum results. In addition, the Governor o f East Timor attempted to partition East
Timor into a western, pro-integration state and an eastern pro-independence state. These
tactics only irritated the international com munity.18 As a result, elements o f the
Indonesian militia unleashed a furor of violence immediately after the referendum that
called international attention to severe human rights abuses and atrocities.19
By 9 September 1999, it was clear that Indonesia was either unable or unwilling
to live up to its 5 May agreement to provide security in East Timor or to invite the UN to
do so.20 Moreover, it had become increasingly clear that Indonesia had role in the
violence against citizens in East Timor. In an attempt to disguise Indonesia’s
involvement in the militia violence, Habibie declared martial law in East Timor on 7
September.

Resistance leader, Gusmao was released on the same day, projecting the

appearance that Jakarta had come to its senses. Under the pretense o f restoring order,
Habibie temporarily relieved external pressure to stop the violence, but in fact the militia
continued to slash and bum.

17. United States House, “Resolution 292,” M arkup before the Subcom m ittee on A sia an d the P acific
o f the Com m ittee on International Relations House o f Representatives, 106th Cong., lsts e s s., 15
September 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing O ffice, 1999), 2.
18. See the Statement o f Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S.
Department o f State, in United States Congress, “The Political Futures o f Indonesia and East Timor,” Joint
Hearing before the Subcom m ittee on A sia and the P acific o f the com m ittee on International Relations
House o f R epresentatives, an d the Subcommittee on E ast Asian an d P a cific Affairs o f the Com m ittee on
Foreign Relations U nited States Senate, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 9 September 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing O ffice, 2000), 9.
19. For a report on the involvement o f the Indonesian military in the atrocities, expulsions and
refugee crisis, see Human Rights Watch, Indonesia/East Timor, and Allan N aim , “U .S. Support for the
Indonesian Military: Congressional Testimony,” in B itter Flowers, S w eet Flowers: E ast Timor, Indonesia,
an d the W orld Community, ed. Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom (Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 163-73.
20. See the Statement o f Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S.
Department o f State, in United States Congress, Joint Hearing, 9 September 1999, 9.
21. See Keith B. Richburg, “Mayhem Continues in East Timor: Martial Law, N ew Indonesian Troops
Fail to Halt Militia Rampage,” The Washington P ost, 8 September 1999, A l.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

183
Indonesia claimed that it was doing everything it could to stem the violence,
despite evidence to the contrary. Indonesia’s deception did not last however, and two
days later, the United States suspended military relations with Indonesia. Amidst
mounting pressure from the international community, Indonesian president Habibie
announced on 12 September that he would allow a UN multinational presence in East
Timor. In the following days, there was concern that Indonesia was stalling, while it
forcibly relocated East Timorese to other parts of Indonesia. Thus, despite supportive
rhetoric from Indonesia, evidence in September indicated that Indonesian militia
remained in East Timor and continued looting, burning, intimidating and killing.
Benedict Anderson explains the crisis in East Timor as a function o f a culture, in
which military prominence absolves leaders from all moral or ethical responsibility. He
writes that a “culture has developed in the military according to which, in ‘security’
matters, every element o f human decency can be set aside, with complete impunity—
provided ‘the boss’ gives them the orders.”22 This culture grew over time until
Indonesians have little sense of shame, a necessary ingredient for a responsible nation to
function. Moreover, he argues, that compared to some leaders in Indonesia’s past,
Habibie was not so bad, considering that he allowed a referendum to take place, set free
resistance political prisoners, and ultimately invited the UN into East Timor to end the
violence. The lack o f security in East Timor made outside efforts to reduce suffering
difficult in many isolated areas. This was especially true in the western region o f East
Timor, as militia from West Timor engaged in cross border violence.

22.
Benedict Anderson, “Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future,” The N ew Left Review, no.
235 (1999): 3.
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Australia
Australia valued relations with Indonesia, its largest neighbor,

but Australia’s

position on Indonesia’s suppression in East Timor shifted in August 1998 for four
reasons.24 First, the Australian government ran a survey and found that nearly all East
Tiomorese wanted a voice in negotiations on autonomy and independence. Australian
Prime Minister John Howard sent a letter dated 19 December 1998 to President Habibie,
suggesting that Indonesia implement a “built-in review mechanism” into the autonomy
process to delay actual autonomy or independence.25 He recommended that Indonesia
enter into negotiations with East Timorese leaders to distract the international community
into thinking it was making reasonable progress on the East Timor issue. Despite
continued Australian insistence on Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, this shift
generated tension, even bitterness between the neighbors. Even so, Australian Prime
Minister John Howard remained “reluctant to commit Australia to a peacekeeping role in
East Timor.”26
Second, Australia and New Zealand presented the only European presence in the
region. As a result, Indonesia insisted that the Asian component be increased in
negotiations and participation in UN missions. This instance threatened Australia’s
influence in the region. Third, in its struggle to retain East Timor, Indonesia was losing a
key long-term symbolic ally within the European camp. This loss occurred, because of

23. For a thorough examination o f Australia’s foreign policy concerns regarding Indonesia and East
Timor, see Henry S. Albinski, “Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to Decem ber 1999,” Australian
Journal o f P olitics and H istory 46, no. 2 (2000): 194-214.
24. The Australians were themselves very divided on the Indonesia-East Timor debate. See for
example, Paul Monk, “East Timor: Truth and Consequences,” Q uadrant (January/February 2000): 33 -4 0 .
25. Laurie Brereton, “Media Release: Howard’s Letter to Habibie,” 22 September 1999 (http://search.
aph.gov.au/search/parllnf...Item=0&ResultsID=29NP9&action-view&W CU, accessed on 15 March 2002).
26. Paul Daley, “Howard Unwilling on Peace Force for Timor,” The A ge, 30 January 1999
(http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 25 February 2002).
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the W est’s turn to policy fostering the protection o f human rights, rather than turning a
blind eye, as had been the case for so many years. As part o f the W est, Australia found
that human rights abuses in East Timor could no longer be easily ignored. Delicate
relations between Australia and Indonesia had the potential to derail progress toward
resolving the violence in East Timor. To keep this from happening, the United States and
Australia asked Jaheed Marker, the UN Representative to East Timor, not to endanger the
April 1999 agreements by pressing Jakarta about security concerns.27 These efforts to
reach an agreement on holding a referendum came to fruition in early May 1999. Once
UNAMET was established on 11 June, Australia committed funds, vehicles and troops
for the mission, and became increasingly intertwined in resolving the crisis as the
referendum approached in late August.
Fourth, Australian public opinion increasingly pressed its government to stop the
violence. Australia experienced internal pressure to intervene, because it had a large
number o f East Timorese citizens and refugees, and the Australian people were highly
sensitized to their neighbor’s plight. Popular approval o f intervention by Australia
AO

reached well over 70 percent.

Consequently, many Australians took to the streets in

demonstrations that pressured the government o f Australia to work harder to resolve the
crisis. As a result, Australia lobbied the UN, the United States, and other countries to
intervene to restore order, and when violence erupted after the referendum, Australia was
ready to use force.
Australia’s Prime Minister, John Howard, phoned Clinton in early September to

27.
U N Secretary General K ofi Annan appointed Ambassador Jamsheed Marker o f Pakistan in 1997
as his Personal Representative for East Timor.
28. See Albinski, “Issues in Australian Foreign Policy,” 196.
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appeal personally for U.S. support. Australia also had a strong lobby in Congress, and
applied pressure to step up U.S. participation. Moreover, Australian Foreign Minister,
Alexander Downer used the media pressure Clinton in a television interview to remind
the United States o f its support during the Gulf War.
Australia insisted on leading INTERFET even though it was concerned over
strained relations with Indonesia, which voiced reservations. Australia demanded a
robust mandate to fulfill the mission, and on 15 September 1999, the UN Security
Council approved Resolution 1264, mandating Australia to lead a Chapter VII peaceenforcing mission into East Timor.

Australia committed half o f the 8,000 initial troops

for the UN mission and quickly brought calm. Thus, INTERFET stopped civil war, cross
border fighting, and widespread militia violence in East Timor. INTERFET transitioned
to UNTAET to begin institutionalizing democracy in East Timor.
Australia was concerned with oil mining rights in the Timor Gap, and surprised
the international community in October 2000, saying it “was not giving up its claim to
half o f East Timor’s oil and gas reserves,” and would continue to honor a 1989 treaty
Art

with Indonesia.

Since international lines are drawn in the middle o f the waterway and

the field is mainly on the East Timor side, UN law o f the sea indicated that the main oil
field lies in East Timor’s economic zone. The final agreement gave East Timor 85
percent o f the oil and gas royalties, with Australia receiving the remaining 15 percent.31

29.
UN, “Security Council Resolution 1264,” 15 September 1999 (hereafter cited as U N , “SC/RES”)
(w w w .un.org/D ocs/sc/scres/1999/scl264.htm , accessed on 15 March 2002).
30.
“Petro Trouble,” Business Week 3 7 0 6 ,6 November 2000, 68E2 (http://web4.infotrac.galegroup.
com /itw/i..._A66532779&dyn=70!ar_fm t?sw_aep=viva_odu, accessed on 15 March 2002).
31.
M y appreciation goes to Don Greenlees for his comments on the econom y o f East Timor,
communication with the author, 14 April 2002.
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Ironically, the oil must be shipped to the northern Australian port o f Darwin to be refined,
stored and distributed. East Timor stands to begin receiving money in 2005.

THE UNITED NATIONS
Since the end o f the cold war, we have seen an increased number o f small
conflicts, and have consequently threatened regional security and become an international
concern. As a result, the UN has experienced increased demands for peacekeeping and
peace-enforcing missions. Moreen Dee proposes that there has been an “emergence of a
possible new paradigm in the mechanisms o f collective security which has seen the
delegation of peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations to regional organizations and
defense alliances.”

The UN Chapter VII mandate to restore order in East Timor fell to

Australia, a dominant regional power.
The United Nations peacekeeping efforts during the crisis can be separated into
four phases. The first phase begins with the November 1991 massacres in Dili and is
mostly inactive, other than disapproving o f the human rights violations. Phase Two starts
with UNAMET in June 1999 and entails assistance in preparations for the referendum in
East Timor. Phase three begins in September 1999 with INTERFET, the UN Chapter VII
mandate for an Australian-led intervention. Phase four begins with UNTAET in late
February 2000 for disarming, repatriation, rebuilding and transition to self-govemance.
UN responsibilities under UNTAET included all legislative and executive authority, as

32. Peter O’Connor, “East Timor and Australia negotiating Maritime Boundary, Oil Revenues,”
A ssociated Press N ew swires, 17 June 2002 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 22
June 2002).
33. Moreen Dee, ‘“ Coalitions o f the W illing’ and Humanitarian Intervention: Australia’s
Involvement with INTERFET,” International Peacekeeping 8, no. 3 (2001): 2.
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well as administration, electoral, repatriation and rehabilitation tasks for up to three years.
East Timor’s independence from Portugal might not have happened at all, had the UN not
insisted in 1960 that Portuguese territories were self-governing according to Chapter VI
provisions. The UN had pressured Portugal to make provisions for independence of East
Timor, and this explains Portugal’s later insistence on East Tim or’s independence from
Indonesian rule. After Indonesia took possession o f East Timor in 1975, the UN Security
Council passed resolutions 384 on 22 December 1975, and 389 on 22 April 1976. The
resolutions called on Indonesia “to withdraw without delay all its forces from the
territory, and on all states to respect the territorial integrity o f East Timor and the
people’s right to self-determination.”34

Phase One
The UN approach to East Timor remained disapproving yet inactive for many
years, until the killings o f demonstrators in Dili in November 1991, after which the
Committee on Human Rights became involved. It took several more years for an
agreement to be reached with Indonesia in 1994, so that UN human rights and
humanitarian organizations could gain access to East Timor. The UN brought together
East Timorese leaders in 1995 to form the All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue
(AIETD) to preserve and promote the cultural identity o f East Timor. After SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan took office in January 1997, the UN began to increase efforts to
resolve the East Timor question o f self-determination.
W hen Indonesian militia unleashed attacks against the pro-independence
resistance in East Timor in April 1999, the UN seriously considered alternatives for

34. Martin, Self-Determination, 17-18.
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resolving the crisis. The UN sent an assessment team to East Timor in late April 1999,
which found deficiencies in the delivery of basic services, health and education.

After

the UN finished assessments, the Secretary-General made recommendations on 22 May
to the Security Council for a new resolution, which was delayed to wait for U.S.
Congressional approval until June.
In the meantime, Indonesia agreed to give special autonomy to East Timor, and
invite the UN to oversee the referendum set for early August. In addition, Indonesia
agreed to provide for the safety o f unarmed UN representatives. Two days later, UN
Security Resolution 1236 welcomed the 5 May agreement between the UN, Portugal and
Indonesia, and announced the UN’s intention to establish a UN presence in East Timor
“as soon as practicable.”36 The resolution promised to assess the security situation in
East Timor, and to decide on a mission in East Timor. The speed with which UNAMET
was set up was unprecedented. The largest contributions were from Australia, Portugal,
Japan and the United States, with substantial contributions from the European Union.37

Phase Two
UN Security Council Resolution 1246 passed on 11 June 1999, UNAMET. The
resolution condemned the violence in East Timor and stressed “the responsibility o f the
Government o f Indonesia to maintain peace and security in East Timor.”38 The

35. For more, see Geoffrey C. Gunn, The N ew W orld H egem ony in the M alay W orld (Lawrenceville,
NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2000), 275; and Martin, Self-Determination, 3 7 -8 .
36. U N , “SC/RES 1236,” 7 May 1999 (w w w .un.org/D ocs/scres/1999/99scl236.htm , accessed on 15
March 2002).
37. Around $50 m illion o f the $80 m illion cost o f UNAM ET was met through voluntary
contributions.
38. See U N , “SC/RES 1246,” 11 June 1999 (w w w .un.org/D ocs/sc/scres/1999/99scl246.htm ,
accessed on 15 March 2002).
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resolution authorized 280 civilian police “to act as advisors to the Indonesian Police . . . ,
to supervise the escort o f the ballot papers and boxes to and from the polling sites.”
The resolution also authorized the deployment of 50 military liaison officers who
maintained contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces. Despite these measures, security
for UN officials in East Timor was a major obstacle in preparing for the August
referendum. In addition, UNAMET faced hostile local media reports that “extended to
deliberate fabrication.”40 As a result, UNAMET officials became targets o f militia
violence themselves. In at least one case on 29 June the stoning o f the regional office in
Maliana, Bobonaro resulted in injuries to locals and the UNAMET official. On 4 July, a
humanitarian convoy was attacked. The led to the evacuation o f the UNAMET staff
from Liqui?a. During the evacuation, militia attacked UNAMET’s helicopter and
vehicles. Both o f these incidents were captured by international news for the world.
Although Indonesia officially supported UN presence, its militia targeted
UNAMET officials with violence and threats. Moreover, Indonesia insisted that
UNAMET remain unarmed, making it very vulnerable. Indonesia also insisted that the
referendum should take place before the end o f August, but used covert activities to make
such progress difficult. This strategy paid off at least in the short term, because the
Secretary General postponed voter registration until 16 July, to give Indonesia time to
bring the security under control41 Four days later, the UN Secretary-General
recommended that despite violence and threats, the registration for the referendum vote

39. Ibid.
40. Martin, Self-D eterm ination, 47.
41. UN, “Letter dated 10 July 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President o f the
Security Council,” S /1999/773, 10 July 1999 (w w w.un.org/D ocs/sc/letters/1999/sl999773.htm , accessed
on 15 March 2002).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

191
should proceed, because Indonesian authorities had assured him that they were taking
steps to improve security.42 Besides, registration had to begin on 16 July for the
referendum to take place by the August deadline. Registration lasted from 16 July to 4
August 1999 with 451,792 East Timorese registered. UNAMET was hailed as an
overwhelming success. The campaign prior to the referendum began 14 August and
lasted until 27 August, allowing for a two-day cooling o ff period before the referendum.
UN Security Council Resolution 1257 postponed the referendum until 30 August
1999 and extended the mandate for UNAMET.43 In late August, Resolution 1262
extended UNAMET until 30 November 1999, but increased the number o f civilian police
in East Timor to 460, and upped the military liaison component to 300 personnel. The
resolution aimed “to build confidence and support stability” during the post-referendum
period.44
The day after the referendum, severe violence broke out, as militia units
implemented a “scorched earth” policy across East Timor. Hundreds o f militia attacked
and burned houses of pro-independence supporters. Journalists were attacked, and locals
fled. On 2 September, militia surrounded UNAMET’s office in Maliana and killed two
local staff members. As a result, UNAMET pulled international and local staff to Dili the
following day. Immediately, BBC pulled out all o f its news correspondents, and took
other journalists with them. The departure o f the international press was cause for militia
celebration, but not for UNAMET representatives left Dili.

42. UN, “Letter dated 14 July 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President o f the
Security Council,” S/1999/788, 14 July 1999 (www.un.org/TDocs/sc/letters/1999/sl999786.htm, accessed
on 15 March 2002).
43. UN, “SC/RES 1257,” 3 August 1999 (vm w .un.org/D ocs/sc/scres/1999/99scl257.htm , accessed
on 15 March 2002).
44. UN, “SC/RES 1262,” 27 August 1999 (w w w .un.org/D ocs/sc/scres/1999/scl262.htm , accessed on
15 March 2002).
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The UN announced the referendum results on the morning o f 4 September.
Immediately after the announcement, the militia renewed a punitive campaign against
pro-independence East Timorese. In light o f the increased violence, UNAMET
considered pulling out completely, but feared that a complete withdrawal might
strengthen Indonesia’s resolve to keep East Timor, rather than honor the referendum. As
a result, on 10 September, all but 80 UN volunteers evacuated from Dili to Australia.
When UN volunteers again came under militia fire, international and domestic pressures
squeezed Habibie. With the UNAMET volunteers in ever more danger, UN headquarters
threatened Habibie with economic consequences, such as holding IMF and the World
Bank funds, which were critical to Indonesia’s economic recovery.45 This pressure from
the international community had the potential to bring domestic consequences and the
political and economic isolation o f Indonesia began to take shape.
Domestically, Habibie was dependent on General Wiranto and the Indonesian
military for power. Rumors of a potential coup swept through Jakarta, and Habibie, a
lame duck leader, was increasingly vulnerable to forces in his government that could oust
h im 46 In a conversation with UN Secretary-General, for example, Habibie agreed to
allow in multinational forces, but when it came to negotiations that included the presence
of his military general, Wiranto, he was uncommitted. Moreover, Habibie refused to
invite a UN mission into East Timor to restore order until Wiranto had first visited Dili
personally to assess the situation. Outsiders understood Habibie’s indecision as weakness
and vulnerability relative to Wiranto, whose power was increasing. Moreover, even

45. The World Bank set a precedent, because it entered into politics by warning Indonesia that further
violations o f human rights in East Timor would result in halted funding.
46. See Seth Mydans, “Indonesia says N o to Timor Peacekeepers,” N ew York Times, 9 September
1999, A8.
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though the militia in East Timor was shown to have ties to Jakarta, it is unclear whether it
was Habibie, or Wiranto, who was controlling the troops. Wiranto visited Dili on 11
September, where “members o f the [UN] mission were convinced that he had been
personally shocked by his visit.”47 Afterwards, Wiranto agreed to invite an international
force into East Timor, which Habibie announced the very next day.
Remaining UNAMET volunteers in Dili were in precarious danger, despite
Habibie’s announcement, and two days later, all but twelve UN volunteers were
evacuated to Australia because o f continuing militia attacks48 The UNAMET
headquarters was closed and those remaining were removed to the former Australian
Consulate for safety. The UN remained reluctant to withdraw UNAMET completely
from East Timor, because such action could signal the militia to continue violence with
impunity.

Phase Three
The day after the evacuation, UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264
INTERFET to send a multinational force to restore peace and security, to protect and
support UNAMET, to facilitate humanitarian assistance, and authorize the participating
States in the multinational force “to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate.”49
Thus, Resolution 1264 authorized a Chapter VII mandate for the International Force in
East Timor to restore order. Countries that participated in INTERFET included
Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, New

47. M artin,Self-D eterm ination, 111.
48. Keith B. Richburg, “UN S taff flees East Timor: Local People sheltered in Compound taken along
on Flights to Australia,” The Washington P ost, 15 September 1999, A18.
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Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, the Republic o f Korea, Thailand, and the United
States. In addition, Brazil and China offered to send civilian police. The resolution also
requested plans for a UN transitional administration in East Timor, and stressed the
importance of encouraging and ensuring the safe return o f refugees to their homes in East
Timor, as well as “full, safe, and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations.”50
Australian Commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove flew to Dili on 19
September to meet with the Indonesian military and work out details o f Indonesia’s
withdrawal from East Timor. On the same day, Jakarta renounced the integration of East
Timor into Indonesia, and announced Indonesia would cooperate with INTERFET
operations. Jakarta added claims that the referendum had been rigged and requested an
investigation, but the UN quickly dismissed such accusations. The following day,
INTERFET forces arrived in East Timor, and according to Cosgrove, “met absolutely no
resistance.”51
The success o f the INTERFET mission in East Timor was largely due to the dual
nature of mission implementation. First, initial success depended on depriving the
adversary o f chances gained from using force by creating the perception that the
Indonesian military and militia were out-manned and out-equipped. INTERFET
carefully downplayed the connection between the Indonesian military and the militia by
working through the military leadership. Second, INTERFET success was due to
consistent and co-operative communication with the Indonesian military, so that they

49. U N , “SC/RES 1264,” 15 September 1999 (w w w .un.org/D ocs/sc/scres/1999/scl264.htm , accessed
on 15 March 2002).
50. Ibid.
51. Quoted in D oug Struck, “In East Timor, Smiles Greet Peacekeepers: Armed Patrols Meet no
Resistance,” The Washington P ost, 21 September 1999, A13.
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were “given the space to retire gracefully from East Timor.”52 This required careful
communication between INTERFET and the Indonesian military to prevent
misunderstandings.

Phase Four
Within a month o f the Australian led intervention, the UN began the transition of
East Timor to self-governance. On 4 October, the Secretary-General published a report
with recommendations for the fourth phase o f UN activity in East Timor, which began
with Resolution 1272 on 25 October 1999. The resolution established the UNTAET.53
With the last remaining Indonesian representatives departing East Timor on 30 October,
the daunting task o f UNTAET was to maintain order and institutionalize democracy in
East Timor. It was estimated that the transition could take up to 3 years. In the
meantime, UNTAET was “endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of
East Timor” and “empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority,
including the administration of justice.”54 UNTAET could deploy 8,950 military
personnel, 200 military observers, and 1640 civilian police in November, and formally
replaced INTERFET on 23 February 2000.
The task before UNTAET was daunting because virtually all infrastructure and
services had been interrupted or destroyed by the militia, and displacement and forced
relocation had made conditions ripe for a humanitarian disaster. While East Timor was

52. David D ickens, “The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational
Level,” Contem porary Southeast A sia 23, no. 2 (2001): 214.
53. UN, “SC/RES 1272,” 25 October 1999 (w w w .un.org/D ocs/scres/1999/99scl272.htm , accessed on
15 March 2002).
54. Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

196
poor before the referendum, afterwards it was poorer still. Crime in East Timor grew to
be a large problem complicated by the lack o f a legal system. In addition, refugee issues
in West Timor constituted a threat to regional stability.
Even though many factors favored UNTAET operations, it was plagued with
persistent lack o f success. One key failure had to do with bureaucratic struggle between
departments in the UN over who would administer UNTAET. The struggle was
eventually settled by the Secretary-General, who decided to give leadership to the
Department o f Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), rather than the Department o f Political
Affairs (DPA), which had run the UNAMET preparations in country for the referendum.
Thus, the “planning o f UNTAET took place in the context o f a fierce bureaucratic
struggle between the DPA and the DPKO.”55 The DPA had extensive in country
experience and networks, while the DPKO did not. Therefore, when the DPKO received
the leadership, much o f the in-country experience and contacts were not used. As a
consequence, the key failure o f UNTAET was that UN administrative, judicial and
military operations failed to incorporate East Timorese in their operations, thereby
prolonging East Timor’s dependence on the UN, and diffusing existing political influence
o f East Timorese leaders. Under the auspices o f remaining neutral, the UNTAET
leadership refused to incorporate local leaders into its framework. A secondary
consequence was that the already diminished numbers o f skilled workers in East Timor
received no critical training in institutions or governing. As a result, UNTAET ironically
functioned as a pseudo-colonial government over East Timor, rather than as a transitional
administrative body as planned.

55. Astri Shurke, “Peacekeepers as Nation-builders,” 6.
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Another flaw in the implementation o f UNTAET, was that “both legislative and
executive powers are in the hands o f a single individual, the Special Representative o f the
Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who is also
the head o f the U N ’s Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.”56 Such
consolidated power enabled a monarchy style rule, in which a double standard made
locals, but not UN representatives, subject to UN laws.
A third concern with UNTAET was the growth o f a dual economy by April 2000:
one for the UN, and one to serve the UN. This was possible because the UN bureaucratic
administration in East Timor resisted the incorporation o f locals. For example, in April
2000, de Mello resisted replacing the 13 UN central department deputies with East
Timorese. In May however, Annan and Jose Ramos Horta demanded that the district
deputies be removed and replaced with local leaders and that a terminal date for
UNTAET be fixed.
In early September, the UN presence in East Timor came under renewed attack.
Militia killed three UN personnel in West Timor, who were assisting refugees, and two
UNTAET peacekeepers were killed in East Timor. The Indonesian government
expressed outrage over these attacks and killings in a letter to the UN Security Council
dated 7 September. The following day, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1319,
condemned the attacks and killings. It stated that Indonesia must “disarm and disband

56. Chopra, “The U N ’s Kingdom,” 29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

198
the militias immediately” and that “UNTAET should respond robustly to the militia
threat in East Timor, consistent with its resolution 1272.”

en

THE U.S. CONGRESS
Congress had long disliked U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, due to its
repressive policies in East Timor and other territories. Congress cut military aid to
Indonesia in 1992 after learning that the Indonesian military committed human rights
violations in East Timor. The U.S. Department o f Defense continued military aid
however, by using a different program under the code name “Iron Balance” to hide from
Congress and the public its training of and equipment shipments to Indonesia’s military.
In particular, an elite and especially feared force called the Kopassus received U.S.
training. The Kopassus had played a large role in the 1975 genocide o f an estimated
200,000 people in East Timor. It received Joint Combined Education and Training, for
“military expertise that could only be used internally against civilians, such as urban
guerilla warfare, surveillance, counter-intelligence, sniper marksmanship and
co

‘psychological operations.’”

Some of the U.S.-trained Kopassus were linked to the

1991 massacre in Dili. In a UN Inquiry, the Kopassus was later linked to spearheading
militia and police violence against pro-independent East Timorese.59
When the crisis occurred in 1999, the U.S. Congress preferred pressuring
Indonesia to halt the human rights violations in East Timor. Moreover, Congress favored

57. U N , “SC/RES 1319,” 8 September 2000 (www.un.org, accessed on 15 March 2002).
58. Id Vulliamy, and Antony Barnett, “U.S. aided Butchers o f Timor: Exclusive: Washington trained
Death Squads in Secret w hile Britain has continued to help Indonesian Army,” The Guardian, 19
September 1999 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/st.. .AAAM jAwM jAzM TgoW TM 2M DEAAAAK
&refer=true, accessed on 18 March 2002).
59. Mark Riley, “U N Official Doubts Jakarta Probe,” The A ge 2 February 2 0 0 0 ,7 (http://ptg.djnr
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sending a UN sanctioned multilateral force to provide humanitarian relief in East Timor,
however, wanted to limit U.S. participation to supplemental assistance, rather than
ground troops. Congress also debated a deeper commitment from Japan.
After the referendum on 30 August, the violence in East Timor generated a shift
in Congress. Senator Russell D. Feingold (D Wis.) introduced a bill on 8 September,
urging the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. government to cut
off assistance to Indonesia.60 In a joint hearing on 9 September, Doug Bereuter,
Representative of Nebraska and Chairman o f the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
warned “Jakarta that Congressional support for pending and future IMF and World Bank
Resources to Indonesia are at grave risk unless acceptable order is restored in East
Timor.”61 Benjamin Gilman, Chairman o f the Committee on International Relations,
declared that “what is happening in East Timor today is nothing short o f ethnic
cleansing.”

69

He argued that genocide loomed and the international community should

be prepared to assist in restoring order. As seen above, the urgings o f the IMF and the
World Bank were instrumental in pressuring Habibie to invite the UN into East Timor.
In a testimony to Congress on 30 September, Allan Naim testified about
continuing U.S. military assistance programs with Indonesia, and described assistance
ranging from training from a variety o f branches o f the U.S. bureaucracy, including, the
Department o f Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau o f
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs, and the U.S. Marshals.

.com /ccroot/asp/publib/story_clean_cpy.asp?articles=AGEE0003200036’T IN E A ..., accessed on 1 May

2002 ).
60. See Steven Mufson, “West’s Credibility at Stake, Laureate Says,” The Washington Post, 9
September 1999, A17.
61. United States Congress, Joint Hearing, 9 September 1 9 9 9 ,4 .
62. Ibid., 7.
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He described equipment such as U.S. C-130s, new U.S. machine guns, U.S. M-16s, hightech electronics and surveillance, ammunition and spare parts. Facilities that were
employed in this assistance included for example, Virginia and California police
departments, the New York City Police Department Police Academy, the U.S. Joint
Combined Education and Training, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy, and
i' - j

training at Quantico.
During the last week of September 1999, the House passed Resolution 292,
condemning Indonesian military efforts to overturn the referendum and called on
Indonesia to help end the civil unrest and violence in East Timor.64 The resolution
supported a UN Security Council move for a multinational force. Congress also
supported further economic sanctions against Indonesia. During the remarks on
Resolution 292, it became clear that the United States might support a UN multilateral
intervention in East Timor, because regional actors such as Australia, N ew Zealand,
Japan, the Philippines and Malaysia were willing to bear the most costs. Australia
wanted to lead the mission, allowing the United States to remain less active. California
Congressman Dana Rohrbacher said; “I support this resolution because the United States
is not the lead player in this intervention for democracy. As should be the case, local and
regional powers are committing their troops, and the United States is there in a supportive
role, rather than having to play the lead role and rather than be the one that has to put out
all the money.”65 At the same hearing, the Representative from American Samoa, Eni
Faleomavaega, pointed out that international interest in East Timor had much to do with

63. A llan N aim , “U .S. Support for the Indonesian Military.
64. United States House, Resolution, 292.
65. United States House, H earing before the Subcom m ittee on International O perations and Human
Rights o f the C om m ittee on International R elations, 30 September 1999, 8.
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the mostly unpublicized oil reserves. Consequently, the question o f East is complicated
“because o f the vast amount o f resources and corporate interests.”66
Congress was reluctant to fund UN peacekeeping missions abroad and played a
large role in pressuring Clinton to request the UN to reduce the U.S. role in the East
Timor operations on 7 October.

(\H

Debate in Congress had already delayed paying back-

dues and further reduced the UN assessments to 25 from 31 percent to reflect a more
“fair” scale o f assessments.68 In the 10 February 2001 joint hearing, Assistant Secretary
Stanley Roth credited both the administration and Congress for their part in pressuring
Indonesia to end the violence and to allow a multilateral force to enter East Timor.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA
This section considers the role o f the media in the developments in East Timor,
particularly as it relates to public opinion. The position o f the media closely reflected the
position o f the U.S. government and downplayed evidence that the United States was
aware o f Indonesia’s involvement in violence against pro-independence East Timorese.
Examination o f the media is followed up with evaluation o f U.S. public opinion
regarding the crisis in East Timor a limited public survey. Overall, public opinion in the
United States did not favor military intervention.
Michael Gordon Jackson examined press coverage o f East Timor by counting the
times “Timor” appeared in the title or first paragraph o f articles. The newspapers
included the Washington Post and the New York Times (Times). Jackson found that in

66. Comments made by Eni F.H. Faleomavaega in ibid., 7 -8 .
67. Joe Lauria, “U .S. Asks U N for Trims in Force for East Timor,” Boston G lobe 256, no. 100
(1999): A l, A 13.
68. Richard Holbrooke quoted in ibid., A13.
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1991 the Times published 35 stories and the Post 7. From 1991 until 1998, the Times
contained 201 and the Post had 106 articles. In 1999, the Times presented 334 and the
Post 223 reports. The trend is similar for both papers with the total trend showing that of
the total 906 stories between 1991 and 1999,4.6 percent were in 1991, 34% were
between 1992 and 1998, and 61.4 percent were in 1999. These figures indicate that media
coverage in 1999 was over thirteen times greater in frequency than in 1991. Thus, the
situation in East Timor clearly received increased media attention as the crisis in East
Timor unfolded. There was a similar pattern for television coverage during the same
periods, but though the coverage increased, “it would be wrong to assume that it
clamored for U.S. military intervention,” since the “coverage gives the sense o f general
approval of the limited nature of the U.S. commitment, full-hearted support for
INTERFET, and great sympathy for the goals o f the East Timorese resistance.”69
The international media during the crisis in East Timor mostly remained uncritical
of the West’s inaction on the part o f the West to prevent or stop the violence in East
Timor. A “follow the flag” phenomenon on the part o f the media, which ignored
evidence that Western countries and organizations, such as Great Britain, the United
States, Australia, the UN, and Human Rights Watch knew that Indonesia had planned
post-referendum violence. Indonesia’s plans for reprisal violence after a pro
independence referendum were varied. The amount o f evidence “was considerable,
including documents from the Indonesian army and militias, intercepted cables and

69. Jackson, “Something must be done?” 61.
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satellite telephone conversations, satellite photographs o f troop movements along the
border o f East and West Timor, and first-person testimonies.”70
As early as March 1999, it was clear, according to intelligence reports that
Indonesia was working closely with as many as 24 militia groups in East Timor, however
the media failed to take note. In the U.S. print media, there were virtually no reports on
the situation in East Timor between 20 July and 24 August 1999, despite increased
turmoil and harassment experienced by UN teams inside East Timor. The media reported
that Indonesia had splintered authority, for example, Indonesia was supposedly
controlling the military, but was also responsible for stopping militia violence. Here, the
depiction o f a Habibie-Wiranto difference allowed the media to represent a moderate
leadership as reasonable, while extremists ran out o f control. Therefore, a central part o f
this interpretation was media complicity not to expose evidence proving that the
Indonesian military supported the militia in East Timor. Thus, the West, particularly the
United States, appeased Indonesia because o f long-term military relations with an
important geopolitical ally.
Herman and Peterson argue that the New York Times so closely reflected U.S.
official policy on Indonesia, that beginning in the 1970s, the paper’s reporting remained
biased in favor of Indonesia, and against East Timor. They criticize Times reporters and
editors for aligning too closely with U.S. official policy and rhetoric regarding Indonesia
and East Timor, and as a result the public was misinformed or uninformed on actual
events. They identify twelve different tactics used by the Times to misconstrue or

70.
Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “East Timor: From ‘Humanitarian’ Bom bing to
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sidestep important information that could have changed public opinion about the crisis.71
The public was led to believe that the crisis in East Timor was a civil war, rather than
resistance to illegal, repressive occupation by Indonesia. The New York Times
sidestepped important issues by not giving the events in East Timor “compelling attention
and it continues to inject Indonesia-protective biases and misleading frames of reference
that it has used since 1975.5,72 For example, the crisis in East Timor received no front
page placement in the Times until 9 September 1999, when National Security Advisor
Sandy Berger highlighted the importance o f the U.S.-Indonesian relationship at the
expense o f East Timor. Moreover, the Times did not publish photos o f victims in East
Timor or “anywhere in the Indonesian Archipelago for 1998 and 1999.”73 In contrast,
during this period the Associated Press reported on 1 April the discovery o f a mass grave
in Ermera, and Reuters reported bodies in the Bay o f Dili on 25 April 1999. Photos of
such atrocities commonly stir up a public reaction, so their omission is notable. In
addition, Times reporters never used the terms “genocide,” “ravaging,” or “horrors” to
describe events on the ground in East Timor. The use o f such words generally conveys a
sense of perverse injustice and therefore holds the potential to turn the tide o f public
opinion against the perpetrators o f such actions. As a result, readers received less
compelling versions o f events, conveying a much lower sense o f urgency about the crisis.
Times reporters approached the crisis as if Indonesia legally occupied East Timor
territory and that the violence was the result of separatist activities. In fact, pro

71. Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “Appendix: The Standard Forms o f A pologetics on
Indonesia and East Timor used by N ew York Times Reporters,” Z M agazine 12, no. 7/8 (1999): 8 7 -8 .
72. Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “How the N ew York Times Protects Indonesian Terror in
East Timor,” Z M agazine 12, no. 7/8 (1999): 84.
73. Ibid., 85.
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independence leaders asked supporters not to resort to violence in response to militia
harassment, and as a result drew increased support from the UN. Reports on resistance
activities were tagged as separatist and by implication illegal. An example o f this is that
the Times failed to report that Indonesia supported the militia activities in East Timor, not
only against East Timorese resistance and citizens, but also against the UN and
humanitarian organizations. A deeper issue however, is that this approach sidestepped
the issue o f U.S. support for the Indonesian military and possibly even U.S. intelligence
on Indonesia used by the military to derail the referendum. As a result, the Times
explained U.S. policy as assisting Indonesia to provide for its defense, rather than
providing equipment and training to be used against East Timor.
Times reporting failed to identify that the militia was connected to and supported
by the Indonesian military, thereby sidestepping the need to identify Indonesia as the
critical agent in the violence and killings in East Timor. By failing to connect the militia
to the Indonesian military and leadership, the Times reporters showed Habibie as a benign
reformist leader in the midst o f difficult times. Such portrayal o f Habibie increased the
image that Indonesia “means well and is trying to amend its ways.”74 Habibie was
however hand picked by Suharto and maintained many o f his predecessor’s policies.
Moreover, the portrayal of Habibie in a weak leadership position led to the gullible
interpretation that neither Habibie, nor Wiranto could control the militia in East Timor.
The Boston Globe portrayed this as an official Washington belief, when it printed that an
administration official said that “U.S. intelligence analysts increasingly believe that
neither Indonesian President Habibie nor Wiranto can control the military in East Timor,”

74. Herman and Peterson “Appendix,” 88.
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because they are “loyal to a rogue faction in the military.”75 Jeffrey Winters
complimented the Boston Globe, which “deserves credit for a level o f completeness and
accuracy that the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Chicago
Tribune, and Washington Post failed miserably to provide” about the crisis in East
Timor.

7

(\

Thus, misconstruing, downplaying, or eliminating important information in

American news did not lead to a sense o f urgency in the American public that the
violence should end, as is reflected in the poll taken in September 1999.
The amount o f data from polls pertaining to the crisis in East Timor is limited. At
the end o f September 1999, the Gallup Organization asked four questions with content on
East Timor. This section examines that survey.77 In general, the poll indicated that the
“American public is paying relatively little attention to the conflict in East Timor, and to
date has little inclination to support the involvement o f U.S. military troops there as a part
o f the international peacekeeping force.”78
The survey revealed that only 5 percent o f the respondents followed the news
about the conflict in East Timor closely. O f the remaining respondents, 24 percent
followed it somewhat closely, 29 percent followed it not too closely, and 41 percent did
not follow it at all. Only 1 percent had no opinion. With 29 percent following the crisis
relatively closely, the crisis rates in the lowest category o f news events followed by the

75. John Donnelley, “Pentagon Reluctant to Isolate Indonesia,” Boston G lobe, 11 September 1999,
A l, A10.
76. Jeffrey A. Winters, “Why U.S. ow es East Timor a Moral Debt,” The K orea H erald, 30 May 2002
(http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publiclib/story.asp, accessed on 22 June 2002).
77. The poll was conducted by random telephone interview o f a national sample o f 1039 adults
between 23 and 26 September 1999. There is a 95 percent confidence that the results o f this survey fall
within a plus or minus 3 percent margin o f error due to sampling or other random effects.
78. “East Timor Has Y et to Register Strongly on Americans’ Consciousness: but Majority Says a
Peaceful Solution Is at least Somewhat Important to U .S.,” The G allup P o ll N ew s Service, 4 October 1999
(www.gallup.com /poll/releases/pr991004.asp, accessed on 30 January 2002).
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Gallop Organization over the previous ten years. As such, it is above only one other
news story tested by Gallup: the 1994 political reforms in Japan.
Many Americans knew little about what happened in East Timor. W hen asked,
“with what country is East Timor currently having a dispute,” only 20 percent answered
correctly with Indonesia. More to the point, 70 percent o f the respondents did not know,
1 percent thought it was with Australia, 1 percent with China, 2 percent thought it was a
civil war, and another 6 percent thought it was with some other country. The level of
disinterest in the crisis in East Timor likely led to a majority o f uninformed respondents,
since 80 percent either knew that they did not know, or guessed incorrectly.
Despite a relative lack o f knowledge about the East Timor crisis, the majority of
those surveyed considered a peaceful solution to the conflict important. O f the 56
percent who considered peaceful resolution important, 14 percent said it was very
important and 42 percent said it was somewhat important. O f the 33 percent who said it
was not important, 20 percent said it was not too important, while 13 percent indicated it
was not important at all. When compared to responses on other conflicts, including the
Palestinian/Israeli, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland, 33 percent ranked the lowest
importance. A full 11 percent had no opinion. When asked if the United States should
send military troops to participate in a multilateral peacekeeping force in East Timor, 34
percent favored, 59 percent opposed, and 7 percent had no opinion. These results suggest
that public opinion was more against intervention than for it.
The role o f the media in the crisis in East Timor mainly endorsed the U.S. official
policy. It did serve an important part in the crisis however, by bringing atrocities to light.
For example, the plight o f East Timor went largely unnoticed until 1991, when the
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Indonesian military massacred pro-independence demonstrators at a rally in Dili. The
media highlighted this event and increased international pressure to stop such
practices. As explained above, the coverage by the New York Times o f the crisis in East
Timor closely followed official U.S. policy and rhetoric supporting Indonesian
occupation and downplaying the right to self-determination in East Timor. The role of
the media during the crisis in East Timor therefore, reinforced a sense o f low
importance.

U.S. INTERESTS
During the 1990s, the momentum of cold war anti-Communist containment
abated, despite continuing concerns over growing Chinese influence in the larger region.
Other competing concerns began to take on greater importance to U.S. policy makers,
including the status o f Taiwan and potential North Korean nuclear armament. Thus, the
United States shifted focus from Indonesia, to promoting regional stability through
economic and democratic development. As a result, the United States was more
interested in seeing stability in Indonesia, the largest and most populous country in the
region, rather than worrying about tiny East Timor.
After the economic downturn in 1997-98, stability became increasingly
worrisome in Indonesia as banks failed, the Rupiah fell, food prices shot up, students
rioted, and the Indonesian Parliament initiated proceedings to impeach Suharto. Rolland
Challis argues that the United States was the force behind the economic diplomacy
packages from the IMF: President Clinton, giving a rare insight into whose voice really
spoke when the IMF moved its lips, telephoned Suharto to make clear that the IMF
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package must be implemented if the proposed help was to be forthcoming.79 The IMF
package forced economic reform on Suharto and ultimately led to his downfall, because it
undermined what IMF managing director, Michel Camdessus, called “an economic
system based on conglomerates, the collusion between the state, banks, business, and
QA

restrictive markets.”

Indeed, on the eve o f Suharto’s resignation, Secretary o f State

Madeleine Albright phoned Suharto that it was time to go. Habibie replaced Suharto
soon thereafter. The United States maintained strong relations with Indonesia however,
to help sustain the fragile economy that threatened regional security. The United States
was interested in seeing Indonesia recover from economic recession after the crash o f the
Thai B ahtin 1998.
The Clinton administration supported Indonesian progress toward democracy, but
was forced to consider the question o f East Timor’s self-determination. The
administration’s approach to the crisis in East Timor was to deal diplomatically with
Indonesia, rather than engage East Timor. This strategy may not have produced
independence for East Timor at great speed, but it maximized results at the lowest cost
and risk to the United States. The following examines more closely Clinton’s policies
regarding East Timor and Indonesia.
In late February 1999, there was a meeting between senior United States and
Australian officials. The United States was convinced that during transition in East
Timor a full-scaled peacekeeping operation would be unavoidable, but the Australians
wanted to avoid a military alternative. Washington was not however, yet willing to
pressure Jakarta to accept a peacekeeping operation without some prior agreement on the
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autonomy o f East Timor under Indonesian sovereignty. The United States and Australia
asked the UN Representative to East Timor to be patient so as not to endanger such an
agreement, and the United States approached the situation in East Timor with diplomatic
pressure on Indonesia to control the militias in East Timor. Secretary o f State Madeleine
Albright visited Jakarta on 4 March 1999. While there, she officially met with
imprisoned resistance leader Xanana Gusmao. Albrights’s spokesman called on the
Indonesian government to bring under control the paramilitary activities in East Timor.81
This visit officially acknowledged the increased importance for U.S. foreign policy o f the
situation in Indonesia regarding East Timor.
On 6 April, militias killed by machete many people gathered in a church in
Liqui^a, East Timor. Two days later, U.S. Commander in C hief o f the Pacific Admiral
Dennis Blair went to Jakarta to tell Wiranto to shut down militia activities. Blair did just
the opposite, however, and invited Wiranto to Hawaii to participate in the upcoming
July/August bilateral defense discussions, and promised “expert exchange for doctrinal
development” and that he would “send a small team to provide technical assistance. . .
on crowd control measures.”82 Once the State Department got wind o f the meeting
contents, however, it wired Ambassador Stapleton Roy at the embassy in Jakarta to
arrange “a corrective phone call” on April 18 from Blair to Wironto. According to an
official report on the call, Blair “again failed to tell Wiranto to shut the militia down,” and
violence again increased.83 Reinforcing Albright’s earlier message, however, President

80.
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Clinton wrote to President Habibie o f Indonesia on 23 April 1999, expressing concern
about East Timor and asked Habibie to control the militias.

fid

Once the 5 May 1999 agreement was signed regarding the sovereignty of
Indonesia, the UN began assessments for the upcoming UNAMET mission and on 22
May the Secretary-General made his recommendations to the Security Council. With
Congressional approval, the UN Security Council Resolution 1246 passed on 11 June
1999, and cleared the way to prepare for the August referendum.
Militia activities were in full swing in East Timor by mid-July, when a meeting
took place in Jakarta, involving Admiral Archie Clemens, Commander o f the U.S. Pacific
Fleet. According to those present, “he offered the officers an increase, a step-up in the
U.S. military relationship with Indonesia.. . . He proposed that in Surabaya, at the
Indonesian naval eastern fleet headquarters, training facilities be established for the U.S.
nc

military.”

Clemens explained that “U.S. goals for the Asia-Pacific region depend on

maintaining our strategic partnership with Indonesia.”86 This meeting happened
concurrently with contradicting messages from the State Department, Congress, and
Clinton.
On 23 July 1999, U.S. Assistant Secretary o f State for Southeast Asia and Pacific
Affairs visited Jakarta for three days and toured East Timor. W hile there, he warned
Habibie that U.S.-Indonesian relations would be affected if the referendum had to be
postponed until 30 August, due to impoverished security.87 In the initial days following
the referendum, the United States stepped up diplomatic efforts by repeatedly requesting
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Indonesia to stop the violence, but it is possible that low U.S. willingness to send troops
to East Timor was misunderstood in Jakarta as an encouraging sign, because the violence
did not abate. On 7 September, Habibie attempted to dupe the world by declaring martial
law in East Timor under the pretense o f bringing order. W hile this may have bought him
a day to continue devastating East Timor, it very quickly became clear that this measure
was a tactic to delay UN action.
While the Clinton administration worked diplomatically to end the violence, it did
not wish to damage U.S. relations with Indonesia. On 8 September, administration
officials said the administration had “made the calculation that the United States must put
its relationship with Indonesia, a mineral rich nation o f more than 200 million people,
ahead of its concern over the political fate o f East Timor, a tiny impoverished territory of
QO

800,000.”

Indeed, the Clinton administration viewed the crisis in East Timor as a

greater Indonesian issue. For this reason, foreign policy favoring Indonesia took
precedence in the administration over injustice in East Timor.
Despite the administration’s wishes not to damage relations with Jakarta, it also
had to consider pressures from important allies. The Clinton administration received
pressure in early September, especially from Australia and Portugal to increase levels of
participation in a UN multinational force. Australia’s Prime Minister, John Howard, used
several means to pressure Clinton. As explained earlier, he phoned personally, lobbied
Congress, and went on television. Portugal used similar tactics. Clinton, ever mindful of
the media and public opinion, knew that the violence had the potential to generate a
public outcry, but Congress was not in the mood to send in U.S. ground troops.

88.
Quoted in Elizabeth Becker and Philip Shenon, “With Other G oals in Indonesia, U.S. moves
gently on East Timor,” N ew York Times, 9 September 1999, A l.
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Whereas prior to the referendum, Clinton “refused to discuss” the alternative for
an international force,89 after the referendum, the violence convinced him that stronger
resolution was necessary. In a speech on 9 September, Clinton warned that Habibie must
invite the international community into East Timor to restore order. On the same day, the
United States suspended all military relations and arms sales to Indonesia. Clinton bent
to international and congressional pressures, by cutting military ties to Jakarta and by
supporting the IMF decision to suspend a loan program.90 Chief o f U.S. military forces
in the Pacific, Dennis Blair delivered the message personally to Indonesian Defense
Minister Wironto of the U.S. suspension o f military ties on 9 September.91 In addition,
the United States retracted Blair’s April invitation to Wiranto to attend the Hawaii
meeting of Asia-Pacific defense chiefs. All together, the message from Washington was
clear that Indonesia was responsible for security in East Timor, and would pay a high
price if it failed to do so.
Despite diplomatic and economic moves to isolate Indonesia, the United States
supported Indonesian stability and pushed for reform in Indonesia to continue to
institutionalize democracy. As a result, the United States continued to focus on
Indonesia, rather than the much smaller East Timor. For example, on 10 September
1999, Clinton’s National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger likened the crisis in East Timor
to his daughter’s “very messy room up in college.”92 He thereby intimated that
involvement in East Timor was insignificant messy business o f very low importance.

89. John Roosa, “Fatal Trust in Timor,” N ew York Times, 15 September 1 9 9 9 ,29A.
90.
See Steven Mufson, and Bradley Graham, “US, IMF m ove to Isolate Jakarta; Clinton cuts Ties to
Indonesian Military; Loan Program suspended,” The Washington Post, 10 September 1999, A l.
91.
U.S. military training o f Indonesian officers resumed in February 2000, see Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, “U.S. Resumes Training Indonesian Army Officers,” The Washington Post, 19 Februaiy
2000, A21.
92. Quoted in “Another M essy Apartment,” The Washington Post, 10 September 1999, A36.
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According to some, Berger’s explanation o f the U.S. inaction in East Timor was a side
effect o f Euro-centric geopolitics after all East Timor is in Asia, not in Europe. Where
U.S. interests in East Timor were low, interests in Indonesia were, according to Under
Secretary Thomas Pickering, “profound.”93
The following day, Clinton strongly criticized Indonesian military involvement in
the violence in East Timor, and finally admitted94 that it “is now clear that the Indonesian
military is aiding and abetting the militia violence. This is simply unacceptable.”95 He
warned that the “Indonesian Government and military must reverse this course to do
everything possible to stop the violence and allow an international force to make possible
the restoration of security.”96
At the 12 September meeting o f the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summit in Auckland, New Zealand, President Clinton took advantage of an opportune
moment to build consensus among important regional leaders regarding a united
international response to Indonesian policy in East Timor. He urged other countries to
join the United States to pressure Jakarta to control militia violence in East Timor, and
indicated U.S. willingness to place economic diplomacy on the table as necessary and
that the United States was ready to consider backing a UN multinational force in East
Timor to restore order. He repeated his comments o f 10 September and hammered home
his remarks with a statement that invoked the Clinton Doctrine: “We must help both the

93. See the Statement o f Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S.
Department o f State, in United States Congress, Joint Hearing, 9 September 1999, 12.
94.
A s early as 11 June 1999, Australia had publicized that it had evidence connecting the Indonesian
military to militia activities in East Timor.
95.
William J. Clinton, “Statement on the Situation in East Timor,” Weekly Com pilation o f
P residential D ocum ents 35, no. 3 6 ,1 0 September 1999 (http://frw ebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bi...ID5605249287+4+0+0& W AISaction-retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
96. Ibid.
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people of East Timor and the democratic process in Indonesia because the world
community seeks to have the integrity o f democracy protected everywhere.”97 As a
result, regional leaders came together at the APEC meeting against the violence in East
Timor, creating tremendous pressure on Jakarta.
On the same evening, Habibie succumbed to international pressure and invited a
UN mandated force into East Timor. The next day Clinton, still in Auckland, spoke to
reporters, welcoming Indonesia’s invitation to a UN force. He kept on the pressure by
saying that “its important to get the details worked out and get this force in a hurry, in a
way that it can be effective.” Once this could be done he said, “we can resume our work
with the people o f Indonesia ... to help their transition to democracy and the restoration
of prosperity there.”

OR

On 14 September, Clinton explained that he was “strongly

supportive” o f Australia leading INTERFET, regardless o f Indonesia’s reservations.
Again reinforcing the Clinton Doctrine, he said, “The work w e’ve done in the past few
days will help build a more secure, more prosperous, more integrated Asia-Pacific region.
It will give our citizens, all our citizens, all the way from N ew Zealand back to
Washington, better lives in the 21st century.”99 His comments reflect U.S. interests in the
larger region, rather than in East Timor.
During the days following the Indonesian invitation for the UN to enter East
Timor, concern was raised that Indonesia was again stalling, possibly to gain time to

97. W illiam J. Clinton, “Remarks to American and Asian B usiness Leaders in Auckland,” Weekly
Com pilation o f P residen tial D ocum ents 35, no. 3 7 ,1 2 September 1999 (http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bi...D -56117930978+7+0+0& W A ISaction-retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
98. W illiam J. Clinton, “Remarks on the Situation in East Timor and an Exchange with Reporters in
Auckland,” 13 September 1999 (http://frw ebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bi...ID -5605249287+5+0+0&
WAISaction-retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002), 1740.
99. W illiam J. Clinton, “Remarks on Departure from Auckland and an Exchange with Reporters,” 14
September 1999 (http://frw ebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bi...D -5605249287+1 l+O+O&WAISaction-retrieve,
accessed on 19 March 2002).
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forcibly relocate East Timorese to other parts o f Indonesia. An example was given in the
Washington Post on 14 September, in which Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said
that he “needed time to discuss details o f the United Nations’ proposal for the
deployment o f as many as 7000 troops,” and that he would be there “as long as it takes.”
U.S. Ambassador to the UN responded that “if he starts to stretch this out while the
Indonesian forces continue to rampage, that would be a major deception. The
Indonesians would be back in the depths o f the mess they created and only just began to
bail themselves out of.” He further indicated that “Timing is o f the essence.” 100
The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264 on 15 September, establishing
INTERFET with a Chapter VII mission to restore order in East Timor. President Clinton
committed limited support to the multinational force, including “communications,
intelligence, logistics, planning assistance, and transportation.” 101 Clinton also deployed
the amphibious ship USS Belleau Wood, carrying a special operations capable Marine
Expeditionary Unit and helicopters to provide airlift, search and rescue. The president
was unclear on how long the mission would last, however indicated that the objective
was to support INTERFET until a transition to an upcoming UN peacekeeping mission
could be achieved.
At the end of September, Harold H. Koh, o f the State Department outlined the
U.S. position on East Timor at a Congressional Hearing. He indicated that the United

100. Colum Lynch, “Indonesia asks U N for Discussion Time: Annan, Clinton Press for Quick
D eploym ent o f Peacekeepers to East Timor,” The Washington P o st, 14 September 1999, A25
(http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 15 March 2002).
101. William J. Clinton, Communication fro m the P residen t o f the U nited States: Transmitting a
R eport to Congress, Consistent w ith the War P ow ers Resolution, R egarding U.S. M ilitary Forces in East
Timor, 8 October 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999).
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States had a four-tiered policy.102 First, the human rights abuse had to end and refugees
allowed to return home. Second, Indonesia should remove all militia from East Timor
and refrain from hampering relief efforts in East and West Timor. Third, the United
States promoted democracy in East Timor. Fourth, the United States supported the
establishment of an international Commission o f Inquiry to investigate and bring to
justice the perpetrators o f human rights violations.
By late September, the United States had provided $10 million to the
humanitarian relief effort in East Timor. On 29 September, the Department o f State
added $5.1 million to this figure.103 The United States agreed to provide 200 support
personnel for non-combat work in communications, logistics, intelligence, and strategic
airlift, and in late September the increased its commitment o f personnel from 200 to
500.104
On October 7 Clinton asked the UN to reduce the U.S. role in the East Timor
operations, as Congress was reluctant to fund UN peacekeeping missions abroad.105
Debate in Congress had already delayed paying back dues owed by the United States
Despite Clinton’s desire to reduce the U.S. costs, Marine Corps Brigadier General John
Castellaw made available on 10 October four C-53 Sea Stallion helicopters, based near
D ili106 jh g helicopters provided much needed heavy lift for the INTERFET force of
6500 troops.

102. See the Harold Hongju Koh, in United States House, H earing before the Subcom m ittee on
International O perations and Human Rights, 30 September 1 9 9 9 ,1 1 -1 7 .
103. See comments made by Assistant Secretary o f the Bureau o f Population, Refugees, and
Migration, U.S. Department o f State, Julia Taft, in ibid., 20.
104. See Jonah Blank, and Steven Butler, “A Plea for Peace from Someplace near H ell,” U.S. N ews
& W orld R eport 127, no. 12 (1999): 42.
105. Lauria, “U .S. asks U N for Trims in Force,” A l, A13.
106. See Slobodan Lekic, “U.S. adds Choppers, Specialists in E. Timor,” Boston G lobe 256, no. 102
(1999): A12.
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By October, attention was drawn to the plight o f the refugees across the border in
West Timor. An estimated 260,000 of the 850,000 East Timorese population were living
in these militia-controlled camps. The refugees were terrorized and starving. It was
feared that the coming rains would worsen camp conditions. On 10 November, Clinton
wrote to Congress and requested $40 million for the Timor and Caucus crises “to meet
unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs, including those o f refugees, displaced
persons at risk.”

107

Refugee issues threatened to unravel progress made in the crisis.

U.S. involvement in the international response during the crisis was limited to
non-combat troops, specifically the United States supplied communications, logistics and
airlift personnel. In addition, the United States sent civilian police and military observers
in varying numbers, but with a maximum o f 200. U.S. policy remained consistent
throughout the crisis that it would not commit combat troops, but rather it focused
support on humanitarian relief efforts. During the INTERFET phase o f the international
operations, the United States added a small force o f rotational units to work in
cooperation with, but not under the authority o f the UN peacekeeping mission. The U.S.
contribution to the UNTAET phase of the crisis was smaller yet. The U.S. contribution
to UNTAET was small: three military observers and one judge advocate. These
personnel served under UN operational control. Clinton said that the United States
maintained “a credible and visible presence” in East Timor, but this credible presence

107.
William J. Clinton, “Memorandum on Assistance for Refugees and Victim s o f the Timor and
North Caucasus Crises,” P residential D eterm ination 35, no. 45 (1999): 2353.
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consisted of 30 military personnel under U.S. command, who coordinated U.S. military
humanitarian and civic assistance.108
The United States pressured Indonesia to internally address its human rights
violations. The United States supported the UN position that prior to an international
tribunal alternative, Indonesia should investigate and prosecute the war crimes o f
beginning with “33 individuals, including 6 generals, the Governor o f the province, the
head o f several o f the militia groups.” 109 The United States made clear to Indonesia that
if the Indonesian domestic judicial process were inadequate or not credible, then the
United States would “have to consider supporting an international process.”110
Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth testified before a joint hearing in February 2000
that the administration’s position was to pressure Indonesia to resolve the refugee
situation in West Timor by allowing refugees to return to East Timor, or by integrating
them into Indonesian society. This pressure was applied via withholding military aid and
through economic assistance. Moreover, the United States would not resume normal
relations with Indonesia until the refugee matters had been resolved and finalized.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter set out to examine the extent of influence exerted by the five
variables on foreign policy decisions regarding intervention, and how they shaped the

108. W illiam J. Clinton, Communication from the P resident o f the U nited States: Transmitting a
R eport Consistent w ith the War P ow ers Resolution Regarding U.S. M ilitary F orces in E ast Timor, 1 March
2000 (Washington, D.C.: U .S. Government Printing Office, 2000).
109. United States Senate, “East Timor: A N ew Beginning?” Joint H earing before the Subcommittee
on A sia and the P acific o f the Com mittee on International Relations H ouse o f R epresentatives a n d the
Subcom m ittee on E ast A sian and P acific Affairs o f the Committee on Foreign R elations U nited States
Senate, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 February 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

2000 ), 10.
110. Ibid., 11.
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foreign policy o f President Clinton. The overarching consideration in this case study is
that the United States approached the crisis in terms of its long-term relationship with
Indonesia, an important strategic, military, and economic ally in the region.
The crisis in East Timor, beginning in 1991 and ending in 1999, culminated
decades o f suppressed international action, a side effect o f larger cold war concerns
regarding containing communism. Indonesia was a long time ally o f the United States
and had received significant military and economic assistance in reward for remaining a
“bulwark against the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.” 111 As a result, the
international community largely looked the other way as Indonesia committed crimes
against humanity in tiny East Timor and elsewhere. The end o f the cold war changed the
international system and as a result, such crimes were no longer sustainable. Internal
social turmoil toppled the leadership in Indonesia, which was replaced by more moderate
leaders, who accepted reform as inevitable. This leadership too had to go, because it was
too closely associated with the old regime and lacked popular support.
Scholar Naom Chomski argues that the atrocities in East Timor in 1998-99
“could have easily been mitigated or terminated merely by the withdrawal o f direct and
•

decisive participation.”

119

The reasons no state advocated a forcible military intervention

in East Timor had to do with the fact that “Indonesia possessed a strong military, that
such an intervention was likely to be strongly opposed by nearby China, and that
concerned states believed that Indonesia’s consent to a multinational force would, in any

111. Ramesh Thakur, “Cambodia, East Timor and The Brahimi Report,” International Peacekeeping
8, no. 3 (2001): 117.
112. Chomsky, A N ew Generation, 30.
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case, soon be forthcoming.” 113 Washington played a large role in resolving the crisis in
East Timor, even though its focus remained firmly on Indonesia and regional stability.
Clinton pressured Jakarta to invite the UN into East Timor at the point when Congress,
the UN, and U.S. allies pressured him to do so. More importantly, the East Timor issue
had grown into a regional issue that threatened U.S. interests in Indonesia. Thus,
resolving the crisis in East Timor had become a subset o f U.S. interests in Indonesia.

113.
Sean D. Murphy, “Contemporary Practice o f the United States Relating to International Law,”
American Journal o f International L aw 94, no. 1 (2000), quoted in ibid., 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

222
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation examined the extent to which concerns about ethnic cleansing
and democratic governance influenced President Clinton’s decision to intervene with
military force in three specific and distinct cases. The previous chapters explored
domestic and international constraints that shaped these decisions. This chapter
summarizes the findings in the chapters on Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor based on the
theoretical discussion laid out in Chapter III. The results are then compared across the
case studies to assess patterns o f foreign policy. Next, the hypotheses, set out at the
beginning o f this dissertation, are examined in the context o f these findings. In the
concluding section, a comparison is made between the Clinton Doctrine and the policies
implemented during the three crises. This chapter concludes with a discussion o f the
importance of this study and remarks regarding developments since September 11.

CASE SUMMARY FINDINGS
An overview o f case study findings is presented in Table 4, which emphasizes the
important turning points for each case. Together, these turning points show that foreign
policy decisions made by President Clinton were not improvised. In fact, his decisions
fall into a framework that reveals the impact o f specific variables on his decisions to
intervene or not. For example, in the case o f Rwanda, the allies involved included
Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, and the Organization o f American States.
Belgium’s position, for instance, favored the use o f military force to end the civil
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violence until 14 April 1994. After that date, Belgium opposed military intervention.
France openly favored military intervention as o f mid-June 1994, implemented that
policy later in the month, and then turned its support to humanitarian assistance. The UN
policy only approved military intervention on 22 June. The position of the U.S. Congress
was that it never supported the use o f force and only favored humanitarian assistance
after mid-June. Public opinion and the media, was similar to that in the Congress.
Finally, U.S. interests did not reflect the need for military intervention, and humanitarian
assistance was not sent until September. The following section explains the impact of
these variables with more depth.

Table 4
Evaluation o f the Five Variables
U.S. Ally
Case: RWANDA
BELGIUM
+ mil Jan 94
- mil 14 Apr 94

United Nations

U.S. Congress

- mil to 22 Jun
94
+ mil 22 Jun 94

- mil
throughout
- hum mid-Jun
94

Public Opinion
-m il
throughout
- hum mid-Jun
94

U.S. Interests
-m il
throughout
+ hum Sep 94

UNITED
KINGDOM
- mil
throughout
FRANCE
+ mil 17 Jun94
mil intervention
23 Jun 94
+ hum
OAU
+ mil
throughout

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

224
Table 4 (continued)
U.S. Ally
Case: HAITI
OAS
+ san 8 Oct 91
- mil to Jul 92
~ mil Jul 92

United Nations

U.S. Congress

+ san 8 Oct 91
+ mil 31 Jul 94

/ mil to 25 Oct
94
+ mil 25 Oct 94

U.S. Ally
United Nations
Case: EAST TIMOR
INDONESIA
+ san
+ re f5 M a y 9 9
+ mil 15 Sep 99
- mil to 12 Sep
99

U.S. Congress
+ mil san 92
- mil
throughout
-h u m 15 Sep
99

PORTUGAL
+ mil
throughout

Public Opinion
/ san
throughout
/m ilto 15 Sep
94
/+ m il 15 Sep
94
Public Opinion
- mil
throughout
/ mil san

U.S. Interests
+ san 4 Oct 91
+ mil 11 Oct 93
- mil to Aug 94
+ mil Feb 94
mil intervention
19 Sep 1994
U.S. Interests
- mil
throughout
+ mil san 4 Mar
99
+ e san 9 Sep
99
+ hum 12 Sep
99

AUSTRALIA
+ ref Aug 98
+ mil Aug 99
mil intervention
19 Sep 1999
Legend:
+ favored
san sanctions
- opposed
mil military intervention
/ mixed or undecided
e
economic
~ unable to legally endorse military intervention

ref referendum
hum humanitarian relief

FINDINGS: RWANDA
After the crisis in Rwanda, “blame game” occurred for allowing the genocide to
take place or to continue after it had started. The main failure o f the international
community during the crisis in Rwanda was that it failed to distinguish between ongoing
refugee hostilities, renewed civil war, and genocide. Misrepresentations o f the initial
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killings of both moderate Hutus and Tutsi generated the impression that killings were
perpetrated on both sides. As a result, the genocide was mistaken for renewed civil war,
which outside states were hesitant to enter. Thousands o f Hutu refugees fled from
advancing RPF forces as the government collapsed and the Tutsi regained control after
several decades. Hutu gathered in the French protected safe zone, prompting Philip
Gourevitch to say; “the humanitarian relief effort became a catering service for the
largest genocidal movement on the planet at the time.” 1
Behind a charade o f accusations and demands, Rwanda attempts to escape
responsibility for the genocide that happened there. Clinton’s 1998 apology did not ease
tension but precipitated further claims and accusations. Rwandans are left to come to
terms with, and accept responsibility for the genocide that was planned and implemented
by the government against the people. Rwanda’s claim that the UN owes apologies “is
uncalled for.”2 In addition, the demand that the UN, the United States, France, and
Belgium owe reparations to Rwanda for what it did to itself and then misrepresented to
the world, exemplifies an attempt to extract economic benefits based on the judgement
that Clinton was right to apologize. Despite Michael O ’Hanlon’s argument that since all
people are equal, then the decision to intervene becomes one o f pure numbers o f savable
lives over and above the cost in number o f lives required to stop the killing,4 the payment

1. Quoted in Gina Jae, “Interview with Philip Gourevitch: International Responses to Genocide in
Rwanda,” The Journal o f the A m erican M edical Association 285, no. 9 (2001): 1216.
2. See Africa N ew s Service, “Rwanda Genocide: Why the Truth Must B e Told,” Africa News
Service, 10 Jan 2000 (web3.infotrac.galegroup.com /itw/i..._A58510962&dyn=77!ar_frnt?sw_aep=vi
va_odu, 17 January 2002).
3. See Africa N ew s Service, “International Community to Blame for Rwanda Genocide,” Africa
News Service, 10 July 2000 (web3.infotrac.galegroup.com /itw/i..._A6320391&dyn=41!ar_fm t?sw_aep=
viva_odu, 17 January 2002).
4. Michael O ’Hanlon, “H ow to Stop Genocide: Saving Lives with Force,” The N ew Republic, 12 July
1999,21.
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o f reparations would reward Rwanda for having behaved so atrociously in the first place.
Certainly, this is not to say that assistance should not be given to Rwanda per se, only
that such assistance should be attributed to developments in Rwanda, rather than because
it is associated w ith the genocide, guilt, or an erroneous apology.

U.S. Allies
U.S. allies have been highly criticized for their varying positions regarding the
Rwanda crisis. France was accused o f imperialist intentions aimed at maintaining a
francophone sphere o f influence in the region. France played a crucial role in the
Rwanda crisis however, by intervening to provide a safe zone in Southwestern Rwanda
on 23 June 1994. This action not only protected the extremist Hutu government, but also
simultaneously contributed to massive refugee movement that led to deadly conditions in
overcrowded camps. Criticism against the French was due to the fact that France
supported the Hutu genocidal regime. Consequently Rwanda demanded reparations from
France in July 2000.5
The nature o f the French intervention generated moderate divisions between
France and Belgium, which withdrew very early from the UNAMIR mission in mid-April
1994, because o f domestic public pressure based on ethical and economic issues that
were brought to the fore by the killings o f Belgian forces. Belgium’s withdrawal from
the UNAMIR was a severe blow to the effort, as it removed a significant force from
Rwanda, consequently damaging Dallaire’s capacity to provide UN peacekeeping

5.
See Barbara Crossette, “Report Says U.S. and Others A llow ed Rwanda Genocide: Panel Urges
Reparations for 1994 K illings,” N ew York Times, 8 July 2000, A4.
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services and lowering the morale o f troops from participant countries that were left
behind.
The OAU was most supportive of intervention, as was evident by high levels o f
willingness found in its members to send troops. However, given the organization’s
severe financial limitations, the OAU was unable to accomplish much more than provide
consistent pressure on the warring sides to come to a cease-fire. The OAU was pivotal in
facilitating negotiations for the Arusha Accord, and on other occasions, worked to bring
about peace negotiations, albeit without significant success.

The United Nations
The United Nations was ambivalent at best. A Rwandan representative sowed
confusion in the Security Council by giving false information, thereby misrepresenting
the violence as renewed civil war. Regardless o f this confusing situation in the Security
Council at the time, the UN was at fault for sluggish and ineffective administration o f
assistance and in efforts to resolve the crisis. The UN failure grew out o f
communications issues starting in the field, increasing in the Secretariat, and culminating
with the Security Council that “was not informed” o f early communications from Dallaire
regarding the Hutu plans for genocide against the Tutsi.6 Moreover, the general UN
membership was responsible to the extent that capable members were unwilling to
commit troops, equipment and supplies to the mission. The main shift, which occurred
with UN Resolution 929 on 22 June 1994, came at the insistence o f France to intervene
unilaterally with Operation Turquoise, on 23 June 1994. With this exception, the UN

6. See “From Rwanda Study: ‘Serious Mistakes were M ade,’” N ew York Times, 17 Decem ber 1999,
A14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

228
remained overall unwilling and ineffective in peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda, as military
intervention was not considered a viable alternative.

The U.S. Congress
The role played by the U.S. Congress during the crisis was two-fold. First, after
the Somalia incident, Congress worked on legislation aimed at limiting the ability o f the
president to commit the United States to UN missions abroad, especially in Africa.
Essentially, Congress tended toward disengagement after Somalia. Second, after the
news o f possible genocide spread, public opinion began to show signs o f moving to a
more sympathetic stance. As this happened, Congress began to shift accordingly in midJune 1994, but only to the extent o f supporting humanitarian aid. At that time, Congress
began to petition the president to step up support for humanitarian relief in Rwanda.

American Public Opinion and the Media
During the crisis in Rwanda, the U.S. public did not favor injecting U.S. military
troops into the civil violence in Rwanda. The media characterized the genocide
incorrectly as tribal conflict, and therefore failed to convey accurate and timely
information. The media was instrumental in changing policy, however, when it
publicized the terrible conditions that prevailed in refugee camps, where many people
were dying o f cholera and other diseases. Once the tragic plight o f the refugees came to
light, public opinion shifted and favored humanitarian assistance. This shift in turn
moved Congress as well, and as the president was urged to do the same, U.S. policy was
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reevaluated. At no time, however, did the U.S. public, or the media demand the use o f
military force to end violence.

U.S. Interests
There were few vital or peripheral interests compelling the United States to
intervene unilaterally in Rwanda. There were no direct military or economic interests
and French strategic interests in the region were greater than U.S. interests. Peripheral
U.S. interests at stake could be linked to international law, but the costs o f military
operations in such a geographically remote area outweighed any plausible benefits.
France relieved the pressure on the United States to take action when it intervened in
southwest Rwanda to provide a short-term safe haven for Hutu. Thus, neither U.S. vital
nor peripheral interests compelled the United States to take remedial action in Rwanda
before France acted as the regional hegemon to promote stability. The Clinton
administration was unwilling to intervene in Rwanda and blocked UN Security Council
efforts to halt the genocide. This stance only softened after the genocide was ending,
France intervened, and international attention turned to refugee camps, at which time the
administration turned to providing humanitarian relief. Such humanitarian efforts held
low risk and relatively low cost for the United States, both in terms of life and assistance.

Summary
U.S. policy on Rwanda differed from the policy set by France, a major ally and
contender for influence in the region. Belgium however, set the tone o f international
non-involvement, when it pulled out of the UN mission to Rwanda. The Clinton
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administration's policy did not differ significantly from UN policy, which can be seen a
function of U.S. influence in the Security Council. Moreover, U.S. policy in Rwanda
remained in line with public opinion and Congress. For example, until the American
public learned o f the suffering in Goma, there was relatively little action taken by the
Clinton administration. This inaction was largely due to U.S. hesitation to engage in UN
peacekeeping missions abroad after Somalia. Once the American public became
informed however, it supported humanitarian assistance. Then, the domestically oriented
Clinton administration immediately sent relief assistance to the refugees in July 1994,
albeit with strong limitations on the mandate for U.S. troops.

FINDINGS: HAITI
The crisis in Haiti demonstrated the importance o f two main issues. First, despite
Somalia, it revived international and especially U.S. willingness to establish democratic
governance as the most stable and therefore preferable form o f governance. Moreover,
the U.S. willingness to lead in Haiti reinforced norms o f state behavior in a given sphere
o f influence. Second, it confirmed that refugee migration is indeed high politics. It took
only a matter o f days to bring President Clinton to reverse his campaign promises to
accept Haitian refugees into the United States. Moreover, Haitian refugees were flooding
all countries in the region, including those that could not take care of them appropriately.
Consequently, international pressure brought many countries together to root out the
cause o f the refugee issue: representative governance at home. Clinton negotiated with
Aristide in an effort to resolve the crisis in Haiti. Once it became clear that this approach
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was ineffective, he called an invasion to convince Cedras that the United States meant
serious business.

U.S. Allies
In the case o f Haiti, this “variable” consisted mainly o f the OAS. The OAS
initiated action because o f its concern about the disruption o f democracy in Haiti. The
OAS, however, did not endorse military intervention largely because its Charter declares
such action illegal, since it erodes the law o f sovereign authority. M ost OAS members
favored economic sanctions, including an embargo against Haiti after the September
1990 coup. The 1993 Harlan County incident brought about a slight shift in the OAS, as
it began to support, or rather not oppose, UN and U.S. measures for military intervention,
despite its Charter limitations. In addition, the majority o f OAS member states
cooperated with the UN and U.S. military intervention. This cooperation was explained
by the need to contain the security threat posed by refuge migration around the region.

The United Nations
Initial UN activity was informed by urgings from the OAS, and consisted of
sanctions against Haiti on 10 October 1991. Due to the increased threat to regional
security, the UN intensified international pressure on Haiti in late 1992, by declaring that
Haiti was committing human rights violations. Again in m id-1993, the UN increased
sanctions against Haiti. The failure o f the 3 July 1993 Governor’s Island agreement
followed by the Harlan County incident clarified the depth o f the military junta’s
commitment to remain in power, regardless o f sanctions and an oil embargo. By May,
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the UN began to take its lead from the United States, which expressed keen interest in
resolving refugee issues as a result o f the situation in Haiti. On 31 July 1994, the UN
Security Council authorized military intervention in Haiti under United States.

The U.S. Congress
The role o f the U.S. Congress during the crisis in Haiti was minimal. Divisions in
Congress focused the debate on legal issues, such as the extent o f the president’s war
powers. Throughout, Congress remained deeply divided on intervention, neither willing
to endorse it nor prohibit it. Such a deadlock granted the president greater latitude and to
a large extent allowed him to bypass Congressional approval.

American Public Opinion and the Media
Public opinion during the crisis in Haiti was mixed from beginning to end. The
mixed nature of public opinion allowed the president greater freedom, even though he
needed to proceed cautiously. As a result, Clinton exhausted all possible alternatives
before a military solution emerged. Even then, Clinton made one last effort to negotiate
with Cedras by sending Jimmy Carter as the warships were on their way. This course of
action led to media accusations that “Clinton bungled his way into Haiti.”7 This
conclusion is misleading however, because Clinton sought to resolve the crisis at the
lowest cost possible. Thus, public opinion and the media neither hampered nor helped
President Clinton in making his decision to intervene in Haiti.

7. Tony Smith, “In D efense o f Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (1994): 35.
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U.S. Interests
President Clinton intervened in Haiti to restore democracy in an effort to protect
U.S. vital and peripheral interests in the region. The United States sought to protect
strategic interests by preserving regional stability through democratic enlargement
against an authoritarian military government that violated human rights and caused a
refugee problem. The United States promoted peripheral interests including the
enforcement o f international law against the overthrow o f a government, and by enacting
a policy o f nation building to support democracy. Although the United States acted to
impede the drug trade funneled through Haiti, the main U.S. interest involved halting the
flow o f Haitian refugees to the continental United States. Haiti’s geographic proximity to
the United States led Clinton to acknowledge that accepting refugees was not acceptable,
because as more followed, there would eventually be a significant political risk at home.
The best solution for dealing with the increasing flow of refugees was to stabilize the
internal situation in Haiti, or in other words, to reinstate democracy.

Summary
Initially, Clinton responded to the democratic crisis in Haiti by supporting OASUN initiatives for sanctions thereby easing tension in relations with regional allies. The
later embargo supported the international effort to oust the military regime, but it hurt
many people in Haiti. Under embargo conditions, Haiti was unable to provide economic
prosperity for its citizens, and the brunt of economic sanctions fell on the poorest among
them. As a result, the urgency for humanitarian intervention increased because poverty
prompted an ever-greater outward migration. In this sense, international economic
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initiatives contributed to the already dire situation in Haiti and compounded threats to
regional stability. Further destroying the fragile economy left many Haitians so desperate
to survive that they risked life and limb to escape on the high seas. Returning refugees
caught on the high seas is illegal according to international law, however, and caused
some difficulty for the United States in intercepting refugees bound for Florida. As a
result, Clinton eased sanctions, but that again raised tensions between the United States,
the OAS and the UN. The OAS did not oppose intervention as early as the USS Harlan
County incident on 11 October 1993, after which a major international shift was visible.
The UN Security Council passed Resolution 940 authorizing multilateral joint forces
intervention on 31 July 1994, and Clinton authorized plans for military intervention on 26
August. Despite the fact that neither the U.S. Congress, nor public opinion fully favored
a military alternative, Clinton successfully launched Operation Restore Democracy and
U.S.-led intervention took place on 19 September 1994.

FINDINGS: EAST TIMOR
Preferring diplomatic and economic efforts to curb undesirable activities in
Indonesia, the Clinton administration maintained a low profile during the crisis in East
Timor. At no time did Clinton engage East Timor as a primary objective, instead the
U.S. relationship with Indonesia was primary. Indeed, the United States continued to
supply military training and equipment to Indonesia until international pressure mounted
against such actions after the 30 August referendum consumed the territory in severe
violence. As a result, Clinton cut off military assistance to Indonesia in September 1999,
delivering the decisive message to Indonesia that this violence would no longer be
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tolerated. At the same time, Clinton added the needed boost to the efforts within the
international community to take steps to stop the violence. Geographic proximity was an
important element during the crisis in East Timor, because Clinton avoided U.S.
involvement in the intervention, and it fell to Australia to maintain regional stability.

U.S. Allies
Portugal and Australia were most concerned with the situation in East Timor.
Portugal shared a colonial past with East Timor, and did not want to lose its colony at the
request of the UN, and to the benefit o f another regional power that would
opportunistically take over. Consequently Portugal was key to early international focus
on East Timor. Whereas Portugal was leaving the region, Australia, in close proximity to
East Timor, ran the risk of absorbing refugees, or spillover violence. Australia was also
concerned with the shipping and mining rights in the waterway between East Timor and
Australia, an issue, which resurfaced immediately, even before East Timor received
official independence. The strategic importance o f this waterway, the Timor Gap,
brought international action, as Australia paid special attention to crisis resolution and
regional stability.

The United Nations
The UN was initially involved in East Timor in an effort to settle the long-term
dispute about colonial jurisdiction between Portugal, Indonesia, and East Timor. The UN
became deeply involved in providing international pressure on Jakarta to relinquish its
hold on East Timor. Consequently, UN actions in UNAMET, INTERFET, and UNTAET
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were central to resolving the crisis in East Timor. Through negotiations in the UN, the
United States began to reevaluate its protection o f Indonesia as international pressure to
stop the violence in East Timor mounted. Moreover, the UN mandate to use force largely
halted the rising violence against East Timorese, saving many lives in the process. The
UN was subsequently criticized however, for administrative flaws in the UNTAET
mission, which gave the UN overt control o f the tiny country without making it
accountable to the East Timorese.

The U.S. Congress
Despite a strong Australian lobby, debate in the U.S. Congress was concerned
mainly with rendering humanitarian assistance without committing troops other than for
logistics, communications and airlift. Such debate was often characterized by ardent
appeals on behalf o f human rights, while tempered with apologetic limitations.
Congressional debate bore out that U.S. interests in East Timor did not merit military
intervention. Besides, if regional allies were interested and willing to send troops, then
the U.S. Congress would rather support that move thereby circumventing its own
responsibility. This position enabled the United States to remain aloof from the crisis in
East Timor, while supporting efforts o f other countries. Therefore, the U.S. Congress
supported the UN humanitarian mission, but in light o f poor security in East Timor, drew
the line at behind the scenes peacekeeping.

American Public Opinion and the Media
The role o f public opinion and the media was an important part o f the U.S.
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response to the crisis in East Timor, because it closely followed the official policy o f non
intervention. The media increased the exposure o f the crisis in East Timor, but it failed to
convey a sense of urgency to the public that the United States should intervene. Public
interest in the East Timor crisis remained low throughout, as the American public tired of
less than vital interventions. As a result, neither the media nor public opinion pressured
Clinton to a significant degree to send troops and end the violence.

U.S. Interests
The examination o f U.S. interests in East Timor reveals that even though some
peripheral interests were at stake, these were less critical than the vital interests involving
U.S. relations with Indonesia. The Clinton administration was concerned with the
overarching pattern of abusive Indonesian rule, not only in East Timor, but also in other
territories such as Irian Jaya, or states like Aceh. Consequently, the United States was
more interested in seeing institutionalized democracy in Indonesia as a viable method for
reducing such suppression by increasing representation in troubled areas. Thus, the
United States worked with Indonesia, which had only recently had its first parliamentary
elections in June 1999 after the fall o f Suharto in May. Clinton wanted to see democracy
flourish in all o f Indonesia, and the issue o f East Timor was a stumbling block to
democracy that needed to be addressed for Indonesia to move beyond repressive and
military rule. In the aftermath o f the crisis, the task remained to investigate the crimes
against humanity and to bring the perpetrators to justice. Considerable criticism was
levied against the UN and the United States for supporting Indonesia’s insistence to
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internally investigate and prosecute crimes committed in East Timor. Under the
direction o f the new president, Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia produced a list o f 33
names of those charged with responsibility for crimes against humanity.

Summary
The main findings of this case study include the following. Indonesia agreed in
early 1999 to allow the UN to hold a referendum in East Timor offering the choice
between independence and integration. East Timor chose independence on 30 August,
after which punitive violence backed by elements in the Indonesian military was
unleashed against the East Timorese. Indonesia agreed in September to invite the UN
peace-enforcing mission INTERFET into East Timor to restore order. Portugal remained
pro-independence for East Timor throughout the entire history o f the crisis in East Timor.
Australia shifted policy from supporting Indonesia’s integration o f East Timor to
opposing it in August 1998. Consequently, Australia became a major proponent o f
military multilateral intervention in September 1999. The UN initially remained inactive
except for annual condemnation o f the illegal Indonesian occupation o f East Timor and
its violent policy there. The UN changed course favoring multilateral intervention with
Resolution 1264, providing a Chapter VII mandate to restore order. Congress remained
consistent throughout the crisis. It paid lip service to stopping the violence, however,
remained slow to pay UN back dues and staunchly refused entertain thoughts on
contributions o f ground troops to resolve the crisis in East Timor. It did, however,
authorize U.S. contributions of communications, logistics, and airlift capabilities. At no

8. See for example, Chomsky, A New Generation, 57.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

239
time during the crisis in East Timor did the media or public opinion demand that the
United States intervene in East Timor.

PATTERNS IN FOREIGN POLICY ACROSS THE CASES
This section considers patterns in foreign policy across the three case studies. It
examines specific patterns that were observed within each variable in this study.
The major pattern that emerged in the examination o f U.S. allies was that a
dominant regional actor greatly impacted the unfolding events. Across all three cases,
there was a distinct U.S. policy favoring intervention by the regional hegemon, which is a
step away from the idea that the United States would become a type o f globo-cop in post
cold war era. France intervened in Rwanda as the regional hegemon to create a safe
haven for Hutu. In Haiti, the United States was the regional superpower that led the UN
intervention to put down the military regime and reinstate democracy. Australia was the
regional power that led the UN mission in East Timor to stop the punitive violence after
the referendum. In Rwanda and East Timor, the United States objected to intervention,
until the regional hegemon decided to intervene and subsequently petitioned the UN for
support. For example, the United States adamantly opposed the use o f military force to
stop the civil violence in Rwanda up to the last hour, when France declared that it would
unilaterally intervene and the UN half-heartedly agreed. Even in Haiti, where the United
States functioned as the regional hegemon, the United States opposed military use of
force for quite some time. In East Timor, the United States at no time wanted any part of
military use o f force, and opposed UN actions that might commit it to do so. It was not
until Australia decided to intervene and petitioned for assistance in the UN and approval
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from the United States, that the United States agreed as long as it was not involved except
for minimal peacekeeping assignments. In Haiti, the United States also hesitated to use
force, preferring to explore other alternatives before taking that step.
The major pattern found in the examination o f the United Nations was the
apparent unwillingness o f member states to interfere in civil violence within a single
member state. Moreover, the position o f the Security Council depended on the policies
of its members. This most clearly occurred in the case o f Rwanda for two reasons. First,
Rwanda had a temporary seat on the Council at the time o f the crisis, and used this
opportunity to misinform and mislead the Council regarding the violence at home.
Second, the United States blocked UN action by delaying decisions and by refusing to
participate in missions. Without U.S. participation, even humanitarian missions would
suffer, because the United States had the most advanced technology and equipment
available. As a result, missions without U.S. participation or support were more
challenging. In addition, the UN waited to mandate the use o f force until after one
country was willing to intervene unilaterally. For example, France intervened in
Rwanda, the United States went into Haiti, and Australia led the mission into East Timor.
The U.S. Congress reflected a mixed pattern across the case studies. At no time
did Congress support U.S. involvement in military intervention in Rwanda. Moreover,
Congress did not support humanitarian assistance to Rwanda until after public opinion
began to shift in favor o f it. In Haiti, Congress was deadlocked by debate regarding legal
issues and therefore only came to support the military intervention after it had taken
place. Congress responded to the crisis in East Timor in a similar way, as it had to the
crisis in Rwanda. For example, Congress did not support military intervention in East
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Timor at any time, and was slow to support sending humanitarian assistance until midSeptember and then only limited to support activities. Thus, Congress responded to each
crisis differently, but remained generally reluctant to commit U.S. forces to participate in
military missions.
Similarly, U.S. public opinion and the media did not support the use o f force in
the cases of Rwanda and East Timor, but not in Haiti. This was because during the crisis
in Haiti, the public was ambivalent until the presidential address to the nation on the eve
of the intervention. Then, public support slightly increased as it “rallied around the flag.”
Geographic distance and knowledge o f the region also influenced the pattern o f public
opinion and the media with Haiti closer to the United States compared to Rwanda and
East Timor. In addition, the polls indicated that fewer people in the United States knew
as much about Rwanda and East Timor as they knew about Haiti.
The predominant pattern for U.S. interests found in all three case studies is that
the issue of refugees caused political and social instability that ultimately required outside
international intervention. As shown in Chapter II, refugees place considerable strain on
international stability because they essentially “invade” the neighboring country, which
has no recourse but to care for them. The burden of providing for large numbers of
refugees is particularly difficult when violence is involved. In such cases, refugee camps
can become hotbeds for resistance movements and may function as headquarters for raids
into the country of origin. Understandably, such activity strains relations between
neighboring countries, even if they have a history o f friendly relations. Two o f the cases
in this study exhibit examples o f governmental collapse that degenerated into civil unrest,
violence and brutal behavior, as was apparent in Rwanda and Haiti. The crisis in East
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Timor was the result o f outside oppression, which degenerated from brutal suppression o f
self-determination into punitive violence. All o f these cases generated large numbers of
refugees, which consequently merited some form o f international action, regardless o f
whether the United States participated or not.
A related pattern was that each case became a crisis when regional stability was
compromised. In Rwanda, the crisis began years before the double assassination o f the
President o f Burundi and the President o f Rwanda launched the genocide. This event
placed neighboring countries into a highly precarious position, especially considering that
neither country had institutionalized government to any great extent. Consequently, both
countries were thrown into internal political turmoil. In the case o f Haiti, regional
security was paramount in the OAS and UN decisions to take action against the military
regime. A precedent had to be set to oust Cedras to show that military takeovers would
not be tolerated in the W estern Hemisphere. Regional security in East Timor was at the
root o f the lack o f the U.S. commitment to resolving the crisis. The United States viewed
Indonesia as the bulwark o f stability for the larger region, including the shipping lanes
reaching into Southeast Asia. The United States worked to prevent the collapse of
Indonesia after Suharto, damaging this relationship would have potentially meant the loss
o f the largest Muslim U.S. ally in that part o f the world.
It appears that a shift has occurred in the level o f emphasis placed on peripheral
interests such as international laws pertaining to human rights. Historically state security
matters pertained to military or strategic concerns. During the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries however, vital economic interests grew in importance. Today peripheral
interests such as international law, and especially human rights, have been thrust into the
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realm of high politics. While this does not make international law a vital interest, it has
grown in importance, as it increasingly becomes the mechanism for regulating state
behavior to minimize anarchy at the international level. Moreover, the evolution o f vital
and peripheral interests over time continues to progress, as peripheral interests become
more central.
The pattern that emerged in all cases was that the distance o f the crisis had an
impact on the United States decision to intervene. The United States refrained from
involvement in Rwanda partly because of operations in far away Africa are costly, for
example, for air lifting supplies, equipment, and troops. The geographic location o f
Haiti, just next door, also aided the ability of the United States to quickly send ships with
equipment and troops. The geographic location o f East Timor played a very large role in
the decision for two main reasons. First, East Timor was located next to, and some
would argue, within Indonesia, making military use o f force against Indonesia a
possibility that was less than desirable for the United States. Second, East Timor is
distant from the United States and would therefore make operations even more costly
than in Africa. This pattern is revisited below in the hypothesis section.
Third party political actors were another pattern that emerged in Haiti and East
Timor to a larger extent than in Rwanda. For example, the Clinton administration
worked extensively to include Aristide in its plans for Haiti. Part o f the reason that
Clinton did not use force earlier was that Aristide would not endorse such an alternative.
As the democratically elected leader o f Haiti, this resistance from Aristide complicated
policy decisions. Only after Aristide appealed to the UN to restore democracy in Haiti
did the use of force become a viable alternative, even though he had not explicitly

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

244
requested such action. Similarly, the administration worked extensively with Indonesia’s
political and military leaders throughout the crisis in East Timor. It was not until the
United States cut military aid to Indonesia in September, that the Indonesian government
invited the UN to restore order in East Timor. Third party actors also complicated the
crisis in Rwanda, but that involved France more than the United States. For example, the
RPF quickly swept through Rwanda and took power from Hutu extremists. France
however, maintained that the Hutu were the proper government o f Rwanda. This did not
involve the United States directly, but did complicate the crisis for France a great deal.

THE HYPOTHESES REVISITED
H i:

The more vital interests are at stake, and the closer United States is to the crisis,
the more the president will push for intervention. Conversely, the more peripheral
interests are at stake, and the more distant the United States is from the crisis, the
less the president will push for intervention.
The three case studies show that despite competing factors in making foreign

policy decisions, President Clinton remained mindful o f overarching goals, such as
protecting vital and peripheral interests. When faced with a threat to vital U.S. interests,
such as posed by refugee migration from Haiti, Clinton recognized that he needed support
for intervention from international and domestic constituencies to maintain regional
stability. For example, Clinton went to the UN to ask for a mandate to intervene with
force. After receiving a nod of approval from Aristide and the OAS, the UN mandated
the use of force under U.S. leadership. In addition, Clinton made an address to the public
on the eve of the intervention to announce and explain to the American public the
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intervention in Haiti. The public response was favorable, and even though the president
did not ask for congressional approval ahead o f time, the Congress was kept abreast of
events and did not attempt to stop the intervention.
Geographic distance from the United States did impact the U.S. response to crisis.
Our case studies demonstrate that the farther the crisis is from the United States the less
the United States is to intervene. Rwanda and East Timor, for example, are very far from
the United States and the United States did not use military force in either instance. Haiti
however, is very close to the United States and the United States was compelled to
intervene to end the refugee flow. In addition, geographic distance played a role in the
U.S. policy o f endorsing regional powers to settle the crisis. This was observed in both
Rwanda and East Timor, most likely because the cost o f intervention would be lower and
the benefits higher for regional powers than for a distant country, such as the United
States. Besides, the United States was spared participating in intervention, since France
and Australia intervened in Rwanda and East Timor respectively.
At times Clinton hesitated to use force because he had to balance interests with
demands and pressures from other constituencies and actors. During the crisis in East
Timor, vital interests such as military, strategic, and economic interests in the U.S.Indonesia relationship far outweighed vital and peripheral interests in the U.S.-East
Timor relationship. The United States was not ready to risk its long-term and ongoing
military partnership with Indonesia, at least until the international momentum against
certain aspects of this relationship forced the United States to reevaluate the way
Indonesia used its military and equipment. Once Clinton made this reevaluation, he
announced that there would be no more forthcoming military assistance to Indonesia as
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long as its military supported militia in East Timor. Even after this reevaluation,
however, Clinton limited U.S. participation in the UN mission to East Timor to minimal
humanitarian assistance, because relations with Jakarta still remained more important to
the United States than relations with Dili. Thus, Clinton’s hesitation to use force in East
Timor was a function o f U.S. interests in Indonesia that held far more importance to
policy makers than interests in tiny East Timor.
Geographic proximity also played a part in East Timor, but here the importance
fell on its proximity to Indonesia, a long-time and critical ally o f the United States. As a
result, the United States viewed the violence in East Timor as a side effect o f the
modernization and democratization in Indonesia. Clinton therefore recognized that
resolution o f the crisis in Indonesia was key to resolving threats to the larger region. In
this respect, Clinton had to be very careful to walk a thin line between offending
important allies such as Indonesia, China, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines on one
hand, and offending a sense of injustice supported by East Timor, Portugal and the UN in
general. Clinton worked with Indonesia through diplomatic and economic means to end
the suffering not only in East Timor, but all throughout Indonesia.
Clinton not only hesitated, but also refused to use force to stop civil violence in
Rwanda, because the United States had few if any interests in Rwanda. There were no
military, or strategic, and few economic ties to the country. The only U.S. interests in
Rwanda were peripheral, having to do with international law and norms regarding human
rights. Unfortunately, the United States cannot build policy based on principles and
norms alone. Without threats to vital interests, the cost o f U.S. intervention in a hot civil
conflict in Africa would have been too high to justify. As a result, Clinton hampered UN
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aspirations for intervention in Rwanda, because the costs outweighed the benefits of
intervention in a place that ranked low for the United States in terms o f U.S. vital and
peripheral interests, congressional approval, public opinion and the media. Even though
the UN invited member countries to participate in missions around the world this did not
automatically ensure intervention. This was an important part o f the UN intervention in
Rwanda, because after Belgium withdrew, the UN mission was unable to uphold order
because many of the contributing countries had sent inexperienced and ill-equipped
forces.
The U.S. Congress was not likely to support the use o f military force abroad in
either the case of Rwanda or East Timor. This response was more associated with the
recent events in Somalia than geographic location o f the crisis in question.
It was not until the media informed the public about the conditions in the refugee
camps that Clinton sent humanitarian aid to Rwanda. Despite the financial expense of
providing humanitarian assistance in a distant location, the risk to life and limb for
American troops was low and the political benefit to the president at home was great.
As shown in the case studies, Clinton was not willing to risk the lives of
American soldiers to intervene with force to stop ethnic violence either in Rwanda, or
East Timor. While it is true that ethnic cleansing can and often does generate
international instability, it is also true that such instability is generally regional-specific.
Therefore, as the cases in this study demonstrate, the geographic proximity o f the crises
in question along with the long-standing historical and political ties to the United States
have an important impact on the decision whether to intervene. The closer regional
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instability is to the United States the more likely it is that U.S. leaders will be compelled
to intervene.

H2 :

The more a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the less the president will intervene.
Conversely, the less a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the more the president will
intervene.
This hypothesis is confirmed by the case studies examined in this dissertation.

When France intervened in Southwest Rwanda to provide a safe haven for Hutu, it
relieved any pressure on the United States to take action. As a result, the United States
was not compelled to use force in Rwanda to end the violence. Moreover, once it became
clear that humanitarian assistance was necessary, the United States sent assistance for a
short period of time within a multilateral framework.
In the examination o f the case o f Haiti, no U.S. ally came to light that was willing
to intervene with force in Haiti. On the contrary, the OAS objected to the use o f military
force to reinstate Aristide, preferring to use other means o f persuasion, such as economic
sanctions. The OAS position remained opposed to the use o f force, but the appointment
o f a new Secretary General softened its position, and then the OAS neither openly
supported nor opposed the use of force. Therefore, even though no U.S. ally wanted to
intervene in Haiti, there was also little opposition to the U.S. use o f force. This enabled
the United States to intervene with force in Haiti without fear o f condemnation from the
OAS. Consequently, pressure on the United States was not relieved, and as a result the
United States was compelled to intervene to restore democratic rule.
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In the case o f East Timor, Portugal initiated negotiations in the UN to end the
Indonesian occupation o f East Timor. It was not until Australia developed domestic
pressures that it began to push for intervention. Even though Australia and Portugal
approached the United States to send forces, the U.S. relations with Indonesia proved
more important until September. In the meantime however, Australia intervened in East
Timor to end the post-referendum violence. By doing so, Australia relieved pressures on
the United States to contribute to the mission to any great extent. Thus, this hypothesis
proves to be correct as shown in the case studies o f Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor.

H3 :

The more the UN is likely to call for intervention, the more the United States is to
support it.
This hypothesis is problematic because it has a circular element in it. This is

because the United States is a member o f the Security Council from which resolutions are
declared. Moreover, with the United States as a member o f the Security Council, the
United States is as likely to influence other members o f the Council as it is to be
influenced by others. Thus, this hypothesis is problematic, because the United States
cannot influence itself.
Now, looking at our three case studies, the United States did not want to intervene
in Rwanda in any way. Thus, when it came to the UN mandating a mission to help end
violence in this country, the United States actively blocked any such action. Thus, the
United States exercised more influence over the UN Security Council decisions than the
other way around. Indeed, it was not until France announced that it was willing to
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intervene unilaterally, that the UN Security Council approved the mission that did not
require the United States to participate.
In the case o f Haiti, the United States wanted to restore democracy and needed
UN support. Initially, the United States followed the OAS lead. At some point, however
the OAS-sponsored sanctions clearly failed, and the United States began to assume a
more forceful role in resolving the crisis. Consequently, the OAS, limited by its charter,
acquiesced to the use of force by not objecting. The United States appealed to the UN
without objection from either the OAS or Aristide. In this case, the United States again
exerted a large amount of influence over the decisions made by the UN Security Council
to involve the Chapter VII mandate to use force.
The case o f East Timor reveals similar influence o f the United States in the UN
Security Council. For reasons explained above, the United States did not want to
participate in any military action against Indonesia in East Timor. This had many
consequences, but the U.S. position made it difficult for Australia to receive the Chapter
VII mandate to use force. Australia had to apply pressure on the United States not to
block such a mandate. U.S. approval ultimately came with the condition that the United
States would not participate in the intervention to any great extent. In the case o f East
Timor, the United States was a key element o f the UN Security Council decision
regarding the authorization to use force to end the violence. Thus, the case studies
suggest that this hypothesis is conflicted because the United States is a critical factor in
the decisions regarding UN Security Council mandates.
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H4 :

The more the U.S. Congress is likely to call for intervention, the more the
president will intervene. Conversely, the more the U.S. Congress is likely to
oppose intervention, the less the president will intervene.
This hypothesis is confirmed by our case studies. In Rwanda, the U.S. Congress

not only resisted committing troops and firnds, but it also delayed paying already existing
dues at the UN for previous peacekeeping activities. The crisis in Rwanda came at a time
when Congress had turned to domestic affairs after Somalia. Thus, Congress was more
concerned with containing costs and mission creep, than it was about ending the violence
in a far away country in Africa. It was not until the images o f suffering refugees hit the
news that Congress became more pliable in sending humanitarian aid. Even then
however, Congress stipulated that allocated funds should be strictly used for non-military
humanitarian operations. In addition, Congress demanded a pull-out deadline,
reinforcing its position.
Congress was ambivalent at the time o f the crisis in Haiti, and it remained
deadlocked in debate over such issues as the president’s legal rights to use force. As a
result, Clinton received relatively broad freedom to forge policy without congressional
interference. Thus, the inability o f Congress to make a commitment o f support or
opposition o f the use o f force in Haiti had little effect on Clinton’s foreign policy in Haiti.
The crisis in East Timor invoked resistance to the president’s policy toward
Indonesia, thereby sending the message that Congress did not approve o f U.S. implied
involvement in militia activities in East Timor. Congress had already cut military aid to
Indonesia in 1992. By the time o f the referendum and ensuing violence, Congress
favored using U.S. influence on Indonesia to end the human rights violations. It was
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shortly after this that President Clinton shifted the U.S. policy to withhold military aid to
Indonesia, due to its involvement in supporting the militia activities in East Timor. Thus,
congressional pressure on the president did occur just prior to the announced shift in U.S.
policy, as Congress took a position against supporting Indonesia and the President
acquiesced. Congress did not, however, go so far as to demand that the United States
participate in the UN mission to East Timor, but it was instrumental in pressuring Jakarta
to invite the UN force in to restore order.

H5:

The more the media opposes the president’s policy, the more public opinion will
engage during crisis, and the more cautious the president will be regarding
intervention. Conversely, the more the media endorses the president’s policy, the
less public opinion will engage during crisis, and the less cautious the president
will be regarding intervention.
Public opinion is a highly influential variable in the policy-making process. As

shown in the cases o f East Timor and Rwanda, Clinton hesitated to use force to stop civil
violence because public sentiment opposed such action. In each case, the crisis was far
away and in a part o f the world that is less well known to the American public. With less
knowledge about the country and region in question, the public has more difficulty
supporting costly policy, especially if the benefits o f that policy are vague or unknown.
Thus, selling intervention to the public in far away and less known places is more
difficult. Moreover, if the president is not interested in intervening in that part o f the
world anyway, the disinterested public facilitates inaction, because it goes relatively
unnoticed.
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In Haiti, public opinion was mixed and hovered around the 50 percent mark
throughout the crisis. In effect, a divided public opinion allows the president greater
latitude to forge policy, because the president can directly appeal to the public to generate
greater support in either direction. In this way, the president can pull the public along
with him, as policy gains momentum. In a case such as Haiti, where the public is more
interested in the region in question, the public more readily absorbs the information it is
offered either by the president or by the media. Thus, when the president addressed the
public prior to the intervention in Haiti, public approval jum ped to above the half way
mark.
O f the three cases in this study, the Haiti case presented the most evidence that the
U.S. public came the close to engaging elite decision makers in Congress, as a
consequence o f issues surrounding Haitian refugees. The public had more at stake due to
the crisis in Haiti than in the crises in Rwanda or East Timor. Consequently, there was
potential for political implications— at least in Florida— if the Haitian refugee situation
went on unfettered. The crisis in Rwanda produced a public reaction to the plight in the
refugee camps. Here, the public engaged elite decision makers to the extent that it
generated a shift in the congressional position regarding humanitarian assistance.
Initially in Rwanda, the media relayed information to the public that was in line
with official policy, calling the violence renewed civil war, rather than genocide. Once
the refugee camps were established however, the media played an important role, because
it helped public opinion engage elite decision makers to send humanitarian assistance.
Once this took place, Congress also began to shift its position, thereby dividing the elites.
Thus, once Congress saw public opinion shift, it also shifted. The media was
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instrumental in shifting both public opinion and for dividing elites. Therefore, as long as
the media followed official rhetoric on Rwanda, there was no division in public opinion
or Congress. However, once the media began to counter official rhetoric, by publicizing
the suffering in refugee camps, the public engaged and division began to emerge in
Congress as public engagement took effect.
Throughout the three cases, public opinion was mixed regarding intervention in
Haiti, only reaching a slight majority after President Clinton made his address to the
nation to plead his case for intervention. The role o f the media was similarly mixed.
While the president’s address improved the likelihood that the public would favor
intervention, critical news reports about the intervention itself possibly tempered public
opinion. Thus, the mixed nature o f media reports during the crisis in Haiti left public
opinion mixed, and no shift formed in Congress, which remained deadlocked in debate.
The media closely reflected the official position o f the U.S. government during
the crisis in East Timor. This included minimizing evidence o f U.S. involvement or
implication in military affairs in Indonesia that fueled militia intimidation o f East
Timorese. For the most part, the American public neither followed the crisis in East
Timor, nor supported the use o f military intervention to resolve it. Thus, the hypothesis
is true, because the media endorsed the message o f the president, and the public did not
form a lobby in Congress.
Therefore, this study suggests that in cases where public opinion becomes strong
enough to engage elites in Congress, then a reassessment o f policy becomes possible. It
also suggests, that in cases where the public remains disinterested, the public will not
engage elite decision makers and there is little chance for a reevaluation o f policy.
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THE CLINTON DOCTRINE AND FOREIGN POLICY UNDER CLINTON
In the second half of its first term, the Clinton administration moved “toward the
political center . ” 9 International and domestic political forces prompted this moderate
foreign policy. In many respects, Clinton was influenced by the extent o f U.S. interests,
the availability o f international allies and world support, the amount o f congressional
support as well as domestic public approval. This dissertation began with a central
question: to what extent did Clinton uphold the principle that the United States would
intervene to stop ethnic cleansing. This dissertation concludes that Clinton did not
consistently uphold this principle. However, whenever possible, Clinton attempted to
follow through on what some described as the Clinton Doctrine.
The examination o f U.S. interests in these three case studies reveals a great deal
about the conditions for, and types of, intervention that Clinton was willing to risk. The
key was to bring change at the right price, according to the risks involved. An evaluation
o f U.S. interests revealed layers o f interests that are either vital or peripheral. As it turns
out, ending ethnic violence is a peripheral interest, and is therefore much more difficult to
uphold because it is an intangible end product that requires the payment o f tangible costs.
As a rule, foreign policy cannot be determined by intangible principles. Tangible costs
include the likely loss o f life or limb o f troops that are inevitably placed in harms way to
end violence, even though technological advancement since 1975 has made intervention
less costly in terms o f risks to inherent dangers o f warfare. In addition, intervention
abroad is financially costly. Under such conditions, the costs must not outweigh the
benefits o f intervention. Therefore, if ethnic violence occurs in a country in which the

9. Kurtz, Spin Cycle, xiv.
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United States has few financial interests, such as Rwanda or East Timor, then the
intervention could cost more than benefit—in economic terms. The political costs o f
intervention must also be matched with benefits. For example, in Rwanda, France
perceived that its sphere of influence was coming under threat by expanding U.S.
influence. Along this line, France had more interests at stake in Rwanda than did the
United States. Consequently, France was compelled to intervene before the United
States.
The claim that Clinton would defend human rights is a principled stand and is
therefore difficult to substantiate. For example, despite rhetoric to end ethnic violence,
Clinton did not order an intervention in Rwanda because the costs were greater than the
benefits o f doing so. The United States did intervene in Haiti, but it did so because the
political and economic benefits o f reasserting regional stability— and ending refugee
migration— outweighed the costs. The United States did not intervene in East Timor,
regardless o f human rights violations, because the political, diplomatic, economic, and
military costs o f intervening were higher than were the benefits o f coming to the aid o f
this tiny fledgling nation. Thus, Clinton’s rhetoric supporting human rights was not in
line with U.S. interests at all times. Clinton ultimately had to take U.S. vital, as well as
peripheral interests into consideration as part o f the decision whether to intervene. The
Clinton Doctrine therefore places Clinton under pressure to trade peripheral interests for
vital interests, which is unreasonable.
The case studies demonstrate that U.S. allies play an important role in the
formulation o f foreign policy. Obviously, you cannot have a “foreign” policy without
other countries, but consider the implications o f anarchy. International relations
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essentially encapsulate the actions o f states to independently or collectively overcome the
effects o f anarchy. The goal o f each state is to maximize its position within the
international system. Consequently there is tremendous competition, but also
cooperation. The cases in this study show that U.S. allies do impact U.S. foreign policy
and the way the United States behaves in the international system. In both Rwanda and
East Timor, U.S. allies were extremely influential on United States foreign policy
because as the superpower, the United States was effectively relieved o f the “sheriffs”
obligation to respond, if and when one o f its allies did the job first. In Rwanda, France
intervened to provide a safe haven for the Hutu. Australia filled this role in East Timor.
This option was not available in the case o f Haiti, because the regional hegemon is the
United States, so there was no other country left to fill this role.
In addition, U.S.-French competition for expanding or maintaining a sphere o f
influence in Africa added an element o f complication to the crisis. Here we can directly
observe the competition to maximize position under anarchy, as mentioned above.
Similarly, the fact that Australia is considered a “Western” power brought increased
strain in relations around the larger region, because Indonesia demanded a higher level of
Asian participation, yet Japan was reluctant to participate since it fell into trouble in
Cambodia. This element o f competition was lacking in the case o f Haiti, because the
United States dominates the region.
Clearly, U.S. relations with allies in each crisis are rooted in the concept o f
anarchy, because each one deals with actors out to maximize their position within the
system. For the Hutu, it meant eliminating the Tutsi, but retaining a French alliance,
while misleading the UN. For the Tutsi, it meant fighting for survival, and that also
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meant regaining leadership in the state o f Rwanda. Cedras took the government away
from the democratically elected leader and held it for four years. East Timor was a case
in which this tiny half-island was buffeted between occupying forces and stood for the
first time to attain independence, but needed outside support and assistance. In each case,
U.S. allies played a large role in defining the events and policy over time.
Clinton embarked upon the presidency, endorsing a policy to uphold humanitarian
rights, as a catalyst for engineering change. According to Michael Jackson, Clinton did
well, while in office, to support international stability in the much less stable post-cold
war era . 10 He supported “assertive multilateralism” to achieve this lofty goal. Under
such conditions, the UN becomes an important forum for building international
consensus and authority for legitimizing and administering intervention. When
evaluating the Clinton Doctrine, we cannot forget that ending ethnic violence is
potentially a very costly undertaking for any nation. The costs must remain within the
capabilities o f the intervening nation. It is more cost effective to resolve ethnic crises
within a multilateral framework. The UN provides a system for burden sharing, so that
no single country must pay all costs. The UN ultimately mandated the intervention in
each case study. Moreover, the costs o f intervention were spread over the shoulders of
several countries, even though one self-selected country chose to lead the mission and in
fact, pushed for intervention.
That the international community in general, and the UN specifically, would
institutionalize and uphold norms and laws against ethnic cleansing is unprecedented. It
is clear that the UN fulfilled its function o f creating consensus for international policy.

10. Jackson, “Something Must Be Done?,” 13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

259
More importantly, the UN informed members about the crises and thereby enabled the
world body to negotiate peacefully. In this case, information is very important, because
if countries remained uninformed o f the goals and intent o f the intervention exercise, then
there would be an increased perceived threat to international and regional stability. For
example, Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher explain that “there is a growing international
awareness o f the linkage between human rights abuses, forcible displacement o f civilian
populations, and local, regional and international security . ” 11 Stemming regional
instability due to refugee migration is in the interest o f any country. This plays out in all
three o f the case studies in this dissertation, in which refugees generated tension within
the region. In all three cases, the UN authorized military intervention to restore order in
the afflicted country. In each case, the public mood in the specific country with the most
interests in regional stability influenced that country’s decision to intervene. Because
humanitarian intervention is based on principles, it can only be practiced when the
benefits o f such action outweigh the costs. Thus, the UN played a vital role in resolving
each o f these crises by making the intervention activities transparent and more cost
effective and consequently less threatening to regional actors and other allies.
Once situations o f ethnic violence hit the news media, they usually bring about a
global outcry. Once this happens, world leaders come under pressure to do something to
halt this type o f injustice. This public response is a relatively new phenomenon in
history, and suggests that norms and principles supporting human rights have increased at
domestic and international levels in recent years. Ethnic cleansing violates the most
essential human right—the right to life. This issue touches deep American ideological

11. D ow ty and Loescher, “Refugee Flows,” 43.
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sentiment, and encounters part o f the American identity. For this reason, presidential
rhetoric favoring ending human rights violations, such as found in the Clinton Doctrine,
invokes American beliefs in the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit o f happiness.
Therefore, such rhetoric would naturally have powerful political appeal to the American
public.
Despite this ideological appeal, the cases in this study did not show that the
American public consistently supported or demanded that the U.S. government use force
to end ethnic violence abroad. What they did show however, was that the American
public more readily demands humanitarian assistance to be sent to refugees in need. This
was substantiated in instances, when horrible images o f the Goma refugee camps brought
about a U.S. public response. This suggests that even though the American public enjoys
rhetoric such as the Clinton Doctrine, promising to end ethnic violence, when it comes
right down to doing it, there is a tremendous disconnect. Therefore, while the American
public wants to hear benevolent rhetoric, it does not have the stomach to actually send
American troops into harms way.
We cannot be so foolish as to forget, however, that if indeed the public mood
were to become insistent, then it would not only serve the political interest o f the
president to stop such violence, but would place pressure on him to do so. This is seen in
the case studies in this dissertation by the fact that Congress tends to remain extremely
aware o f public sentiment and acts accordingly. This was exemplified in all three cases.
The case o f Rwanda shows that the American public had no real interest in
intervening to end the violence and neither did Congress. Congress did not make great
efforts to end the violence or to pay the UN dues for the peacekeeping effort. Indeed, it
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was not until after the formation o f the deadly conditions in the refugee camps that the
public began to show some shift in the direction o f sending assistance. Congress
followed the same trajectory as the public and resisted the use o f force to put down the
violence, however, readily sent assistance once it became more politically charged. In
Haiti, the public was divided right up until the president’s address to the nation on the eve
of the intervention, after which there was a small spike in public approval. Likewise,
Congress was deadlocked in debate until just after the intervention, at which time it
approved in a post mortem resolution.
The situation in East Timor revealed that the American public had little
knowledge of, or interest in stopping the violence. Congress, for its part was less
concerned with taking action to end the violence in East Timor, than it was over shutting
off funding for military assistance that doggedly continued to flow to Indonesia and the
militia in East Timor. This military aid implicated the United States in supporting the
militia in its reign o f terror throughout East Timor. This was important because once the
media began to spread this message, it made the United States appear to be an
accomplice, and the American public does not tolerate this sort o f injustice for very long.
Moreover, the risk of public disapproval or opposition increased. As explained in an
earlier chapter, once the public catalyzes a response in opposition, then elites in Congress
are more likely to take notice. Consequently, implications o f U.S. involvement providing
training and equipment to the militia via Indonesia could have led to a political scandal.
Thus, continued military assistance to Indonesia inherently had deep political
undercurrents and high risks. Thus, it was in the political self-interest o f politicians to
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avoid connection to scandals of this extreme nature, and Congress acted to reinforce
earlier decisions to end military aid to Indonesia.
The Clinton Doctrine announced that eliminating ethnic cleansing was in the
interest of the United States. It stood to reason that Clinton was committed and willing to
intervene in the internal affairs of other nations to achieve this goal. However, as much
as he would have liked, he was not free to intervene everywhere, because o f constraints
placed on him, either by U.S. interests, the UN, allies, the U.S. Congress, or the public
and the media. These considerations served to remind Clinton o f political and other risks
involved in trying to fulfill unreasonable goals. Foreign policy is very complicated and
can change over time because of conflicting pressures on the president. The variables
examined in this dissertation helped shape foreign policy under Clinton, as he searched
for the best foreign policy alternative.
We have seen in the cases o f Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor that alternative
variables placed pressure on the president. They either pressured him to act, or
constrained him. As a rational actor, the president must assess each alternative according
to desired outcomes and weigh the costs and benefits o f his decision. This process was
evident in the case o f Haiti, in which Clinton sought to resolve the crisis in democracy
through progressively deepening commitment, beginning with sanctions, progressing to
an embargo, reaching agreement, then military deterrence, to ultimate use o f military
force. In this instance, by the time Clinton ordered military use o f force, he had
exhausted his options in negotiations, sanctions, and incentives.
Policy outcomes did not necessarily include the use o f U.S. military force to end
ethnic violence abroad. Clinton learned quickly in Somalia, for example, that the United
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States, despite its prowess, cannot successfully intervene everywhere without first
assessing the costs and benefits involved. Either the United States must be willing to
embrace the necessary costs, or the president must be willing to absorb the risked
political price if intervention does not succeed. Clinton delivered rhetoric with mastery,
but as shown in our case studies, he was unable to end ethnic violence. The conclusion
of this study suggests, surprisingly, that Clinton did in fact fulfill the Clinton Doctrine,
because it was a qualified statement— that the United States would stop ethnic cleansing
whenever possible. This conclusion unfortunately places greater emphasis on the
qualification than the message.
The qualification encompasses the impact of the five variables in this dissertation
on the foreign policy process. While all o f these variables— U.S. interests, allies, the UN,
Congress, and public opinion and the media—do matter, U.S. interests are the primary
contributing variable. Public opinion is expected to be the most influential variable, but it
has relatively little influence on foreign policy, that is unless and until it catalyzes a lobby
that reaches elite decision makers. Rather, the president has tools at his command to
monitor public sentiment and to lead public opinion and the media. Congress is
especially influential in areas where it can limit the budget, but also when it influences
public opinion, informs the media, and demands reports from the president. In addition
to these domestic factors, the president must consider international variables as well.
U.S. allies proved to be highly influential on U.S. foreign policy during the three crises
examined in this study. Moreover, U.S. membership in the UN was shown to motivate
other countries to take or not to take specific actions, as well as to pressure the United
States to alter the direction o f foreign policy. Thus, this study demonstrates that Clinton
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did fulfill the Clinton Doctrine, to the highest degree possible, according to the opposing
winds o f influence from each o f the five variables examined. These opposing forces
served to moderate, shape, and balance Clinton’s foreign policy by limiting the number
o f acceptable alternatives.
The pitfalls of this holistic approach are that foreign policy is extremely complex
and the variables can and often do interact with one another and therefore they have some
feedback between them. This is seen most clearly in the case o f U.S.-UN interaction, in
which U.S. foreign policy is influenced by UN Security Council decisions that are
themselves heavily dependent on U.S. policies. Moreover, the holistic nature o f this
framework intrinsically omits influences on foreign policy that could prove informative.
For example, individual analysis could be included to address the impact o f personality,
belief systems, analogical and imaging cognition, as well as group dynamics, and rational
choice o f the president’s decisions at the personal level. This framework could also
benefit from the inclusion o f analysis on interest groups and multinational corporations,
as they continue to increase in importance.
This study is important to the field o f international relations, because it examines
foreign policy within a framework o f variables that impact foreign policy on a holistic
level. The applicability o f this framework can be used evaluate other foreign policy
decisions to help analysts predict and understand complex foreign policy outcomes. The
framework in this dissertation is not time sensitive, and can be applied to other crises and
events than those in this study. Additionally, this framework is not context dependent,
because it can be applied across different administrations.
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To demonstrate the applicability o f the analysis in this dissertation, consider
briefly the ongoing deliberations on a possible war against Iraq. Negotiations in the
United Nations are delicate and there is contention that a U.S. intervention in Iraq could
cause future regional complications. To find a way through difficult negotiations, the UN
Security Council must focus on the necessity for inspections for weapons o f mass
destruction. Negotiations are confounded because Russian government is reluctant to
sign onto the intervention against Iraq, because o f the U.S. position against a possible
Russian intervention in Georgia. France hesitates to endorse a single UN resolution,
preferring a double resolution instead. The first resolution might call for adherence to
international inspection for weapons o f mass destruction, with the second mandating
enforcement to automatically come into force with violation o f the first. Interestingly,
both France and Russia agree that inspectors should not enter Iraq without a resolution.
China is hesitant, insisting that in the case a resolution can be passed, the U.S. must abide
by it to the letter.
The U.S. allies are also sending mixed messages to the White House. France
resists U.S. military use o f force in Iraq because o f larger unresolved regional issues.
Considerable German opposition came to light in the summer 2002, when the Chancelor
Schroeder built his campaign against any military intervention in Iraq. This opposition
sparked significant diplomatic tensions between the two countries, as shown by President
Bush’s failure to make the customary congratulatory phone call to Chancelor Schroeder
upon his reelection. Despite such reluctance from two key partners in Europe, the United
Kingdom remained firmly supportive o f the U.S. policy, and has helped build the case for
quick military action. Finally, Israel’s response to an Iraqi missile attack aimed at its
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territory remains unclear, and the impact o f such a response, should it occur, on regional
stability continues to be a central U.S. concern.
After much deliberation, the U.S. Congress passed a bipartisan resolution
approving the use o f military force in Iraq. The vote in the Senate was 77 to 23 in favor
of the resolution, and the House passed the Resolution with a margin o f 296 to 133.12
The final resolution, however, also highlighted the importance o f diplomatic measures
designed to achieve a multilateral approach to the issue. The majority in Congress
reflects public opinion polls that showed a 62 to 67 percent majority o f the American
public in favor o f a military intervention in Iraq, but the figures dropped significantly
when unilateral. Clearly the American public supports this pending intervention.
Our framework shows, therefore, that despite the fact that Europe is disinclined to
support U.S. action in Iraq, it is faced with few choices. Congress and the American
public support the action and the media facilitates the transmission of information
without opposition. This leaves President Bush with “extraordinary flexibility” to
intervene in Iraq.

1Q

In addition, vital interests are at stake in the Middle East for Europe

and the United States as well. Thus, the remaining piece in this framework is that it
would be best for the UN Security Council would adopt a suitable resolution that would
give a likely U.S. military action the multilateral legitimacy sought by the Bush
administration.
In conclusion, this dissertation builds on the existing body o f literature on foreign

12. See “Senate, in 7 7 -3 3 Vote, passes Iraq Resolution,” N ew York Times, 11 October 2 0 0 2 ,1 ; and
“Congress Passes Iraq Resolution: Overwhelming Approval gives Bush Authority to Attack Unilaterally,”
New York Times, 11 October 2 0 0 2 ,1 .
13. Glenn Kessler, “A Muscular First Step: Bush Gains Freedom, Negotiating Power,” The
Washington Post, 11 October 2002, 1.
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policy and intervention, and takes into account international relations theory, highlighting
the importance o f international and domestic forces that shape policy decisions to use
military force abroad. This is an original study that approaches foreign policy and
intervention in a holistic method, encompassing the United Nations, U.S. allies, the U.S.
Congress, public opinion and the media, and U.S. interests. This study shows that these
variables significantly shape the course of foreign policy decisions emanating from the
White House by focusing on small scale, low intensity, and low risk crises, but the
framework suggested in this study could also be useful for examining large scale, high
intensity, and high risk crises.
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